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The Evolution of Family Firms: The Exit of Founding Families and the Survival of Family IPOs 
1. Introduction 
Firms controlled by founders or founding families constitute a significant proportion of the U.S. 
public firms.
1
  Scholars propose that family presence can bring both benefits and costs to the firm 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Bertrand and Schoar, 2006).  On the one hand, family control can be 
efficient since concentrated family ownership, family managers’ and directors’ firm-specific knowledge, 
the family’s long-term horizon, and a familial attachment to the firm help reduce the owner-manager 
agency costs.  On the other hand, family control can be costly to nonfamily shareholders when the family 
extracts private benefits of control, at the expense of firm value that accrues to nonfamily shareholders. 
Studies based on pooled cross-sectional U.S. samples find that firms with founder or family 
presence have higher value than other firms, which suggests that in the aggregate, the benefits of lowered 
owner-manager agency conflicts outweigh the costs of a family’s potential expropriation of private 
benefits (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006, Adams et al., 2009, Fahlenbrach, 2009).  
Some evidence suggests that the higher value associated with family presence only exits in the first 
generation (Villalonga and Amit, 2006), in firms with a lone founder and no other family members 
(Miller et al., 2007), or in large and transparent firms (Anderson et al., 2009).  In these samples, family 
presence ranges from 33% to 55% and founder CEO presence ranges from 8% to 28%.  If the benefits of 
family control outweigh the costs, one would expect families to rationally seek to maintain control.  
Although it is possible that market frictions, e.g., limited access to capital, create scenarios in which 
families forgo the presumed superior benefits of control, it is equally plausible that families choose to exit 
the firms because the benefits of family control do not outweigh the costs.  Therefore, the fact that family 
                                                          
1
 Anderson and Reeb (2003) document family presence in one-third of the S&P 500 firms between 1992 and 1999.  
Villalonga and Amit (2006) find family presence in 40% of the Fortune 500 firms between 1994 and 2000.  
Anderson et al. (2009) document family presence in 48% of the largest 2,000 U.S. firms between 2001 and 2003.  
Villalonga and Amit (2010) find family presence in 55% of a random sample of 2,110 U.S. firms in 2000.  For 
evidence on family ownership and control of public firms around the world, see La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et 
al. (2000), and Faccio and Lang (2002). 
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or founder presence is not observed in all firms suggests that families act in their rational self-interest in 
choosing to maintain or give up control. 
Scholars have made significant progress in helping us understand the influence of family 
presence on the firm, but the empirical studies still face two challenges.  The first challenge is the 
selection issues in cross-sectional samples that may limit our ability to generalize the inferences regarding 
the net influence of family control.  For instance, many startup firms do not survive long enough or grow 
large enough to be included in samples based on major indices (e.g., S&P 500), which creates a 
survivorship and sample selection bias.  In addition, founders and families can choose to sell their shares 
and leave the firms if family control is inefficient and results in lower firm value, which creates a self-
selection bias.  The second challenge is the empirical definition of family firms that captures our 
conceptual understanding of family firms.  Conceptually, the term “family firm” refers to a firm in which 
the founding family bears a strong commitment, maintains active involvement, fosters and protects family 
members’ interests, and plans for the long term.  Since these conceptual family traits cannot be measured 
directly, researchers empirically classify family firms based on observable family characteristics.  For 
instance, Villalonga and Amit (2006) define family firms as those in which the founder or any family 
member is an officer, director, blockholder, or the aggregate family ownership is 5% or higher.   
To alleviate the survivorship and self-selection concerns and gain more insight into the influence 
of family characteristics on the firm, I use a sample of 604 IPO firms to study the evolution of these firms 
from the IPO to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted from the stock exchange.  The 604 IPO firms 
come from three cohort years: 310 firms go public in 1993, 254 firms go public in 1997, and 40 firms go 
public in 2001.  I use the time-series data to study family control horizons, family firm evolution 
outcomes, and the influence of family control on firm performance.  First, I examine how ex ante family 
characteristics at the IPO affect the family’s duration of presence (i.e., control horizon) in the public firm.  
Second, I examine how family characteristics in year t affect the firm’s evolution outcomes in year t+1 
and year t+2, i.e., remains as a public family firm, goes back private, becomes a public nonfamily firm, 
3 
 
merges into another firm and gets delisted from the stock exchange, or fails to meet listing requirements 
and gets delisted from the stock exchange.  Third, I examine the influence of family control on firm 
performance and firm’s investment policies.   
To better capture the conceptual essence of family firms and understand the role of family, I use 
several family characteristics to measure the involvement of founder and the involvement of founder’s 
extended family in the firm (Becker, 1981; Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Burkart et al., 2003).  I measure 
founder involvement by an indicator for founder serving as the CEO, an indicator for founder serving as 
the Chairperson, and founder’s stock ownership.  I measure extended family involvement by the number 
of nonfounder family executives, the number of nonfounder family directors, the nonfounder family 
member’s total stock ownership, and an indicator for having family descendants in the firm.  In addition, I 
measure private benefits of control that are unique to the family by an indicator for including a family 
member’s name in the firm name (Gompers et al., 2010) and the difference between family voting rights 
and cash flow rights (Villalonga and Amit 2009). 
In my analysis, I first follow Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) to 
identify family firms if the founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, executive, manager 
disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at least 5%.  
Among the 604 IPOs, 510 (84%) are classified as family firms and 94 (16%) are nonfamily firms.  The 
data suggest the potential for both survivorship biases and self-selection biases in cross-sectional samples.  
Illustrating the survivorship issue, I find that only 36% of the sample IPOs survive 10 years after the IPO.  
For the 1993 IPO cohort that has the longest time series, only 20% of the firms survive 18 years until 
2011.  The percentage of family firms decreases from 84% at the IPO to 66% 10 years after the IPO.  For 
the 1993 IPO cohort, the percentage of family firms decreases from 83% at the IPO to 51% at the end of 
2011.  Illustrating the self-selection issue, 123 (24%) of the 510 family IPOs experience family exit and 
become public nonfamily firms, 157 (31%) merge into other firms and are delisted from the stock 
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exchange, 132 (26%) fail to meet the listing requirements and are delisted from the stock exchange, and 
24 (5%) go private.  Only 74 (14%) of the family IPOs remain as public family firms at the end of 2011.  
Next, I examine how ex ante family characteristics that conform to our conceptual understanding 
of family firms affect the evolution of IPO firms.  Families remain present in the public firms for a longer 
time when family characteristics at the IPO suggest greater ex ante founder involvement and extended 
family involvement in the firm.  For instance, conditional on the family having maintained presence in the 
public firm to a particular year, a 10% increase in founder ownership at the IPO reduces the probability of 
family ending its control by 10%.  Having a founder CEO at the IPO reduces the probability of family 
exit by 26%.  A 10% increase in nonfounder family members’ ownership at the IPO reduces the 
probability of family exit by 10%.  In contrast, I find evidence that families’ excessive voting rights 
increase the probability of family exit and imply a shorter horizon of family presence.  For instance, a 
10% wedge between family voting rights and cash flow rights increases the probability of family exit by 
20%.  It is likely that when a family uses superior voting rights to protect its private benefits of control, 
the excessive expropriation of such private benefits leads to poor firm performance, which increases the 
likelihood of family exit.   
After going public, families are less likely to exit the firms when family characteristics suggest 
greater founder involvement and extended family involvement in the firm.  For instance, a 10% increase 
in founder ownership in a certain year reduces the probability of family ending its control in the next year 
by 30%.  A 10% increase in nonfounder family members’ ownership reduces the probability of family 
exit by 20%.  Taken together, these results suggest that the self-selection issue among family firms at the 
initial stage as public firms is substantial.  Since family firms with weaker family involvement are more 
likely to be merged and delisted from the stock exchange, they would not be included in samples of larger 
and older firms.  Therefore, the survivorship issue is also likely to be substantial in studies using larger 
and older firms.   
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To compare my results of families’ influence on firm performance with studies based on larger 
and older firms, I follow the test specifications of Villalonga and Amit (2006), which use Fortune 500 
firms, and Anderson and Reeb (2003), which use S&P 500 firms.  Based on my sample that includes each 
firm until it is delisted from the stock exchange, I do not find evidence for the value-increasing influence 
of family characteristics.  Instead, I find that family’s excess voting rights and family descendant CEOs 
have negative impact on firm value, which confirms the value-decreasing effects of these family 
characteristics documented by Villalonga and Amit (2006).  After I control for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity by using firm fixed effects, I find that family ownership has a negative impact on firm value 
but a positive impact on accounting performance in the sample of family firms.  The contrasting effects 
indicate that although families seek to maintain long control horizons, they do not necessarily maintain 
the long-term perspective to increase value, and they seem to focus instead on short-term profitability.  
I also conduct subsample tests to gain additional insight into the influence of family control on 
firm performance.  In the subsample of firms that change status from family firms to nonfamily firms, I 
find evidence that firm value increases but accounting profitability decreases two to three years after 
family exit.  The results support the findings of fixed effects tests and again cast doubt on the value-
increasing role of families.  In the subsample of family firm mergers, the combined wealth effect created 
in the transaction is unrelated to family characteristics.  The overall market reaction suggests that the 
expected firm performance of the combined entity after the merger is not affected by the pre-merger 
family characteristics.  Therefore, the family appears to adjust its involvement in the firm and make exit 
decision as a rational response to the firm’s state of evolution.  On firms’ investment decisions, I find that 
family firms tend to make more investment in capital expenditures relative to R&D expenditures, which 
suggests that the lack of risk taking likely contributes to the absence of higher firm value and reflects the 
pursuit of accounting performance. 
Since the variables of family characteristics exhibit high correlations between each other, putting 
multiple family variables together in the tests incurs the problem of multicollinearity, which can result in 
6 
 
loss of significance and incorrect coefficient sign.  To address this concern, I use principal component 
analysis (PCA) to generate factors that extract the underlying family attributes.  I obtain three factors 
from the analysis.  The first factor loads heavily on the variables of extended family involvement, the 
second factor loads heavily on the variables of founder involvement, and the third factor loads heavily on 
family firm name and family ownership wedge.  The factors are stable over time: both the variance 
explained by the factors and the pattern of factor loadings measured at the IPO are comparable to those 
measured on all the family firm-years.  The results of the PCA are stronger empirically and they further 
support my inferences obtained from the individual family characteristics. 
By following cohorts of IPO firms and including each firm until it is delisted from the stock 
exchange, my study largely avoids the survivorship and selection issues in cross-sectional samples.  The 
findings that founders and families actively make exit decisions help us better understand why family or 
founder presence is not dominant in public firms.  The self-selection of families suggests that over time, 
the surviving nonfamily firms increasingly represent former family firms that experienced inefficient 
family control.  Therefore, the value differences between family firms and nonfamily firms in cross-
sectional comparisons are likely to be conditional on families’ exit decisions early in firms’ evolution 
process.  If the sample consists of seasoned and older firms that have passed the stage of families’ self-
selection, it is important to realize that at least some nonperforming families have exited and are not 
observed.  Hence there are limitations in interpreting and generalizing the influence of family control 
obtained from cross-sectional comparisons.  Researchers should consider cohort effects and firms’ 
evolution stages in such conditional comparisons of family firms and nonfamily firms. 
My sample still incurs survivorship biases related to family firms that fail prior to going public 
and self-selection issues that arise from families that choose to remain private or go public. These 
decisions are not observable in a sample of firms that go public. Thus, the reader should take care in 
extending the inferences drawn from these results to private family firms.  However, the sample selection 
procedure used in this study provides a more unbiased view of the relations between family control, firm 
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value, and firm policies than can be obtained from cross-sectional samples of seasoned firms that are 
included in indices based on firm size or stock performance. 
My study also sheds additional light on the role of family in a firm.  Bertrand and Schoar (2006) 
suggest that different family structures can alter the strategic choices and the eventual performance of the 
firm.  Bertrand et al. (2008) examine a group of family businesses in Thailand and find that family 
structure affects the organization, governance, and performance of the business groups.  My analysis 
suggests that ex ante family attributes of newly public firms influence firms’ evolution outcomes.  
Villalonga and Amit (2010) examine family control in a large cross-sectional sample of U.S. firms and 
indicate that family control gives the firm a competitive advantage.  My analysis provides evidence that 
family control of public firms is an evolving equilibrium that represents rational choices of families 
throughout the evolution process since the IPO. 
The results of my study also provide additional insight into the different life stages of IPO firms.  
Kaplan et al. (2009) use a sample of 50 venture capital financed firms to study the early-stage evolution 
of firms from business plans to approximately three years after the IPO.  My study extends Kaplan et al. 
by tracing firms from the IPO for over a decade and by examining the dynamics between family 
characteristics and evolution outcomes.  Klasa (2007) examines the reasons why family blockholders sell 
their ownership in a sample of 84 family firms in which the Chairman is a family member and the family 
controls at least a 20% ownership stake.  He explains the sale of family ownership by firm characteristics 
such as size, profitability, operational complexity, outside block ownership, and family’s CEO succession 
planning.  My study identifies founder and extended family involvement as important determinants of 
family control termination.   
My dissertation proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses the conceptual background, the 
framework for analysis, and the research questions. Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 presents the 
survival analysis of family control horizons.  Section 5 presents the analysis of family firm evolution 
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outcomes.  Section 6 presents the analysis of family control, firm performance, and investment decisions.  
Section 7 concludes. 
2. Conceptual background, framework for analysis, and research questions 
2.1. The potential benefits of family control 
Compared to nonfamily firms, family firms have distinct features associated with family 
presence, which bring potential benefits and costs to the firm.  The overall family influence on the firm 
depends on the aggregate net benefits or costs of family control.  In this section, I discuss four features of 
family presence and relatedly the potential benefits.  I discuss the potential costs of family control in 
Section 2.2. 
First, founding families often hold concentrated ownership and designate family members as 
executives and directors of the firm.  Incentive alignment motivates family members to exert more effort.  
Second, family members possess firm-specific knowledge from their long-term relationship with the firm.  
Such private information can cultivate firm-specific human capital and enhance monitoring and advising.  
Third, family shareholders are different from other blockholders such as institutions, because family 
shareholders have a psychological attachment to the firm.  Such emotional ties should promote family 
members to focus on the long-term growth of the firm instead of short-term returns.  Fourth, family 
altruism can motivate family members to improve firm performance, because a family member’s utility 
depends positively on other members’ utility (Becker, 1981).  Along with greater family involvement in 
the firm, incentive alignment and better monitoring reduce the owner-manager agency conflicts (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976).  Ceteris paribus, lower agency costs lead to better performance and increase the 
pecuniary benefits of the family.   
2.2. The potential costs of family control 
The distinct features associated with family presence also bring potential costs to the firm.  First, 
family executives and directors can be entrenched with their concentrated ownership and hence exclude 
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more competent nonfamily individuals from the top management.  Second, family members’ private 
information can give them an advantage if they seek profits at the expense of other nonfamily 
shareholders.  Third, family shareholders’ concentrated ownership may be less diversified than 
institutional blockholders.  Ownership under-diversification can induce greater risk aversion and cause 
inefficient investment decisions (Anderson, Duru, and Reeb, 2012).  Fourth, family ties can create family 
infighting for resources, which negatively influences firm performance (Bertrand et al., 2008).  Besides 
the pecuniary benefits, a family can utilize its control advantage and information advantage to expropriate 
nonpecuniary private benefits that are exclusive to the family.  Such expropriation can be costly to 
nonfamily shareholders and induce the majority-minority shareholder agency conflicts (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997).   
2.3. Framework for analysis 
Since families derive both pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits from their control of the firm, 
family characteristics should affect the firm’s evolution process.  Specifically, family involvement 
through stock ownership, management positions, and board seats reveals the family’s intention to stay in 
or exit the firm.  In addition, the firm’s survival and performance should depend on the costs and benefits 
associated with family presence.  The reduced owner-manager agency costs help achieve better 
performance and longer survival, whereas the increased majority-minority shareholder agency costs 
should have the opposite effect.  Further, since families derive nonpecuniary private benefits of control, 
they might refuse to give up control even when firm performance is declining.  Therefore, families’ self-
selection likely plays an important role in the relation between family control and firm performance. 
I build my framework for analysis based on the evolution outcomes of IPO firms.  The time to the 
realization of an evolution outcome (e.g., change of status from a public family firm to a public nonfamily 
firm) determines the family’s duration of presence (i.e., control horizon) in the public firm.  The 
differentiation between evolution outcomes (e.g., family exit through going private vs. family firm 
privatization) determines the family’s way of changing its control.  Since the time-series dataset includes 
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each firm until it is delisted from the public market, I can test the general impact of family presence or 
certain family characteristics on the firm throughout the its initial stage as a public firm.  In addition, the 
subsamples of firms under particular evolution outcomes help me gain additional insight into the impact 
of family on the firm.  For instance, the subsample of firms that transform from public family firms to 
public nonfamily firms allows me to examine the impact of family departure on the firm.  The subsample 
of family firm mergers allows me to examine market reaction to the discontinuation of certain family 
characteristics.   
Each year, the family chooses whether to retain control of the firm.  Meanwhile, the public firm 
faces the uncertainty of surviving as an independent entity or being delisted from the stock exchange, 
either for going private, merging into another firm, or failing to meet the listing requirements.  When we 
consider the family’s control retention decision and the firm’s survival status, we see five possible 
evolution outcomes of a family IPO: 1) the firm remains as a public family firm until the end of the 
sample period, 2) the family exits the firm and the firm becomes a public nonfamily firm, 3) the family 
firm fails and the stock exchange delists the firm, 4) the family exits the firm when the firm merges into 
another firm or goes private, and 5) the family firm goes private as a family firm.  In the first scenario, the 
family never exits the firm and the firm survives the whole sample period.  In the second scenario, the 
family exits the firm and the firm either survives as a nonfamily firm until the end of the sample period or 
gets delisted sometime after family departure.  In the third scenario, the family never exits the firm but the 
firm fails in the public market.  In the fourth scenario, the family exits the firm and the firm is merged or 
goes private and no longer survives as an independent entity.  In the last scenario, the family never exits 
the firm and takes the firm private sometime after the IPO. 
2.4. Family characteristics 
I use observable family characteristics to measure the influence of family involvement.  Since the 
literature on family firms documents the special role played by founders (e.g., Adams et al., 2009; 
Fahlenbrach, 2009; Li and Srinivasan, 2011), I separate the influence of the founder and the influence of 
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the founder’s family members (i.e., parents, spouse, siblings, children, etc.).  I use three proxies for 
founder involvement: an indicator for founder serving as the CEO, an indicator for founder serving as the 
Chairperson, and founder’s cash flow rights.  I use four proxies for extended family involvement: the 
number of nonfounder family executives (CEO, President, Vice President, and other chief officers), the 
number of nonfounder family directors, the nonfounder family member’s total cash flow rights, and an 
indicator for having family descendants in the firm.   
In addition to the information of the founding family, I also use two variables to measure private 
benefits of control that are unique to only the family.  The first proxy is an indicator of family firm name, 
which equals one if the firm’s name includes any family member’s name.  Burkart et al. (2003) suggest 
that a founder can derive utility from having the family name in the firm’s name.  Gompers et al. (2010) 
suggest that naming a firm after the founder indicates a high value of private benefits of control, as the 
firm’s name represents a personal stake in the business.  Therefore, the name variable can represent the 
family’s greater effort to protect family business reputation on the hand and unwillingness to introduce 
nonfamily outsiders to the top management on the other hand.  The second proxy is family ownership 
wedge, which equals the difference between family voting rights and cash flow rights.  Villalonga and 
Amit (2006, 2009) find that families use dual class stock as a control-enhancing mechanism.  Gompers et 
al. (2010) suggest that insiders with greater private benefits are more likely to set up a dual class stock 
structure.  Therefore, a larger ownership wedge indicates greater potential of the family’s expropriation of 
private benefits of control at the expense of nonfamily shareholders. 
2.5. Research questions and empirical design 
2.5.1. Do family characteristics predict family control horizons? 
In Section 4, I use observable family characteristics at the IPO to predict family control horizons.  
On the one hand, greater family involvement in the firm at the IPO indicates greater potential for the 





  Therefore, I expect the family that exhibits stronger involvement in the firm at the IPO to 
seek to maintain a longer control horizon after the IPO.  On the other hand, the costs from the majority-
minority shareholder agency conflicts potentially cause family control to be inefficient and bring it to a 
quicker end.  Therefore, even if the family has a strong intention to maintain control, the realized control 
horizon might be short when the private benefits of control are consumed with high agency costs on the 
firm.  In general, the relation between family involvement and control horizon depends on the pecuniary 
and nonpecuniary benefits derived by the family and the agency costs associated with family control.  
Similarly, the variable of family firm name can predict a longer horizon if family members work harder to 
enhance the family business image or a shorter horizon if inept family managers crowd out competent 
nonfamily managers.  The variable of family ownership wedge, however, is likely to cause a shorter 
horizon since it is documented as a costly and value-decreasing control mechanism (Villalonga and Amit, 
2006, 2009). 
Since the family characteristics no longer exist when families cease control, using 
contemporaneous family characteristics will create a misleading mechanical relation in the empirical 
tests.  Therefore, I use ex ante family characteristics at the IPO to test their influence on the duration of 
family control of the firm.  I use Cox Proportional hazards models to estimate the hazard ratio of family 
ending its control at time t conditional on the family having maintained its control until time t.  I measure 
control horizon as the number of months between family IPO and the firm’s last sample observation as 
family firm.  The events of family ending its control include 1) when the family exits the firm and the 
firm becomes a public nonfamily firm, and 2) when the family exits the firm through merger or going-
private transaction. 
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 A family can use the IPO as an exit strategy and sells its ownership both at the IPO and after the lockup period.  
With this intention, the family should exhibit weaker involvement in the firm when the firm goes public. 
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2.5.2. Do family characteristics predict family firm evolution outcomes? 
In Section 5, I use observable family characteristics in year t to predict various family firm 
evolution outcomes in year t+1 and year t+2.  Specifically, after a family firm goes public, I examine the 
probability of family exit and family firm failure relative to the probability of family maintaining control 
of the firm.  The firm’s evolution outcome should be consistent with the family’s control horizon.  If 
greater family involvement creates more utility for the family and leads to a longer control horizon, I 
expect the probability family maintaining control of the firm to be higher than the other outcomes.  On the 
contrary, if greater family involvement creates higher agency costs and leads to a shorter horizon of 
inefficient family control, I expect the probability of family maintaining control of the firm to be lower 
than the other outcomes. 
I construct different categories of evolution outcomes discussed in Section 2.3.  First, I use 
conditional logistic regressions with industry fixed effects to test whether the binary outcome of family 
firm failure is affected by family characteristics.  Second, I use conditional logistic regressions to test 
whether the binary outcome of family exit is affected by family characteristics.  The outcome of family 
exit happens when 1) the family exits the firm and the firm becomes a public nonfamily firm, or 2) the 
family exits the firm when the firm merges into another firm or goes private.  Third, I jointly test both the 
outcome of family exit and the outcome of family firm failure in multinomial logistic regressions.  Last, I 
jointly test the outcomes of family firm privatization, family exit, and family firm failure.   
2.5.3. Do family characteristics influence firm performance? 
In Section 6, I investigate the influence of family characteristics on firm performance.  Extant 
studies document better firm performance when family ownership is higher and when the founder serves 
as the CEO in Fortune 500 firms (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and S&P 500 firms (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003).  In addition, Anderson and Reeb (2003) also find that family ownership and family CEOs have a 
positive influence on accounting performance.  Since these studies use samples of seasoned and 
established firms over a relatively short time span, they do not consider firms that are not selected into the 
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indices or family characteristics before the firms change from family firms to nonfamily firms.  Therefore, 
survivorship and selection issues likely play a role in the comparisons of firm performance between 
family firms and nonfamily firms.   
By tracing each sample firm over time from the IPO, I am able to examine the influence of family 
presence and family characteristics on the firm in a more comprehensive manner.  For instance, if the 
family exits the firm because of inefficient and costly family control, I can observe the negative influence 
of the family before it exits.  In comparison, this negative influence would not be observed in cross-
sectional samples that only include the firm when it already evolves into a nonfamily firm.  Since the 
family derives both pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits from its control, the decision to stay in or exit 
the firm should represent the family’s rational choice that maximizes its total benefits.  Therefore, I do not 
expect family presence or family characteristics to cause better firm performance.  I follow the extant 
studies and use OLS regressions to test family influence in the whole panel data.  In addition, I use firm 
fixed effects regressions to control for unobservable firm heterogeneity as well as subsample tests to gain 
additional insight into family influence. 
3. Data 
3.1. Sample of IPOs 
My sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 
firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm 
is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  In total, the sample includes 604 IPO firms and 5,827 firm-
year observations.  I choose the three cohort years for several reasons.  First, the three years largely avoid 
special macro-economic conditions, such as the market crash in the late 1980s, the recession in the early 
1990s, and the dot-com boom in the late 1990s.
3
  Second, the average industry distribution of the three 
years’ IPOs does not show special clustering and the distribution is comparable to the average industry 
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distribution of all IPOs between 1980 and 2010.  The average first-day return of the three years’ IPOs is 
11.5%, which compares to the average 13% first-day return of all IPOs between 1980 and 2010.
4
  Third, 
the access to SEC filings allows me to compile the ownership and management data for empirical tests.  
To construct the dataset, I obtain a sample of all IPOs in 1993, 1997, and 2001 from Thomson 
SDC Platinum’s Global New Issues database.  From this sample, I exclude spinoffs, carve-outs, foreign 
issuers, partnerships, trusts, unit offerings, savings and loans, financial and utility firms (primary SIC 
Codes 6000 – 6999 and 4900 – 4999), and IPOs with an offer price less than five dollars or proceeds less 
than five millions.  Next, I exclude firms that were public earlier in their history and rollup IPOs.
5
  I also 
require that the sample firms have Compustat data after the offering and are listed on CRSP within three 
months of the offering.   
3.2. Identification of family firms and family data collection 
As a baseline definition, I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family 
ownership of outstanding equity is at least 5%.  This broad definition follows previous studies (e.g., 
Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and identifies the largest possible number of firms 
with founder and family presence.  I rely on IPO prospectuses to identify founders and their families.  A 
prospectus normally contains a History Section, a Business Section, and a Management Section.  These 
sections provide information on the founder(s) and disclose family relationship(s) between the managers 
and directors of the firm.  If founder information is unavailable in the prospectus (e.g., possibly all family 
members are in the second or later generation), I search online for the history of the firm to add family 
information or to confirm the nonfamily status of the firm when it goes public.   
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 The data are from Jay Ritter’s IPO data website: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm.  
5
 Ritter (2014) states that “Rollup IPOs are defined as IPOs in which the company has made significant acquisitions 
in the recent past and states an intention of using acquisitions as a major source of growth in the future. Frequently 
the prospectus states that the company was recently created from the merger of several companies in the same 
industry. Frequently the prospectus states that part of the company’s strategy is to consolidate a fragmented industry.”  
The list of rollup IPOs is from Jay Ritter’s IPO data website: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm.  
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In the identification stage, I follow Villalonga and Amit (2006) to identify founders as individuals 
who play an important role in transforming and developing the businesses, even though they did not 
directly start the businesses.  These indirect founders usually take control of the predecessor businesses at 
an early stage and oversee the growth of the businesses.
6
  For instance, Central Garden & Pet was 
incorporated in California in 1955 as Central Garden Supply.  William E. Brown purchased the company 
in 1980, became its Chairman and CEO, and led the fast growth of the company in the late 1980s.  He is 




In addition, when there are co-founding families, I use information of the majority family that has 
the highest aggregate family ownership or controls the most director and management positions in the 
case of equal ownership.  For example, Urban Outfitters was founded in 1970 by Richard Hayne and 
Scott Belair. When the firm went public, Richard Hayne’s ownership was 51% and Scott Belair’s 
ownership was 8%.  Throughout the post-IPO years, the Hayne family always has higher ownership.  
Therefore, I consider the Hayne family as the majority family.   
Among the 604 IPOs, 510 firms (84%) are classified as family firms at the time of IPO.  The 
other 94 firms (16%) are classified as nonfamily firms.  In the group of nonfamily IPOs, most firms 
experienced founder or family exit at some point early in the firm’s history.  For instance, Gymboree was 
founded in 1976 by Joan Barnes when she started her first commercial children's workout center.  Joan 
Barnes exited the firm in the late 1980s and the firm became a nonfamily firm.  The rest of the nonfamily 
IPOs are not founded by individuals.  For instance, Illinois Superconductor was founded by ARCH 
Development Corporation, a not-for-profit corporation whose sole member is The University of Chicago.  
For each family IPO, I collect data on family characteristics at the IPO from the prospectus and 
from the proxy statement or annual report in each post-IPO year.  I do this until the family exits the firm 
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or the family firm is delisted from the public market and exits the sample.  In the data collection stage, I 
also use various sources such as corporate websites and news reports obtained from online searches to 
confirm family relationships.  For each family member disclosed in the SEC filings, I record the 
individual’s ownership, employment (director, executive, or other types of employee), relationship with 
the founder(s), and family generation.  I aggregate all family members’ information to obtain total family 
ownership, management positions, and board directorships.  If the family sets up estate planning vehicles, 
such as family trusts and estates, I also record these entities’ ownership information.  Sometimes the same 
family trust’s holdings are reported more than once under multiple family members’ holdings.  I remove 
these duplicated holdings in calculating total family ownership to ensure the accuracy of total family 
ownership.  
3.3. Variables 
I collect family data and the data on stock structure and blockholders from corporate SEC filings 
and various online sources such as corporate websites and news reports.  I obtain accounting and financial 
data from Compustat, stock return and delisting data from CRSP, and data on firms’ founding dates from 
Jay Ritter’s IPO data website.  To reduce the influence of extreme values, I winsorize all continuous 
variables at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  Appendix A provides a summary of data sources and variable 
definitions. 
Firms founded by more than one family are common in my sample.  Approximately 37% of the 
family firms at the IPO have co-founding families.  Although I focus on the majority family, it is likely 
that co-founding families also exert influence on the majority family’s evolution and exit decision.  To 
control for the influence of co-founding families, I include their voting rights in the tests.  For sensitivity 
analysis, I provide the main test results based on the number of founding families at the IPO in Appendix 
B, Section IV (Table B-14). 
In addition, nonfamily blockholders can also affect corporate policies and events.  Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) suggest that large shareholders can play an active role in monitoring the management and 
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facilitating takeovers.  I measure the influence of nonfamily blockholders by their aggregate voting rights.  
Further, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) provide evidence that large shareholders affect corporate 
policies and firm performance, and the effects differ with certain blockholder characteristics.  The authors 
find that blockholders with larger holdings, board representation, management involvement, or with a 
single decision maker have larger effects.  Therefore, I divide nonfamily blockholders into active 




I measure firm performance by Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA).  I define Tobin’s Q as the 
ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets.  The market value is the sum of book value of 
assets and market value of common stock minus the sum of book value of common stock and deferred 
taxes.  I define ROA as the ratio of Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 
(EBITDA) to total assets.   
I measure firm risk by stock return volatility and cash flow volatility.  Annual stock return 
volatility is the standard deviation of daily CRSP stock returns in a given calendar year multiplied by the 
square root of 252.  Systematic risk is the beta coefficient estimated from the market model (CAPM), in 
which the firm’s daily returns are regressed on the value-weighted market returns.  Idiosyncratic risk is 
the standard deviation of the residuals estimated from the market model. To reduce noise, I require at 
least 24 daily observations to compute the risk measures. Cash flow volatility is the standard deviation of 
quarterly EBITDA over assets for a five-year window between year t and year t+4.  I require at least a 
three-year window (12 quarterly observations) to compute this variable. 
I measure organizational complexity by the number of business and operating segments that 
account for at least 10% of firm’s total sales.  Following Boone et al. (2007) and Coles et al. (2008), I 
measure the importance of firm-specific knowledge by R&D intensity and the industry median market-to-
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 For the evidence on the different effects of family ownership, nonfamily active block ownership, and nonfamily 
passive block ownership on top management compensation, see Li, Ryan, and Wang (2012). 
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book ratio of equity value.
9
  I calculate R&D intensity as the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets.  If 
a firm does not report R&D expenditures in a certain year, I set the missing value to zero.  To obtain 
industry median market-to-book ratio, I use Fama-French 17 Industry Definitions and match each sample 
firm to a Fama-French industry by the four-digit SIC Code.   
In addition to R&D intensity, I also measure investment policy on physical assets by capital 
expenditure (CAPEX) intensity, which is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets.  I measure 
operating costs by the ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A) to total assets.  
Financial leverage is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities to total assets.  
Cash holdings is calculated as the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets.  Dividend 
payout based on EBITDA is calculated as the product of ex-date dividends per share and the number of 
shares outstanding divided by EBITDA.  I use a dummy variable to indicate dual class stock structure. 
I measure firm age as total book assets and firm age as the number of years since the firm’s 
founding.  To reduce skewness of the distribution, I use the natural logarithm of one plus firm size and 
firm age.  I use a dummy variable to indicate if the firm is in an industry with high private benefits of 
control.  The variable equals one for firms in two-digit SIC Codes 13 (Oil & Gas Extraction), 27 (Printing 
& Publishing), 28 (Chemical & Allied Products), 29 (Petroleum & Coal Products), 37 (Transportation 
Equipment), 48 (Communications), 78 (Motion Pictures), 79 (Amusement & Recreation Services), and 
zero otherwise.  Industries 13, 28, 29, 37 are identified as having high private benefits of control by Bayar 
and Chemmanur (2012).  Industries 27, 48, 78, and 79 represent media and sports industries, which are 
classified as having high private benefits of control by Gompers et al. (2010) and Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985). 
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 R&D intensity also represents the firm’s investment policy on R&D spending. 
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3.4. Evolution of sample firms 
3.4.1. Time-series changes of sample firms 
Exhibit 1 presents the time-series changes of sample firms by IPO cohort year.  I keep each firm 
in my sample from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in 
CRSP.  In each graph, the horizontal axis denotes time, which starts from the IPO year and ends in 2011.  
The left vertical axis denotes the number of firms and the right vertical axis denotes the percentage of 
family firms or surviving firms.  The upper gray bars represent the number of nonfamily firms and the 
lower colored bars represent the number of family firms.  The dotted line represents the percentage of 
surviving firms and the solid line represents the percentage of family firms.  Over time, the sample size 
decreases as firms leave the sample and the percentage of family firms in the sample also decreases.   
[Insert Exhibit 1 about here.] 
For the 1993 IPO cohort (Exhibit 1.A), the number of firms decreases from 310 at the IPO to 123 
in 2003, 10 years after the IPO, and further decreases to 63 in 2011, 18 years after the IPO.  The survival 
rate is 40% in 2003 and 20% in 2011.  The percentage of family firms decreases from 83% to 67% in 
2003 and then to 51% in 2011.  The time-series changes of the 1997 cohort (Exhibit 1.B) show similar 
pattern to the 1993 cohort, though over a shorter time span.  The number of firms decreases from 254 at 
the IPO to 77 in 2007, 10 years after the IPO, and further decreases to 55 in 2011, 14 years after the IPO.  
The survival rate is 30% in 2007 and 22% in 2011.  The percentage of family firms decreases from 87% 
to 70% in 2007 and then to 64% in 2011.  The 2001 cohort (Exhibit 1.C) differs from the 1993 and 1997 
cohorts.  Out of the 40 IPOs in 2001, 48% (19 firms) survive until 2011, 10 years after the IPO, but the 
percentage of family firms decreases from 75% at the IPO to only 37% in 2011.  It is likely that these 
more recent IPOs after the fast high-tech development differ from the firms that go public earlier.  The 
2001 cohort might conform less to our understanding of traditional family firms and have weaker family 
control intention from the other two cohorts.  I explore these differences in Section 3.5. 
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Exhibit 2 presents the survival of family firms by IPO cohort year.  Exhibit 2.A describes the 
number of remaining family firms each year.  All three cohorts show a similar decreasing trend, though 
the 2001 cohort has a smaller percentage of family firms at the IPO.  To better compare the survival rate 
of the three cohorts, I plot the respective percentage of surviving family firms since the IPO in Exhibit 
2.B.  I also mark the year 2000, when the dot-com bubble burst, and the year 2008, when the financial 
crisis peaked, on the timeline of each cohort.  The 1993 cohort almost always has the highest survival rate.  
The 1997 cohort and the 2001 cohort have close survival rates that show a converging trend.  This graph 
relieves the concern that the survival of family firms is unique to a particular cohort.   
[Insert Exhibit 2 about here.] 
3.4.2. Evolution outcomes of sample firms 
Exhibit 3 presents the evolution outcomes of sample firms.  I consider the three IPO cohorts 
together.  The numbered blue blocks represent the five possible outcomes of a family IPO.  First, the 
family IPO can remain as a public family until the end of the sample period.  Among the 510 family IPOs, 
74 (14.5%) are in this group.  Second, the family can exit the firm and the firm becomes a public 
nonfamily firm.  This group has 123 firms (24.1% of the family IPOs).  Third, the family IPO can be 
delisted as a family firm from the stock exchange for failing to meet the listing requirements.  This group 
has 132 firms (25.9% of the family IPOs).  Fourth, when the family firm is delisted for merger, the family 
can exit at the merger by leaving the management and selling the shares.  This group has 157 firms (30.8% 
of the family IPOs).
10
  Last, the family firm can go private as a family firm.  This group has 24 firms (4.7% 
of the family IPOs). 
[Insert Exhibit 3 about here.] 
The orange gridded blocks represent a middle stage of a family IPO’s evolution process: merger.  
The firm is delisted from the stock exchange after the merger, but the family can either stay in the 
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 If a family firm is merged into another family firm and the original family becomes the minority family in the 
surviving entity after the merger, I treat it as family exit.  Although the original family might retain some ownership 
or occupy a board seat, the partial exit normally precedes a complete exit in a few years after the merger. 
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combined entity after the merger or exit at the merger.  I investigate the details of the 188 family firm 
mergers to identify if the family ends its control through the merger.  The majority of the mergers 
represent family exit (the fourth evolution outcome discussed above).  The other mergers represent 
continued family control, either through going-private transactions (the last evolution outcome discussed 
above) or through transferring family control to the surviving entity after the merger (11 firms).  Among 
the 11 firms with transferred family control, one goes private as family firm, seven become public 
nonfamily firms, two are merged again with family exit, and one is merged with the family becoming the 
minority family (partial exit). 
Among the 94 nonfamily IPOs, 17 (18.1%) remain as public nonfamily firms until the end of the 
sample period.  A Chi-square test shows that the 18.1% survival rate does not differ statistically from the 
14.5% survival rate of public family firms (p-value equals 0.37).  Thirty-one nonfamily IPOs are delisted 
from the stock exchange for failing to meet the listing requirements.  The 33% failure rate does not differ 
statistically from the 25.9% failure rate of family IPOs (p-value equals 0.15).  The other forty-six 
nonfamily IPOs (48.9%) are delisted for mergers.   
3.4.3. Survival time of sample firms 
Table 1 presents the survival time for each evolution outcome shown in Exhibit 3.  I measure 
survival time as the number of months between the IPO issue date and the date of proxy statement or 
annual report for the last sample observation.
11
  Panel A provides the statistics for survival time of all 
sample firms, the family IPO group, and the nonfamily IPO group.  Panel B provides the statistics for 
comparisons between different groups.  The average sample IPO survives as a public firm for 8.4 years 
and the median survival time is 6.7 years.  On average, the subsample of family IPOs (group (b)) survives 
8.5 years and the subsample of nonfamily IPOs (group (c)) survives 7.7 years (p-value of t-test equals 
0.18). 
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 The maximum survival time is 234 months and is longer than 228 months (19 years times 12 months).  This 
happens when a firm goes public in January 1993, survives until 2011, and files proxy statement for its 2011 fiscal 
year in 2012. 
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[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
Panel A.1 (A.2) provides the statistics for family (nonfamily) IPOs that have different evolution 
outcomes.  The 24 family IPOs (group (e)) that go private as family firms survive 71 months on average, 
which is 35 months shorter than the 19 family IPOs (group (j)) where families exit through privatization 
(p-value of t-test equals 0.04).  On average, the 123 family IPOs that become public nonfamily firms 
survive 69 months before the transformation (group (f)) and another 71 months after the transformation 
(group (g)).  A p-value of 0.87 suggests that the survival time before and after the change of family firm 
status does not differ statistically.  The 120 family IPOs (group (h)) where families exit through mergers 
survive on average 67 months before the delisting.  The 18 family IPOs (group (i)) where families 
partially exit through mergers survive on average 47 months before the delisting.  The median survival 
time of group (i) is shorter than the median survival time of group (f) (p-value equals 0.1) and group (h) 
(p-value equals 0.06). 
3.4.4. Family firm evolution outcomes 
In this section, I study the evolution outcomes of family IPO firms based on different firm and 
industry characteristics.  These comparisons provide insight into the factors that can influence the 
evolution of family firms, such as IPO cohort, firm age, and industry classification.  I use these findings 
to control for certain firm and industry characteristics in the tests.  To facilitate the comparisons, I 
categorize the evolution outcomes in a way consistent with Section 3.4.2.  The first category is family 
maintaining control of the firm, which includes firms that remains as public family firms until the end of 
the sample period and firms that go private as family firms.  The second category is family ending its 
control of the firm, which includes firms that become public nonfamily firms and firms that merge into 
other firms or go private with family exit.  The third category is family firms delisted from the stock 
exchange for failing the listing requirements. 
Exhibit 4 presents the evolution outcomes by IPO cohort year.  The 1993 cohort has the highest 
percentage of family exit, the 1997 cohort has the highest percentage of family firm failure, and the 2001 
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cohort has the highest percentage of family maintaining control.  Although a Chi-square test shows that 
the evolution outcomes are statistically different across the cohorts (p-value equals 0.01), the difference 
resides between the 1993 cohort and the 1997 cohort (p-value equals 0.00).  The evolution outcomes do 
not show a significant difference between the 1993 cohort and the 2001 cohort (p-value equals 0.57) or 
between the 1997 cohort and the 2001 cohort (p-value equals 0.62).  I control for the influence of cohort 
year in the tests.  For sensitivity analysis, I provide the main test results based on the 1993 cohort and 
1997 cohort separately in Appendix B, Section IV (Table B-15).   
[Insert Exhibit 4 about here.] 
 Exhibit 5 presents the evolution outcomes between different time periods.  The distribution of 
outcomes across the sub-periods for each cohort does not show a significant difference, although the 
number of firms is increasingly smaller at the beginning of each period.  Exhibit 5.A presents four periods 
for the 1993 cohort.  The p-value of Chi-square test between the initial period (1993 to 1996) and the last 
period (1998 to 2011) equals 0.29.  Exhibit 5.B presents three periods for the 1997 cohort.  The p-value of 
Chi-square test between the initial period (1997 to 2000) and the last period (2008 to 2011) equals 0.14.  
Exhibit 5.C presents two periods for the 2001 cohort.  The p-value of Chi-square test between the initial 
period (2001 to 2004) and the last period (2008 to 2011) equals 0.45.  However, the distribution of 
outcomes for the initial period (t to t+3) across the three cohorts shows a significant difference (p-value is 
smaller than 0.00).  The difference again validates the importance of controlling for IPO cohort year in 
the tests. 
[Insert Exhibit 5 about here.] 
 Exhibit 6 presents the evolution outcomes by firm age at the outcome event.  I construct four age 
groups: 138 firms belong to the group of less than 10 years old, 178 firms belong to the group of between 
10 and 19 years old, 124 firms belong to the group of between 20 and 29 years old, and 70 firms belong 
to the group of at least 30 years old.  Families are more likely to retain control when they have been in 
control for a longer time (51% as the highest percentage in the oldest age group).  Family firms are less 
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likely to fail as they exist for a longer time (13% as the lowest percentage in the oldest age group).  The 
differences are also statistically significant (p-value is smaller than 0.00).  Therefore, it is important to 
control for firm age in the tests. 
 [Insert Exhibit 6 about here.] 
Exhibit 7 presents the evolution outcomes by firm age at the IPO.  Compared to the age 
distribution in Exhibit 6, the distribution of firm age at the IPO is skewed to the left.  By the same cutoff, 
282 firms belong to the group of less than 10 years old, 146 firms belong to the group of between 10 and 
19 years old, 50 firms belong to the group of between 20 and 29 years old, and 32 firms belong to the 
group of at least 30 years old.  The findings are consistent with those from Exhibit 6 that older the firm 
age at the IPO, more likely the outcome of family maintaining control and less likely the outcome of 
family firm failure.  The p-value of Chi-square test across the four age groups is smaller than 0.00.  Hence 
the difference again stresses the importance of controlling for firm age in the tests.  For sensitivity 
analysis, I provide the main test results based on two age groups separately in Appendix B, Section IV 
(Table B-16).  The group of young firms is less than 10 years old at the IPO.  The group of old firms is at 
least 10 years old at the IPO. 
   [Insert Exhibit 7 about here.] 
Exhibit 8 presents the evolution outcomes by Fama-French 17 Industry Definitions.  Two special 
industries are Chemicals (industry 6), which has three firms but has no family exit, and Transportation 
(industry 13), which has 10 firms but has no family maintaining control.  To see if the test results are 
driven by differences in the most populated industries, I compare the outcome distribution across the five 
industries with the most firms (industries 5, 8, 11, 15, and 17 for a total of 427 firms).  The p-value of 
Chi-square test across these industries is 0.5, which suggests no significant difference and relieves the 
concern.  Nonetheless, I control for industry fixed effects in the tests wherever feasible.  For sensitivity 
analysis, I provide the main test results excluding the two special industries (industry 6 and industry 13) 
in Appendix B, Section IV (Table B-17). 
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   [Insert Exhibit 8 about here.] 
 Exhibit 9 presents the evolution outcomes by industries with and without high private benefits of 
control.  I follow the literature (e.g., Bayar and Chemmanur, 2012; Gompers et al., 2010) to classify the 
industries.  Ninety-eight firms are in industries with high private benefits of control.  The outcome 
distribution is similar across the two types of industries with a p-value of 0.9.  Therefore, whether the firm 
is in an industry with high private benefits of control does not seem to affect the evolution outcome.  The 
indifference suggests that although the private benefits of control from operating in certain industries are 
a factor that influences certain firm decisions, such private benefits of control do not seem to be a factor 
that influences family firm evolution outcomes.  Nonetheless, I control for these certain industries’ effects 
in the tests. 
   [Insert Exhibit 9 about here.] 
3.5. Descriptive statistics 
3.5.1. Summary statistics for firm characteristics and stock ownership 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics for firm characteristics in Panel A and ownership 
structure in Panel B.  In the whole panel, 73% of the firm-years have family presence.  The average 
(median) firm has total assets of 408 (104) million dollars and is 20 (15) years old.  More than 75% of the 
firm-years have only one business segment.  The firms with the most complex organizational structure 
have four segments.  The average (median) firm has a CAPEX intensity of 7.2% (4.3%), a R&D intensity 
of 9.0% (0.1%), and a SG&A expense ratio of 40.4% (31.9%).  The average (median) firm has a financial 
leverage of 21.6% (11.9%).  The maximum leverage exceeds 100% because some firms are in distress 
and their book equity reduces to negative values.  Approximately 1.5% of the sample firm-years have 
leverage greater than 100%.  The average (median) firm has cash holdings of 25.2% (15.4%).  Most of the 
firms do not pay dividends, which reflects the fact that most newly public firms need capital for growth.  
The average industry market-to-book ratio of equity value is 2.1.  Nineteen percent of the sample firm-
years are in industries with high private benefits of control.  Only 5% have a dual class stock structure.   
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[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
The average (median) firm has a Tobin’s Q of 2.3 (1.7) and ROA of 1.1% (10.4%).  Consistent 
with the documented underperformance of IPO firms (e.g., Jain and Kini, 1994), 26.6% of the firm-years 
are unprofitable with a negative ROA.  The average (median) sales growth is 27.1% (14.9%), the largest 
growth is 327.8%, and the largest decrease is 60.6%.  The annual average stock return is 17.6% (-1.6%), 
which is consistent with the general underperformance of IPO firms.  The average (median) firm has a 
cash flow volatility of 4.6% (2.5%) and a total stock return risk of 0.7 (0.7).  Based on the CAPM, the 
average (median) market risk is 0.9 (0.9) and the idiosyncratic risk is 0.7 (0.6). 
The average family cash flow rights (voting rights) are 16.6% (17.7%) of the shares (votes) 
outstanding.  The maximum family cash flow rights (voting rights) are 77.9% (88.6%).  The average cash 
flow rights (voting rights) of co-founding families are 1.7% (1.7%).  Nonfamily active blockholders, who 
control board seats and/or management positions, hold 7.0% (7.2%) of the shares (votes) outstanding on 
average, although only less than half of the firm-years have active blockholders.  By contrast, most of the 
firms have passive blockholders who do not control board seats or management positions.  The passive 
blockholders’ ownership (16.2% cash flow rights and 15.9% voting rights) is also higher than that of the 
active blockholders. 
3.5.2. Univariate comparisons 
Table 3 presents the comparisons of firm characteristics between family firms and nonfamily 
firms.  Panel A provides the results for firms at the IPO, Panel B provides the results for all post-IPO 
firm-years, and Panel C provides the results for firms at the end of 2011.  The main findings are that 
family firms differ from nonfamily firms at the IPO and in the whole panel years, but the differences 
gradually go away as the firms evolve. 
[Insert Table 3 about here.] 
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At the IPO, family firms tend to be smaller, younger, and have fewer segments than nonfamily 
firms.  Since most of the nonfamily IPOs have completed the transformation from family firms to 
nonfamily firms prior to going public, it is normal to observe these differences.  The median family IPO 
has higher SG&A, lower leverage, and higher cash holdings.  The family IPOs tend to be in industries 
with higher market-to-book ratio, which likely reflects the active entrepreneurship in these industries.  
The accounting performance measured by ROA does not differ between the family IPOs and nonfamily 
IPOs.  Consistent with family IPOs being smaller in firm size, their IPO proceeds are also lower than the 
nonfamily IPOs’ proceeds.  The family IPOs’ offer price is lower by about one dollar than that of the 
nonfamily IPOs, but their first-day returns do not differ statistically. 
During all post-IPO years, the difference in firm size no longer exists, though the family firm-
years are still younger in age.  Family firm-years exhibit greater CAPEX intensity and faster sales growth.  
The differences in median SG&A and cash holdings disappear, but the median family firm-year has 
higher leverage.  The median value for several other variables also differs between family firm-years and 
nonfamily firm-years.  The median family firm-year has lower R&D intensity, higher ROA, higher total 
stock return volatility, and higher idiosyncratic risk.  Among the firms that survive to the end of 2011, the 
differences between family firms and nonfamily firms almost all go away, except that the family firms are 
still younger in age. 
3.5.3. Summary statistics for family characteristics 
Table 4 presents the summary statistics for family characteristics.  Panel A provides the statistics 
for family firms at the IPO, Panel B provides the statistics for all post-IPO family firm-years, and Panel C 
provides the statistics for family firms at the end of 2011.  The main findings are that family ownership 
becomes lower and family control of the CEO position becomes weaker as the family firms evolve and 
survive.  Since I measure family involvement by several dimensions of family characteristics, these time-
series changes in family control and management are integrated and considered together in the tests.  
[Insert Table 4 about here.] 
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For instance, the average (median) family controls 29.1% (21.2%) of the shares outstanding and 
30.5% (21.8%) of the votes understanding at the IPO.  After the IPO, the average (median) cash flow 
rights decrease to 21.8% (14.0%) and the average (median) voting rights decrease to 23.4% (14.5%).  At 
the end of 2011, the percentages decrease to 13.2% (7.0%) for cash flow rights and 15.4% (7.0%) for 
voting rights.  Founders control up to 73.0% (85.6%) of the cash flow rights (voting rights), with an 
average of 24.1% (16.8%) and a median of 25.3% (16.8%) at the IPO.  The average founder’s cash flow 
rights (voting rights) decrease to 9.9% (11.6%) at the end of 2011.  The average cash flow rights (voting 
rights) of the nonfamily family members decrease from 4.8% (5.1%) at the IPO to 3.3% (3.6%) at the end 
of 2011.  Despite the persistent decrease in family ownership, the surviving families achieve higher 
ownership wedge through dual class stock structure.  The average ownership wedge increases from 1.35% 
at the IPO to 2.22% at the end of 2011, which indicates the family’s intention to maintain enhanced 
control. 
The number of family executives and directors is relatively stable during the evolution process, 
but the percentage of family firms with a family member serving as the CEO decreases from 61% at the 
IPO to 47% at the end of 2011, with a 59% average in all the post-IPO years.  The decrease suggests that 
family control of the CEO position becomes weaker, possibly because professional managers from 
outside the family are needed as the firm grows.  The percentage of family firms with a founder CEO also 
decreases from 56% at the IPO to 38% at the end of 2011, with a 52% average in all the post-IPO years. 
As the family firms survive and evolve, more family descendants in the second or later generation 
join the firms.  For instance, only 15% of the family IPOs have some family descendants employed by the 
firm.  In the post-IPO years, this percentage increases to 19% and reaches 27% at the end of 2011.  In 
addition, the average number of family descendants increases from 0.33 at the IPO to 0.42 at the end of 
2011.  The appearance of more family descendants suggests that the surviving families set up succession 
plans as the firms evolve.  
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3.5.4. Time-series changes in family characteristics 
Exhibit 10 presents the time-series changes in some major family characteristics by IPO cohort 
year.  Exhibits 10.A and 10.B present the changes in family ownership.  Exhibits 10.C and 10.D present 
the changes in family management.  First, the time-series changes are consistent with the general trends 
shown in Table 4.  For instance, Exhibits 10.A and 10.B present the downward sloping ownership lines, 
which reflect the persistent post-IPO decrease in family cash flow rights and voting rights.  Exhibit 10.C 
presents largely flat lines for the total number of family executives and directors, which reflect the 
stability of family management.  In addition, Exhibit 10.D presents a general decreasing trend in the 
percentage of family firms with family CEO, consistent with weaker family control of the CEO position. 
[Insert Exhibit 10 about here.] 
Second, the development of the 1997 cohort resembles that of the 1993 cohort, because the trends 
are always in the same direction and the values are close in each post-IPO year.  However, the 2001 
cohort appears to be different, especially in Exhibit 10.D, where the 2001 cohort shows an upward trend 
and the other two cohorts show a downward trend.  IPOs in the 2001 cohort might have inherent 
differences from the other two cohorts due to the influence of fast high-tech development.  Therefore, it is 
important to control for the influence of cohort year in the tests. 
3.5.5. Correlation matrix of family variables 
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix of family characteristics.  Panel A provides the 
correlations of 510 family firms at the IPO.  I use this information to predict family control horizons in 
Section 4.  Panel B provides the correlations of all 4,210 family firm-years.  I use this information to 
predict family firm evolution outcomes in Section 5.  On the family level, total family cash flow rights 
have the highest correlation with founder’s cash flow rights, as the founder holds most of the shares.  
Number of family executives and directors is highly influenced by the number of nonfounder family 
executives and the number of nonfounder family directors (both correlations are above 0.7).  The 
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indicator of family CEO has the highest correlation with the indicator of founder CEO, since most family 
CEOs are still in the first generation. 
[Insert Table 5 about here.] 
I use multiple proxies to measure founder involvement and extended family involvement, and 
hence my tests potentially incur the problem of multicollinearity.  The pairwise correlations in both Panel 
A and Panel B reveal this issue.  For example, variables (4) to (7) are proxies for extended family 
involvement.  In both Panel A and Panel B, all of the pairwise correlations between the four variables are 
greater than 0.5.  Variables (8) to (10) are proxies for founder involvement.  All of the pairwise 
correlations are around 0.4.  The high pairwise correlations suggest not only collinearity between two 
variables, but also multicollinearity across multiple variables.  I address the issue of multicollinearity by 
using principal component analysis (PCA), which extracts the information contained by the family 
variables and transforms the variables into a smaller number of factors.  
3.6. Principal component analysis of family characteristics 
Table 6 presents the principal component analysis (PCA) of family characteristics.  PCA 
transforms the variables into a smaller number of factors that extract the most information contained by 
the original variables.  PCA generates standardized factors using orthogonal linear combination, so the 
factors are orthogonal to each other.  Orthogonality addresses the issue of multicollinearity from using all 
family variables in the same test.  The first factor is the linear combination of the original variables and it 
explains the highest proportion of the total variance, the second factor is the linear combination that 
explains the highest proportion of the remaining variance, and so forth.  I keep factors with eigenvalues 
greater than one, because these factors account for more variance than the individual variables do.  Panel 
A reports the PCA of 510 family firms at the IPO and Panel B reports the PCA of all 4,210 family firm-
years.  Panels A.1 and B.1 present the eigenvalues and the proportions of total variance explained by the 
factors.  Panels A.2 and B.2 present orthogonalized factor loadings that are multiplied by 100 and 
rounded to the nearest integer.   
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[Insert Table 6 about here.] 
Panel A shows that the PCA generates three factors out of the nine family variables at the IPO.  
The first factor explains 34% of the total variance, the second factor explains 21% of the remaining 
variance, and the third factor explains 11% of the remaining variance.  The three factors explain 66% of 
the total variance in the original variables and are generated in a way consistent with the clustering of 
information.  Factor 1 mainly loads on the four proxies for extended family involvement, i.e., number of 
nonfounder family executives, number of nonfounder family directors, nonfounder family members’ cash 
flow rights, and whether family descendants are involved in the firm.  Factor 2 mainly loads on the three 
proxies for founder involvement, i.e., whether founder is the CEO, whether founder is the Chairperson, 
and founder’s cash flow rights.  Factor 3 mainly loads on the two proxies for family’s private benefits of 
control, i.e., family firm name and family ownership wedge.   
Panel B shows that the PCA of the family firm-year panel is highly comparable to the PCA of 
family information at the IPO.  Three factors are generated with similar pattern of factor loadings to those 
presented in Panel A.  The total variance explained by the three factors is 66%, the same proportion as the 
total variance explained by the factors at the IPO.  Therefore, the information contained in the family 
characteristics is stable over time, even though these family characteristics change over time with firm 
survival and evolution.   
Exhibit 11 presents the time-series changes of factor scores by IPO cohort year.  The factors are 
standardized so they have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.  First, Factor 1 (Extended 
Family) over time becomes stronger for the 1993 cohort, weaker for the 1997 cohort, and generally stable 
for the 2001 cohort.  The patterns are consistent with the different evolution stages of the three cohorts.  
The 1993 cohort has the longest time span and is at a more mature stage of family control.  As family 
succession unfolds, more family members join the firm, which increases the factor score.  The 1997 
cohort has a medium time span and family control is still evolving.  It is likely that some initial family 
members start departure, which leads to a lower factor score.  The 2001 cohort has the shortest life span 
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and is still at its earlier stage of family control, and hence does not show a clear trend for its extended 
family involvement. 
[Insert Exhibit 11 about here.] 
Second, Factor 2 (Founder) over time becomes weaker for the 1993 and 1997 cohorts, which 
reflects the natural decrease of founder control as the firm ages.  The 2001 cohort first shows stronger 
factor score from t+3 (year 2004) to t+5 (year 2006) and then starts to weaken, especially from t+6 (year 
2007) to t+7 (year 2008), possibly influenced by the financial crisis during that period.  Third, Factor 3 
(Private Benefits of Control) is relatively stable with a slight increasing trend for the 1993 and 1997 
cohorts and a slight decreasing trend for the 2001 cohort.  In addition, the 2001 cohort generally has the 
lowest factor scores among the three cohorts, which suggests that the 2001 cohort has weaker family 
characteristics.  This distinction is also reflected in Exhibit 1 by the fast decrease in the percentage of 
family firms for the 2001 cohort. 
4. Family control horizons 
As presented in Exhibit 3, family IPO firms can 1) remain as public family firms until the end of 
the sample period, 2) become public nonfamily firms with family exit, 3) fail to meet listing requirements 
and go off the stock exchange, 4) merge into other firms or go private with family exit, and 5) go private 
as family firms.  In this section, I use Cox proportional hazard models (Cox, 1972) to estimate the hazard 
ratio of family ending its control at time t conditional on the family having maintained its control until 
time t.  I measure control horizon as the number of months between family IPO and the firm’s last sample 
observation as family firm.  A hazard ratio less (greater) than one suggests a smaller (greater) hazard and 
hence a longer (shorter) control horizon.  The exit events include outcomes 2) family-to-nonfamily 
transformation with family exit and 4) mergers or going-private transactions with family exit.   
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4.1. The impact of individual family characteristics   
Table 7 presents the impact of family characteristics on family control horizons.  The control 
variables include co-founding family voting rights, nonfamily blockholder voting rights, stock return risk, 
leverage, ROA, number of segments, R&D intensity, industry median market-to-book ratio, an indicator 
for industries with high private benefits of control, total assets, firm age, and a square term of firm age.  
Family characteristics and co-founding family ownership are values at the IPO.  All other variables are 
contemporaneous.  I include IPO cohort dummies and Fama-French 17 Industry dummies in the 
regressions and report robust standard errors clustered on the firm level.     
[Insert Table 7 about here.] 
First, all the variables for extended family involvement (models (1) to (4)) reduce the hazard of 
family exit and increase family control horizons.  The effect of nonfounder family members’ ownership is 
significant at the 5% level.  Conditional on the family having maintained control of the public firm to a 
particular year, a 10% increase in nonfounder family members’ ownership at the IPO reduces the 
probability of family ending its control by 10%.  Second, all the variables for founder involvement 
(models (5) to (7)) reduce the hazard of family exit and increase family control horizons.  The effect of 
founder CEO and founder ownership are significant at the 5% level and the 1% level, respectively.  
Having a founder CEO at the IPO reduces the probability of family exit by 26%.   
In contrast, family ownership wedge (model (9)) has a positive and significant impact on the 
hazard ratio.  A 10% wedge between family voting rights and cash flow rights at the IPO increases the 
probability of family exit by 20%.  It is likely that when the family uses superior voting rights to protect 
its private benefits of control, the excessive expropriation of such private benefits leads to low efficiency 
and poor performance, which advances the end of family control.  Villalonga and Amit (2009) provide 
evidence that dual class stock, which is a common mechanism to create family control wedge, manifests 
the agency conflicts between family shareholders and nonfamily shareholders.   
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4.2. The impact of family factors 
Table 8 presents results of the Cox regressions using the three factors generated by PCA.  The 
factors are generated by principal component analysis (PCA) to extract the information contained by 
individual family characteristics at the IPO.  I also use one component variable for Factor 1, one 
component variable for Factor 2, and the two component variables for Factor 3 in models (2) to (5), 
respectively.  The results of Table 8 confirm those of Table 7 and support the hypothesis that greater ex 
ante family involvement at the IPO leads to longer family control horizons.   
[Insert Table 8 about here.] 
In model (1), both Factor 1 (Extended Family) and Factor 2 (Founder) have a negative and 
significant impact on the hazard of family exit, i.e., a positive impact on family control horizons.  
Conditional on the family having maintained control of the public firm to a particular year, a 0.1 unit 
increase in the Factor 1 (Factor 2) at the IPO reduces the probability of family ending its control by 1.8% 
(2%).  Factor 3 has a positive influence on family exit, though the effect is not statistically significant.  
The results of models (2) to (5) confirm the effects of the component variables of Factor 1 and Factor 2.  
The founder CEO indicator in model (2), the number of nonfounder family directors in model (3), both 
types of family ownership in model (4), and the founder ownership in model (5) predict longer durations 
of family control.  In addition, family ownership wedge in models (2) to (5) consistently exhibit a 
significant impact on the probability of family exit, which confirms the finding in model (9) of Table 7.   
4.3. Robustness tests 
In all the previous tests, I use IPO cohort dummy variables and Fama-French 17 Industry dummy 
variables to control for the cohort effects and industry effects.  I also use strata to consider IPO cohort 
fixed effects and industry fixed effects in Appendix B, Section I.  Table B-1 presents the tests of the 
impact of individual family characteristics.  The results are similar to those of Table 7.  The individual 
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family characteristics that represent extended family involvement and founder involvement reduce the 
probability of family exit, whereas family ownership wedge increases the probability of family exit.   
[Insert Table B-1 about here.] 
Table B-2 presents the tests of the impact of family factors using strata for IPO cohort fixed 
effects and industry fixed effects.  The results are similar to those of Table 8.  In addition, I also find a 
positive and significant effect of Factor 3 (Private Benefits of Control), which is a stronger result 
compared to the result of model (1) in Table 8 and further confirms the negative impact of family’s excess 
control on the probability of family exit. 
[Insert Table B-2 about here.] 
5. Family firm evolution outcomes 
The results of Section 4 provide evidence that stronger family characteristics at the IPO predict 
longer family control horizons after the IPO.  Since the family characteristics are measured at the IPO and 
the tests only examine the family’s duration of presence in the public firm, we do not observe family 
characteristics right before the revelation of evolution outcome or how family characteristics determine 
the family’s way of changing control.  To gain insight into these issues, I use logistic models to estimate 
the probability of different family firm evolution outcomes presented in Exhibit 3.  By distinguishing 
between these outcomes, I am also able to use subsamples of firms under particular evolution outcomes to 
examine the impact of family presence or certain family characteristics on firm performance.  In this 
section, I first test the binary outcome of family firm failure and the binary outcome of family exit.  Then 
I combine the outcomes of family exit and family firm failure in multinomial logistic models, with family 
maintaining its control of the public firm as the base outcome.  Last, I jointly estimate the outcomes of 
family firm privatization, family exit, and family firm failure. 
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5.1. Family firm evolution outcomes: family firm failure 
Table 9 presents the impact of family characteristics on family firm failure.  All independent 
variables are in year t, including the family characteristics and the PCA factors.  The outcome variable 
equals one when family firms are delisted from the stock exchange for failing to meet listing requirements 
and zero otherwise.  I use conditional logistic regressions based on industry groups to control for industry 
fixed effects.  I include IPO cohort dummies in the regressions and report robust standard errors clustered 
on the firm level.  The outcome is in year t+1 in models (1) to (5) and in year t+2 in models (6) to (10).  I 
use the three factors generated by PCA in models (1) and (6).  I also use one component variable for 
Factor 1, one component variable for Factor 2, and the two component variables for Factor 3 in models 
(2) to (5) and models (7) to (10), respectively.     
[Insert Table 9 about here.] 
The main findings are that family characteristics do not affect the probability of family firm 
failure, compared to all the four outcomes listed in Exhibit 3 (survive as public family firms, become 
public nonfamily firms, merge into other firms or go private with family exit, and go private as family 
firms).  Neither the three factors nor the individual family variables have any significant impact on the 
odds ratio of family firm failure.  Therefore, the rate of direct firm failure among family IPO firms is not 
affected by the various measures of family involvement.  I further distinguish the other outcomes in the 
following sections. 
5.2. Family firm evolution outcomes: family exit 
Table 10 presents the impact of family characteristics on family exit.  All independent variables 
are in year t, including the family characteristics and the PCA factors.  The outcome variable equals one 
when 1) family firms become public nonfamily firms with family exit, or 2) family firms merge into other 
firms or go private with family exit.  The estimation method and model setup are the same as in Section 
5.1.  The main findings are that family characteristics significantly influence the family’s exit decision. 
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[Insert Table 10 about here.] 
First, both Factor 1 (Extended Family) and Factor 2 (Founder) have a negative and significant 
impact on the probability of family exit in year t+1 (model (1)) and in year t+2 (model (6)).  Based on the 
results of model (1), a 0.1 unit increase in the Factor 1 (Factor 2) reduces the probability of family ending 
its control in year t+1 by 3.4% (4.3%).  Second, the individual component variables for the factors also 
exhibit similar effects.  For instance, in model (2), the family is more likely to stay in control in year t+1 
as the number of nonfounder family executives increases and when the founder still serves as the CEO.  
Third, the family’s next-period exit decision is not affected by Factor 3 (Private Benefits of Control) or its 
component variables. 
5.3. Family firm evolution outcomes: family exit and family firm failure 
Table 11 presents the impact of family characteristics on family exit and family firm failure in 
year t+1.  All independent variables are in year t, including the family characteristics and the PCA factors.  
I use multinomial logistic regressions to jointly estimate the outcomes.  The base outcome is family 
maintaining its control of the public firm.  The outcome variable equals one for family exit, either through 
selling shares in the open market or through mergers or going-private transactions.  The outcome variable 
equals two for family firm failure.  I include IPO cohort dummies and industry dummies in the 
regressions and report robust standard errors clustered on the firm level.  The odd-numbered models 
compare the base outcome with outcome one (family exit) and the even-numbered models compare the 
base outcome with outcome two (family firm failure). 
[Insert Table 11 about here.] 
The main findings confirm the results presented in Table 9 and Table 10.  Both extended family 
involvement and founder involvement reduce the probability of family exit, but do not affect the 
probability of family firm failure.  The individual family variables negatively affect the exit probability 
but not the failure probability.  In addition, the magnitude of the effects in models (1), (3), (5), (7), and (9) 
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resembles the effects presented in Table 10.  By contrast, measures of family’s private benefits of control 
do not have any impact on either the exit probability or the failure probability. 
Table 12 presents the impact of family characteristics on family exit and family firm failure in 
year t+2.  The estimation method and model setup are the same as in Table 11.  The main findings are 
similar to those of Table 11, although the magnitude of the effects is smaller.  Therefore, the impact of 
family involvement on firm evolution outcomes is evident both one year prior to the event and two years 
prior to the event.  These findings suggest the existence of self-selection bias among family IPO firms.  
Since firms with weaker family involvement are more likely to be merged and delisted from the stock 
exchange, they would not be included in samples of seasoned firms and their exclusion creates 
survivorship bias in these samples. 
[Insert Table 12 about here.] 
5.4. Family firm evolution outcomes: family firm privatization, family exit, and family firm 
failure 
Table 13 presents the impact of family characteristics on family firm privatization, family exit, 
and family firm failure in year t+1.  I use factors for family characteristics in multinomial logistic 
regressions to jointly estimate the probability of different outcomes.  All independent variables are in year 
t.  The base outcome is family maintaining its control of the public firm.  The outcome variable equals 
one for family firm privatization, two for family exit via open market, three for family exit via merger or 
going-private transaction, and four for family firm failure.  I include IPO cohort dummies and industry 
dummies in the regressions and report robust standard errors clustered on the firm level.   
[Insert Table 13 about here.] 
When the four outcomes are modeled jointly, the factors for family characteristics show different 
effects on the outcomes.  First, Factor 1 (Extended Family) decreases the probability of family exit via 
open market, i.e., the transformation from public family firm to public nonfamily firm.  However, Factor 
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1 does not influence the probability of other family firm evolution outcomes as shown in models (1), (3), 
and (4).  Second, Factor 2 (Founder) increases the probability of family firm privatization but decreases 
the probability of family exit, either via open market (model (2)) or via merger (model (3)).  Factor 2 does 
not influence the probability of family firm failure (model (4)).  These results suggest that strong founder 
involvement keeps the family to stay in control, either as a public firm or as a private firm though going 
private transaction.  Third, Factor 3 (Private Benefits of Control) is not related to the probability of any of 
the outcomes, which is the same finding as in the previous sections. 
Table 14 presents the impact of family characteristics on family firm privatization, family exit, 
and family firm failure in year t+2.  The estimation method and model setup are the same as in Table 13.  
The results are consistent with those of Table 13, although the influence of Factor 2 (Founder) is only 
significant in distinguishing between the base outcome of family staying in control and the second 
outcome of family exit via open market.  In addition, greater family involvement of the extended family 
also predicts the probability of family exit via open market, as shown by the negative and significant 
coefficient of Factor 1.   
[Insert Table 14 about here.] 
5.5. Interaction effects of family factors and firm performance 
It is possible that family firm evolution outcomes are affected by both family characteristics and 
firm performance.  If pecuniary benefits are an important consideration when the family makes its control 
retention decision, the outcome probabilities should change with firm performance.  In this section, I 
examine the interaction effects between family factors and measures of firm performance.   
I use a market-based measure, Tobin’s Q, and an accounting measure, ROA based on EBITDA.  
For each family firm-year, I compare the values of its performance measures to the industry values.  I 
identify the 33
rd
 percentile and the 67
th
 percentile of Tobin’s Q and ROA for each Fama-French 17 
Industry each year.  I use three dummy variables to indicate how a sample firm-year’s performance 
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compares to the industry values.  The dummy variable Lowest tercile of Tobin’s Q (ROA) equals one if 
the firm’s Tobin’s Q (ROA) is smaller than the 33rd percentile of the industry value and zero otherwise.  
The dummy variable Middle tercile of Tobin’s Q (ROA) equals one if the firm’s Tobin’s Q (ROA) is 
between the 33
rd
 percentile and the 67
th
 percentile of the industry value and zero otherwise.  The dummy 
variable Highest tercile of Tobin’s Q (ROA) equals one if the firm’s Tobin’s Q (ROA) is greater than the 
67
th
 percentile of the industry value and zero otherwise.   
I interact the three factors for family characteristics with the tercile dummy variables in 
multinomial logistic regressions.  Since Tobin’s Q and ROA are affected by the firm’s leverage, R&D 
investments, risk, etc., I reduce the number of control variables and only keep the co-founding family’s 
ownership, nonfamily blockholders’ ownership, firm size, and firm age.  I include the dummy variables of 
the firm being in the lowest tercile or the highest tercile of performance measures to control for the direct 
effects of firm performance.  I also include IPO cohort dummies and industry dummies in the regressions 
and report robust standard errors clustered on the firm level.   
Table 15 presents the interaction effects of family factors and Tobin’s Q on evolution outcomes.  
All independent variables are in year t.  Models (1) and (2) have evolution outcomes in year t+1.  The 
results show that Factor 1 (Extended Family) and Factor 2 (Founder) both reduce the probability of family 
exit in year t+1 regardless of the ranking of Tobin’s Q, whereas Factor 3 (Private Benefits of Control) 
does not show any significant impact.  Further, the probability of family firm failure is not changed by 
any of the factors.  Models (3) and (4) have evolution outcomes in year t+2.  The results are similar to 
models (1) and (2), although the effect of Factor 1 is only marginally significant (p-value equals 0.102).   
 [Insert Table 15 about here.]  
The results of Table 15 suggest that the influence of family involvement on firm evolution 
outcomes is not conditional on Tobin’s Q, the market-based measure of firm performance.  In every group 
of Tobin’s Q, both founder involvement and extended family involvement predict a higher probability of 
family staying in control over family exit.  I now examine whether accounting performance plays a role in 
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affecting family firm evolution outcomes.  Table 16 presents the interaction effects of family factors and 
ROA on evolution outcomes.   
 [Insert Table 16 about here.] 
First, the results for Factor 1 (Extended Family) and Factor 2 (Founder) are similar to those of 
Table 15.  However, when the firm’s ROA is in the lowest tercile, the effect of Factor 1 is not statistically 
significant when predicting the outcome in year t+1 (p-value equals 0.101) or year t+2.  The findings 
suggest that when the firm’s accounting performance is low, involvement of the extended family does not 
extend the family’s duration of presence in the firm.  Second, when the firm’s ROA is in the middle 
tercile, Factor 3 (Private Benefits of Control) shows a positive influence on the probability of family exit 
in year t+2 and a positive influence on the probability of family firm failure in year t+1 and year t+2.  
Therefore, when the firm has moderate profitability and the family extracts private benefits, the firm is 
more likely to fail and the family is more likely to cease its control and leave the firm.  
In general, the results of Section 4 and Section 5 provide evidence that stronger family 
involvement lead to a longer control horizon and a lower probability of family exit via open market, i.e., 
the transformation from public family firm to public nonfamily firm.  Presumably, longer control 
horizons reduce short-term focus on returns and lead to long-term perspective of creating firm value.  
Such long-term perspective should also be reflected in the firm’s investment policies.  However, if the 
family takes advantage of its control position and exploits the nonfamily shareholders for private benefits, 
it is possible that the benefits of family control do not outweigh the costs, and hence family control might 
not increase firm value and might even reduce firm value.  I examine the influence of family 
characteristics on firm performance and investment policies in the next section. 
6. Family characteristics and firm performance 
The literature suggests that family ownership and management in large and established firms are 
associated with better firm performance.  Anderson and Reeb (2003) (AR (2003)) show that family firms 
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in the S&P 500 Index have higher Tobin’s Q and higher ROA.  Villalonga and Amit (2006) (VA (2006)) 
show that family firms on the Fortune 500 List have higher Tobin’s Q.  Since these large and established 
firms have probably past the early evolution stage of family control, it is difficult to resolve the self-
selection issue of family departure.  In addition, Section 3 shows that the average (median) sample IPO 
survives as a public firm for only 8.4 (6.7) years and only 36% of the IPOs survive 10 years after going 
public.  Hence it is also difficult to resolve the survivorship issue of newly public firms.  In this section, I 
examine the influence of family characteristics on firm performance in my panel sample.  By including 
each firm from the IPO until the firm is delisted from the stock exchange and by observing the time-series 
change in family characteristics, my sample largely avoids the concerns of self-selection and survivorship 
and provides new insight into the family influence on firm performance. 
6.1. Firm performance and family characteristics based on the panel data  
I follow the test specifications of VA (2006) and AR (2003) to test the relation between Tobin’s 
Q and family characteristics in my panel data.  I then follow the specification of AR (2003) to test the 
relation between ROA and family characteristics in my panel data.  I calculate Tobin’s Q as the ratio of 
market value of assets to book value of assets.  I calculate ROA as the ratio of Earnings Before Interest, 
Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization to total assets.  As a caveat, the direct calculations of ratios based 
on total assets could be distorted and represent erroneous information about firm performance, because 
IPO firms generally experience a significant decline in operating performance (e.g., Jain and Kini, 1994).  
For instance, if a firm reports a negative book value of equity and a corresponding reduced book value of 
assets, both Tobin’s Q and ROA would be distorted to show large values.  To alleviate this concern, I also 
calculate Tobin’s Q and ROA based on adjusted book assets.  The adjusted book assets use the initial 
book value of equity at the IPO as the lower bond of the post-IPO book equity.  A firm’s book equity is 
set to the initial value if it falls below the initial value in a given year.  Alternatively, I construct the ratios 
requiring the firm to have positive book equity or total assets greater than five millions. 
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Table 17 presents the relation between Tobin’s Q and family characteristics following the 
specification of VA (2006, Table 4).  I include the same set of control variables as in VA (2006), except 
the Governance Index and the percentage of nonfamily outside directors, for which I do not have the 
data.
12
  Models (1) and (2) use the unadjusted Tobin’s Q.  Models (3) to (8) use the adjusted Tobin’s Q to 
mitigate the influence of reduced book assets.  The odd-numbered models use a dummy variable that 
indicates family firm and a dummy variable that indicates family’s excess voting rights.  The even-
numbered models use the percentage of family’s ownership and the percentage of family’s excess voting 
rights. 
[Insert Table 17 about here.] 
In VA (2006), the variables Family firm and Total family cash flow rights have a positive and 
significant effect on Tobin’s Q, and the variables of family’s excess voting rights have a negative and 
significant effect on Tobin’s Q.  Family management through the CEO position has no effect on firm 
value.  These findings provide evidence that in Fortune 500 firms, family ownership is beneficial to 
general shareholders, but family’s excess control is costly to minority shareholders who are not from the 
founding family.   
My results of the same tests, as presented in Table 17, confirm the negative effect of family’s 
excess control.  Across all models, both the dummy variable of family excess voting rights and the 
percentage of the excess voting rights have negative and significant coefficients.  My results also conform 
to those of VA (2006) regarding the insignificant effect of having a family CEO in the firm.  However, I 
do not find any significant influence of the presence of families or the ownership held by families.  In all 
eight models, both Family firm and Total family cash flow rights have small and insignificant coefficients.  
Therefore, my findings suggest that in smaller and younger firms that are at their initial public stage, 
family ownership and management evolve with the firm in equilibrium.  In addition, when the family 
                                                          
12
 The IPO firms normally have simpler governance structure than the S&P 500 firms or the Fortune 500 firms, so 
not having the Governance Index should not cause a serious missing variable problem.  Board structure does not 
show a significant effect on firm value in VA (2006), who explain the board’s role as functioning in equilibrium. 
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achieves greater voting rights than cash flow rights, the excess control indicates extraction of private 
benefits of control by the family and is costly to nonfamily shareholders. 
Table 18 presents the same test specification as Table 17 with the dependent variables adjusted by 
subtracting industry median value.  Following VA (2006), the year dummies and industry dummies are 
also removed from the regressions.  The results are the same as in Table 17.  Whether the firm is a family 
firm, how much ownership the family controls, or whether a family member serves as the CEO does not 
affect firm value.  However, if the family has voting rights above its cash flow rights, firm value is 
negatively affected and nonfamily shareholders’ value is reduced.  The findings further support the 
premise that the change in family ownership and management represents a rational choice of the family 
along with the firm’s evolution. 
[Insert Table 18 about here.] 
Table 19 presents the relation between Tobin’s Q and family characteristics following the 
specification of AR (2003, Table IV).  I include the same set of control variables as in AR (2003), except 
the ownership of nonfamily officers and directors, the percentage of nonfamily outside directors, and 
CEO equity-based pay, for which I do not have the data.
13
  Panel A reports the results based on 
unadjusted Tobin’s Q and Tobin’s Q with adjusted book equity.  Panel B reports the results based on 
Tobin’s Q with certain denominator restrictions.  Models (1), (4), (7), and (10) use a dummy variable that 
indicates family firm.  Models (2), (5), (8), and (11) distinguish between young family firms and old 
family firms, with nine years since the firm’s inception as the age cutoff.14  Models (3), (6), (9), and (12) 
distinguish between hired nonfamily CEOs, founder CEOs, and descendant CEOs. 
  [Insert Table 19 about here.] 
                                                          
13
 Nonfamily insider ownership should be small in IPO firms due to the high ownership of families and nonfamily 
blockholders.  CEO equity-based pay should be affected by the CEO’s ownership and family status.  About 61% of 
my sample observations have a family CEO and therefore should reduce the missing variable concern. 
14
 AR (2003) use 50 years as the age cutoff.  I use nine years as the age cutoff as the median family firm age when 
going public is eight. 
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In AR (2003), the indicator variable Family firm has a positive and significant effect on Tobin’s 
Q.  Both the young family firm group and the old family firm group have a positive and significant effect 
on Tobin’s Q.  In addition, both hired nonfamily CEOs and founder CEOs have a positive and significant 
effect on Tobin’s Q, but descendant CEOs are unrelated to Tobin’s Q.  These findings provide evidence 
that in S&P 500 firms, family firms exhibit higher firm value than nonfamily firms, but descendant CEOs 
do not perform differently from CEOs in nonfamily firms.     
My results of the same tests, as presented in Table 19, do not support the positive role of family 
presence in the firm or the CEO’s founder or nonfamily status.  Further, I find a persistent negative 
influence of descendant CEOs.  In all the models that distinguish the CEO’s family generation status, 
descendant CEOs have a negative and significant effect on Tobin’s Q.  This finding is consistent with VA 
(2006), who finds a negative impact of second-generation family CEO on firm value.  These results again 
support the premise that in newly public firms, family presence is an evolving equilibrium as the firm 
grows.  In addition, when family descendants take over the CEO position, firm value is reduced, possibly 
because the inherited power excludes outside talent and causes the management to be inept. 
Table 20 presents the relation between ROA and family characteristics following the specification 
of AR (2003, Table III).  Panel A reports the results based on unadjusted ROA and ROA with adjusted 
book equity.  Panel B reports the results based on ROA with certain denominator restrictions.  In AR 
(2003), the indicator variable Family firm has a positive and significant effect on ROA.  Both the young 
family firm group and the old family firm group have a positive and significant effect on ROA.  In 
addition, both founder CEOs and descendant CEOs have a positive and significant effect on ROA, but 
hired nonfamily CEOs are unrelated to ROA.     
  [Insert Table 20 about here.] 
My results of the same tests, as presented in Table 20, again do not support the positive role of 
family presence in the firm or the CEO’s family status.  In all the models that distinguish family firms or 
family CEOs, ROA does not show a significant difference between the distinctions.  Further, I find 
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persistently lower accounting performance in the group of young family firms, which is not surprising 
given the documented operating underperformance of IPO firms (e.g., Jain and Kini, 1994).  Therefore, in 
newly public firms, family presence or family management does not influence the firm’s accounting 
performance. 
In general, the tests in Section 6.1 do not replicate the positive influence of family presence, 
family ownership, or founder management documented in Fortune 500 firms or S&P 500 firms.  In 
addition, I find negative effects of family’s excess voting rights and descendant CEOs on firm value.  
These results suggest that the positive influence of family ownership and management in large and 
established firms is likely caused by survivorship issue and self-selection issue that take place at the initial 
stage of the firm’s evolution process.  For instance, as firms evolve, the nonperforming families exit the 
firms or cause the firms to fail, leaving performing families in the surviving firm sample and hence 
creating the positive association between firm performance and family control. 
6.2. Firm performance and family factors based on the panel data 
In the previous section, I follow VA (2006) and AR (2003) and examine the influence of certain 
family characteristics on firm performance.  To gain a more comprehensive understanding of the family’s 
influence, I use the three factors generated by principal component analysis in the tests for firm 
performance in this section. Factor 1 represents involvement of the extended family, Factor 2 represents 
involvement of the founder, and Factor 3 represents private benefits of control unique to the family.  I use 
dummy variables to group the family firm-years based on their factor scores.  For instance, Factor 1 
above median (below median) equals one if the firm’s Factor 1 score is above (below) the family sample 
median.  I also use a dummy variable Factor 1, 2, or 3 below (above) median to indicate if the family 
firm’s factor score is below (above) median for any of the three factors.  I first follow the test 




Table 21 presents the relation between Tobin’s Q and family factors following the specification 
of VA (2006).  The main findings are that firm value is not related to the factors for family characteristics.  
For instance, the results of models (1) and (2) show that Tobin’s Q is not statistically different between 
nonfamily firms and family firms with high factor scores or low factor scores of family involvement and 
private benefits of control.  The findings are consistent with those of Table 17 that there is no significant 
influence of the presence of families or the ownership held by families on firm value.  In addition, the 
negative effect of family ownership wedge on Tobin’s Q is no longer evident when ownership wedge and 
family firm name are considered together under Factor 3. 
  [Insert Table 21 about here.] 
Table 22 presents the same test specification as Table 21 with the dependent variables adjusted by 
subtracting industry median value.  The findings are the same as those of Table 21.  The factors for family 
characteristics do not have significant effects on industry median adjusted Tobin’s Q, regardless of 
whether the firm has high factor scores or low factor scores.  The results of Table 21 and Table 22 
provide additional support for the findings of Section 6.1, which suggest that the change in family 
characteristics is a rational response to the firm’s evolution and hence stronger family characteristics do 
not lead to higher firm value. 
  [Insert Table 22 about here.] 
Table 23 presents the relation between ROA and family factors following the specification of AR 
(2003).  The main findings are that involvement of extended family has a positive influence on ROA and 
family’s extraction of private benefits of control has a negative influence on ROA.  For example, Factor 1 
above median is positively related to ROA in the odd-numbered models and Factor 1 below median is 
negatively related to ROA in the even-numbered models.  By contrast, founder involvement, as 
represented by Factor 2, does not have significant impact on ROA.  These results suggest that the 
extended family involvement is associated with higher accounting performance, although not improved 
firm value.  The expropriation of private benefits by the family is associated with lower accounting 
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performance, consistent with the negative impact of family ownership wedge on firm value shown in 
Tables 17 and 18. 
  [Insert Table 23 about here.] 
6.3. Firm performance in firm fixed effects regressions based on family firm-years 
In the previous sections, I follow VA (2006) and AR (2003) and test the implication of family 
characteristics on firm performance in the whole panel.  The overall results suggest lower firm value for 
firms in which the family controls excess voting rights, firms in which the CEO is a family descendant, 
and family firms that are relatively young.  ROA is higher for family firms characterized by high Factor 1 
(Extended Family) and family firms characterized by low Factor 3 (Private Benefits of Control).  
Therefore, the evidence demonstrates that family characteristics do not lead to higher firm value and 
certain family characteristics even negatively affect firm value.  In addition, accounting performance is 
positively affected by extended family involvement but negatively affected by family’s private benefits of 
control.  Since there might be unobserved heterogeneity across firms, I test firm performance with firm 
fixed effects in this section. 
Firm fixed effects regressions remove the unobserved heterogeneity across firm, assuming that 
the heterogeneity is constant over time.  To use firm fixed effects properly, the variables need to have 
within firm variation over time.  I modify the test specifications from the previous sections in the 
following way.  First, the sample now only includes family firm-years to ensure variation in the family 
characteristics.  Second, I only use family ownership and the three factors generated by principal 
component analysis as my variables of interest.  These variables have both time-series variation and 
cross-sectional variation, whereas the other family characteristics, such as CEO’s family generation status, 
have little time-series variation.  Third, based on the test specifications of VA (2006) and AR (2003), I 
remove the control variables that have little time-series variation (i.e., Dividends/book value of equity, 
Diversification, and R&D/sales in VA (2006), and R&D/sales in AR (2003)). 
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Table 24 presents the relation between Tobin’s Q, family ownership, and family factors in firm 
fixed effects regressions.  The test specifications are based on VA (2006).  The main findings are that 
among family firms, firm value is negatively related to family ownership, although not related to factors 
for family characteristics.  Since the factors include not only family ownership, but also other family 
characteristics, such as family control of management positions and board seats, involvement of family 
descendants in the firm, etc., the results of the factors suggest that in general, family involvement or 
family’s private benefits of control does not affect firm value in family firms. 
  [Insert Table 24 about here.] 
Table 25 presents the relation between ROA, family ownership, and family factors in firm fixed 
effects regressions.  The test specifications are based on AR (2003).  The main findings are that among 
family firms, accounting performance is positively related to family ownership, although not related to 
factors for family characteristics.  Combined with the results of Table 24, the firm fixed effects 
regressions suggest that higher family ownership leads to higher accounting performance but lower firm 
value for family firms.  The different effects of family ownership indicate that firms controlled closely by 
families tend to pursue short-term profitability even at the cost of long-term firm value.  I explore firms’ 
investment policies as a possible channel through which families exert their influence on firm 
performance in Section 6.7. 
  [Insert Table 25 about here.] 
6.4. Robustness tests 
Since family ownership could be an endogenous variable and partly determined by firm 
performance and firm risk, the inference drawn from the OLS panel regressions might be partial.  I 
address the endogeneity issue in Appendix B, Section II.  I follow VA (2006) and use idiosyncratic risk 
and lagged Q as instruments for family ownership.  VA (2006) model the dummy variable of family 
status to control for the selection problem.  My sample does not incur much sample selection problem 
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since I follow all the sample firms from the IPO.  Therefore, I use 2SLS regressions to model family 
ownership and examine its influence on Tobin’s Q.  Table B-3 presents the results of 2SLS regressions.  
The results confirm the findings of Table 17 that family ownership does not influence firm value in the 
whole panel.     
  [Insert Table B-3 about here.] 
Further, the firm fixed effects regressions in Section 6.4 remove the unobserved firm 
heterogeneity, but they do not solve the problem of family ownership being a time-varying endogenously 
determined variable.  Therefore, I consider unobserved firm heterogeneity with family ownership 
endogeneity and use 2SLS regressions with firm fixed effects to examine the influence of family 
ownership on Tobin’s Q.  Table B-4 presents the results of 2SLS regressions with firm fixed effects on 
the sample of family firm-years.  The results confirm the findings of Table 24 that family ownership has a 
negative impact on firm value among family firms.
15
     
  [Insert Table B-4 about here.] 
6.5. Firm performance and family exit 
An alternative way to examine the influence of family presence on firm performance is to 
compare performance with family presence and performance without family presence in the same firm.  
In my sample, 123 family IPOs experience family exit and become public nonfamily firms (groups (f) and 
(g) in Table 1).  I use this particular subsample and follow Pagano et al. (1998) to estimate the following 
model:                                                                .       , 
       ,        ,        , and         are dummy variables that equal one if family exit happens in year 
t, t-1, t-2, t-3, or t-n (n≥4), respectively.     is firm fixed effects and    is year fixed effects.  By 
estimating a fixed effects model, I use a firm before it becomes nonfamily firm as a control for itself after 
                                                          
15
 A caveat with the fixed effects 2SLS is indicated by the Hansen J-statistic, which is an overidentification test with 
the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term.  The low p-
values in models (2), (6), and (8) suggest that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10% or 5% level, respectively. 
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it becomes nonfamily event.  I also test the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of the post-exit year 
dummies equals zero.  The p-value of the F-test is reported in the last row of the table. 
[Insert Table 26 about here.] 
When performance is measured by Tobin’s Q, there is evidence that firm value increases in year 
2 and year 3 following family exit (model (1)).  When performance is measured by ROA, there is 
evidence that accounting performance decreases starting two years after family exit (model (5)).  
However, both results are possibly driven by some extreme values, because all the ratios with adjusted or 
restricted denominators do not show significant changes (models (2) to (4) and (6) to (8)).  Therefore, in 
this sample of 123 firms that change from family firms to nonfamily firms, there is no consistent evidence 
on the influence of family presence on firm performance.  
For sensitivity analysis, I exclude the subsample of 157 mergers with family exit (groups (h), (i), 
and (j) in Table 1) and replicate the tables in Sections 6.1 to 6.4 (Tables 17 to 25).  The results are 
provided in Appendix B, Section III (Tables B-5 to B-13).  All the results are similar to the results 
presented in Sections 6.1 to 6.4.  
6.6. Announcement returns of family firm mergers 
Another way of uncovering the influence of family characteristics on firm value is to examine the 
market reaction to family firm mergers.  In my sample, 192 family firms are the targets in merger events.  
Twenty-four mergers are family going-private transactions (group (e) in Table 1), 120 mergers represent 
complete family exit (group (k)), 18 mergers represent partial family exit (group (i)), and 19 mergers 
represent complete family exit through going-private transactions (group (j)).  In addition, 11 mergers are 
transitional, where the family remains as the majority family after the merger (see Exhibit 3).  I am able to 
identify 184 merger details from Thomson SDC Platinum’s M&A database.  Among the 184 mergers, 
122 involve public acquirers with stock traded on an American stock exchange and the rest 62 involve 
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private acquirers or foreign acquirers whose stock is not traded in the U.S.  I examine how the combined 
wealth of the 122 mergers is affected by family characteristics. 
Table 27 presents the summary statistics for the family firm mergers.  Panel A provides the 
statistics for the 122 mergers that involve public acquirers with stock traded on an American stock 
exchange.  Panel B provides the statistics for the 62 mergers that involve private acquirers or foreign 
acquirers whose stock is not traded in the U.S., and hence do not have the measure of relative size.  Panel 
C provides the statistics for the comparisons between mergers in Panel A and mergers in Panel B.  
Combined wealth effect is the combined abnormal return of the target and the acquirer, weighted by 
target size and acquirer size.  Cumulative abnormal return is calculated based on the market model.  The 
estimation period is 240 trading days beginning 300 days before the merger announcement with a 
minimum of 30 trading day observations. 
[Insert Table 27 about here.] 
Since the mergers in Panel B are mainly going private transactions with private acquirers, they 
are different from the mergers in Panel A in several ways.  For instance, 30% of the Panel A mergers are 
cash deals and 90% of the Panel B mergers are cash deal.  Compared to Panel B mergers, Panel A 
mergers include more high-tech targets (50% vs. 26%), fewer tender offers (24% vs. 39%), and fewer 
diversifying transactions (40% vs. 58%).  The median Panel A merger is significantly larger than the 
median Panel B merger.  Panel A mergers also have higher Tobin’s Q and are younger in age.  The 
average target size is 0.29 relative to the average acquirer size of the Panel A mergers.  The combined 
wealth effect of the Panel A mergers is positive over both windows and significant at the 5% or lower 
level.   
Table 28 presents the relation between the combined wealth effect and certain family 
characteristics prior to the merger.  Models (1) to (3) use a three-day event window and models (4) to (6) 
use a five-day event window.  In models (3) and (6), I include the family characteristics used by VA 
(2006) and AR (2003).  The main findings are that the various family characteristics do not influence the 
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combined wealth generated in the merger.  The overall market reaction suggests that the expected firm 
performance of the combined entity after the merger is not affected by the pre-merger family 
characteristics.  Therefore, the family appears to adjust its involvement in the firm and make exit decision 
as a rational response to the firm’s state of evolution.   
 [Insert Table 28 about here.] 
Table 29 presents the relation between the combined wealth effect and family factors prior to the 
merger.  The results confirm those of Table 28.  None of the family factors show any significant influence 
on the combined wealth effect.  Therefore, the overall market reaction does not vary with the factors for 
family characteristics, which further supports the premise that family characteristics evolve with the state 
of the firm in equilibrium. 
[Insert Table 29 about here.] 
6.7. Investment policies 
The findings in the previous sections suggest that in general, family characteristics do not lead to 
higher firm value, and even reduce firm value under certain conditions.  Since stronger family 
characteristics lead to longer family control horizons, as shown in Section 4 and Section 5, the results 
suggest that families act in their rational self-interest and choose to exit the firms when the benefits of 
family control do not outweigh the costs.  Since firm performance is affected by the investment horizon, I 
examine how family firms make investment decisions in this section.  I focus on the investments of R&D 
expenditures and capital expenditures, both as a percentage of total assets.  In addition, I follow 
Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2012) and examine the component of R&D expenditures in the firm’s total 
investments (the sum of R&D expenditures and capital expenditures).  Since R&D is usually considered 
riskier investment than capital expenditure (e.g., Kothari et al., 2002), the relative weight of R&D 
expenditures in total investments also reflects a firm’s risk taking incentives. 
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Table 30 presents the relation between family characteristics and firm investments.  Models (1) to 
(4) examine R&D expenditures and models (5) to (8) examine capital expenditures.  For each investment 
decision, I investigate the influence of family presence (models (1) and (5)), family ownership, excess 
voting rights, and family CEO (models (5) and (6)).  I follow Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2012) and 
distinguish between family firms with a lone founder and family firms with multiple family members in 
models (3) and (7).  I jointly test the effects of family ownership, excess voting rights, and family CEO 
generation in models (4) and (8). 
[Insert Table 30 about here.] 
The main findings are that family characteristics negatively influence the R&D investment but 
positively influence the fixed assets investment.  First, both family ownership and excess voting rights 
have a negative impact on R&D.  Second, firms with multiple family members have lower R&D.  Third, 
CEOs hired from outside the family are positively related to R&D.  In comparison, family presence has a 
positive effect on CAPEX, firms with a lone founder have higher CAPEX, and founder CEO has a 
positive impact on CAPEX.  These results are consistent with what Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2012) 
find and provide evidence that family firms tend to make more investment in safer fixed assets but less 
investment in riskier R&D projects.   
Table 31 presents the relation between family characteristics and R&D expenditures as a 
percentage of total investments.  The results are similar to those of Table 30.  The weight of R&D 
expenditures is negatively associated with family ownership, excess voting rights, and having multiple 
family members, but positively associated with the appearance of a CEO hired from outside the family.  
In addition, the magnitude of the effects is larger in all specifications compared to that of Table 30. 
[Insert Table 31 about here.] 
Next, I use factors extracted by principal component analysis for family characteristics to 
examine family influence on investment decisions in a more comprehensive way.  Factor 1 represents 
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involvement of the extended family, Factor 2 represents involvement of the founder, and Factor 3 
represents private benefits of control unique to the family.  Similar to the test design of Table 21, I use 
dummy variables to group the family firm-years based on their factor scores.  Table 32 presents the 
influence of family factors on R&D expenditures and capital expenditures.  The main findings are that 
R&D investment decreases with the involvement of extended family and capital expenditure is higher 
when family has high private benefits of control or low extended family involvement. 
[Insert Table 32 about here.] 
Table 33 presents the influence of family factors on R&D expenditures as a percentage of total 
investments.  The results are similar to those of Table 32.  The weight of R&D expenditures is negatively 
associated with Factor 1 (Extended Family).  The magnitude of the effects is larger compared to that of 
Table 32.  Therefore, as the influence of the founder’s extended family (i.e., parents, spouse, siblings, 
children, etc.) becomes larger, the firm invests less in R&D projects.  Since R&D is usually considered 
riskier investment than fixed assets investment, the results suggest that extended family involvement 
tends to reduce the risk-taking behavior by making less risky investment. 
[Insert Table 33 about here.] 
In general, Section 6.6 shows that family firms prefer investing in safer fixed assets relative to 
riskier R&D projects, which indicates greater risk aversion of family firms compared to nonfamily firms.  
Combined with the results of Section 6.2 that extended family involvement is associated with higher 
ROA but not higher Tobin’s Q and the results of Section 6.3 that higher family ownership is associated 
with higher ROA but lower Tobin’s Q, the family’s investment decisions suggest that families tend to 
focus on short-term accounting profitability and are willing to forgo risky investment opportunities that 
might increase firm value in the long run. 
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7. Conclusion  
The academic literature on family firms suggests that ownership, management, and control by the 
founding family have both positive and negative effects.  On the one hand, family commitment can lead 
to a longer firm horizon, which mitigates agency problems associated with myopic behavior.  On the 
other hand, the ability of founding families to consume private benefits at the expense of nonfamily 
shareholders creates agency problems that result in inefficient contracting and potentially lower firm 
value.  Sample selection issues, however, impose impediments to the ability of researchers to empirically 
examine these characteristics in cross-sectional samples.    
To provide better insight into the influence of family characteristics in family firms, I collect a 
longitudinal dataset of firms that go public in 1993, 1997, and 2001.  I follow the evolution of each firm 
until the end of 2011 or until it is delisted from the stock exchange.  Using characteristics observable at 
the IPO, I find that stronger family involvement in the firm leads to a longer horizon of family control.  
Firms that meet the empirical definition of a family firm but lack the indications of strong family 
involvement are not characterized by longer horizons.  These findings indicate the sample selection bias 
in cross-sectional samples, where we cannot observe the family firms that have been delisted from the 
stock exchange or the family characteristics before the firms become nonfamily firms.   
My analysis also has important implications for our ability to generalize results from cross-
sectional studies of family firms.  I find that only 36% of the IPOs survive 10 years after going public and 
during the firm’s evolution, families actively make exit decisions.  Families retain control of the firm for a 
longer time period when family characteristics indicate higher founder involvement and extended family 
involvement, which supports the notion that families seek to maintain longer horizons.  However, these 
horizons appear to be related to control and not to long-term investment policies that create value.  I find 
that family characteristics do not have positive influence on firm value and that family firms tend to have 
less R&D expenditures but more capital expenditures than nonfamily firms.  In comparison, studies using 
samples of older and larger firms document better performance of family firms.  Since those samples 
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likely suffer from survivorship bias and self-selection bias, readers should be aware of the limitations in 
generalizing the net benefits or costs of family control in cross-sectional studies.   
The results of my study suggest an empirical approach that improves our ability to test 
hypotheses about family firms.  Specifically, controlling for cohort effects and considering firms in 
similar evolution stages can help alleviate the concerns associated with selection issues.  If firms in 
different evolution stages are pooled together in empirical tests, it is likely that the conclusions are 
influenced by the existence of entrepreneurial firms in which the founders plan to exit in the short run, 
nonfamily firms that represent prior family firms with inefficient family control, and family firms in 
which the families plan to maintain long-term control.  Thus, without differentiating firms in different 
phases of family control, our understanding of the influence of founders and families are incomplete at 
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Appendix A: Data sources and variable definitions  
This appendix presents the data sources and variable definitions.   
Variable Source Definition 
Total assets Compustat Book assets in millions of dollars; AT 
Firm age (years) Jay Ritter's IPO data website Number of years since the firm's inception 
# Segments Compustat 
Number of business and operating segments that account for at least 10% of 
sales, one if missing 
CAPEX intensity (%) Compustat Capital expenditures divided by book assets; CAPX/AT 
R&D intensity (%) Compustat 
Research and development expense divided by book assets, zero if missing; 
XRD/AT 
SG&A (%) Compustat 
Selling, General and Administrative expense divided by book assets; 
XSGA/AT 
Leverage (%) Compustat 
Long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by book assets; 
(DLTT+DLC)/AT 
Cash holdings (%) Compustat Cash and short-term investments divided by book assets; CHE/AT 
Dividend payout based on EBITDA (%) Compustat Ex-date dividends divided by EBITDA; DVPSX_F×CSHO/EBITDA 
Industry median mkt-to-book Compustat 
Median market value of equity divided by book value of equity in a given 
Fama-French 17 Industry and year; PRCC_F*CSHO/CEQ 
Dual class stock (0/1) Corporate SEC filings 
One if the firm has at least one class of stock that deviates from one voter 
per share 
Tobin's Q Compustat 
Market value of assets divided by book value of assets; 
(AT+PRCC_F*CSHO-CEQ-TXDB)/AT 
ROA (%) Compustat Earnings before interest divided by total assets; EBITDA/AT 
  Continued on next page 
   
 
 
Appendix A – Continued    
Sales growth (%) Compustat One-year change in sales; (REVTt –REVTt-1)/REVTt-1 
Stock return (%) Compustat One-year change in stock price; (PRCC_Ft-PRCC_Ft-1)/PRCC_Ft-1 
Cash flow volatility Compustat 
Standard deviation of quarterly EBITDA over assets for a five-year window 
between year t and year t+4 
Annual stock return volatility CRSP 
Annualized standard deviation of daily CRSP stock returns in a given 
calendar year 
Idiosyncratic risk CRSP 
Standard deviation of the residuals estimated from the market model 
(CAPM) 
Market risk CRSP Beta coefficient estimated from the market model (CAPM) 
Family firm (0/1) 
Corporate SEC filings, 
complemented with 
information from company 
websites, news reports, and 
online searches 
Firms in which the founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, 
executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate 
family ownership of outstanding equity is at least 5% 
Total family cash flow rights (%) Corporate SEC filings Aggregate family cash flow rights of shares outstanding 
Total family voting rights (%) Corporate SEC filings Aggregate family voting rights of votes outstanding 
Family ownership wedge (%) Corporate SEC filings Family voting rights-family control rights 
Founder's cash flow rights (%) Corporate SEC filings Founder's cash flow rights of shares outstanding 
Founder's voting rights (%) Corporate SEC filings Founder's voting rights of votes outstanding 
Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) Corporate SEC filings Founder's family members' cash flow rights of shares outstanding 
Nonfounder family members' voting rights (%) Corporate SEC filings Founder's family members' voting rights of votes outstanding 
  Continued on next page 
   
 
 
Appendix A – Continued   
# Family executives and directors Corporate SEC filings 
Number of family members who serve as CEO, President, Vice President, 
other chief officers, and/or directors 
# Family executives Corporate SEC filings 
Number of family members who serve as CEO, President, Vice President, 
and/or other chief officers 
# Family directors Corporate SEC filings Number of family members who serve as directors 
Founder CEO (0/1) Corporate SEC filings One if founder serves as the CEO 
Founder Chair (0/1) Corporate SEC filings One if founder serves as the Chairperson 
# Nonfounder family executives Corporate SEC filings 
Number of founder's family members who serve as CEO, President, Vice 
President, and/or other chief officers 
# Nonfounder family directors Corporate SEC filings Number of founder's family members who serve as directors 
Family CEO (0/1) Corporate SEC filings One if a family member serves as the CEO 
Latest family CEO generation Corporate SEC filings 
Latest family generation of the CEO; 0=nonfamily, 1=first generation, 
2=second generation, etc. 
Family descendant (0/1) Corporate SEC filings 
One if family descendants are involved in the firm as employees and/or 
shareholders 
# Family descendants Corporate SEC filings 
Number of family descendants who are involved in the firm as employees 
and/or shareholders 
Co-founding family cash flow rights (%) Corporate SEC filings Cash flow rights of co-founding families 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) Corporate SEC filings Voting rights of co-founding families 
Family firm name (0/1) Corporate SEC filings One if the firm's name includes a family member's name 
Estate planning vehicles (0/1) Corporate SEC filings One if there are family trusts, estates, or foundations 
  Continued on next page 
   
 
 
Appendix A – Continued   
Nonfamily active blkholder cash flow rights (%) Corporate SEC filings 
Cash flow rights of nonfamily blockholders who control board seats and/or 
management positions 
Nonfamily active blkholder voting rights (%) Corporate SEC filings 
Voting rights of nonfamily blockholders who control board seats and/or 
management positions 
Nonfamily passive blkholder cash flow rights (%) Corporate SEC filings 
Cash flow rights of nonfamily blockholders who do not control board seats 
or management positions 
Nonfamily passive blkholder voting rights (%) Corporate SEC filings 





Exhibit 1. Time-series changes of sample firms by IPO cohort year 
The sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 firms that go 
public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer 
reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, 
executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at 
least 5%.  The sample firms are from Thomson SDC Platinum’s Global New Issues database.  I exclude spinoffs, 
carve-outs, foreign issuers, partnerships, trusts, unit offerings, mutual funds, savings and loans, financial and utility 
firms, rollups, firms that were public earlier in their history, and IPOs with an offer price less than five dollars or 
proceeds less than five millions.  I require that the sample firms have Compustat data after the offering and are listed 
on CRSP within one year of the offering.  In each exhibit, the upper gray bars represent the number of nonfamily 
firms and the lower colored bars represent the number of family firms.  The dotted line represents the percentage of 
surviving firms and the solid line represents the percentage of family firms.  Exhibit 1.A describes the 1993 IPO 
cohort, Exhibit 1.B describes the 1997 IPO cohort, and Exhibit 1.C describes the 2001 IPO cohort. 
Exhibit 1.A. Sample composition and percentage of family firms (IPO year = 1993) 
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Exhibit 1 – Continued 
 
Exhibit 1.B. Sample composition and percentage of family firms (IPO year = 1997) 
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# family firms # nonfamily firms family firms % surviving firms %
Exhibit 2. Survival of family firms by IPO cohort year 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, 
and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the 
firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of 
outstanding equity is at least 5%.  Exhibit 2.A describes the number of family firms each year for the three IPO 
cohorts, respectively.  Exhibit 2.B describes the time-series percentage of surviving family firms since the IPO year 
for the three IPO cohorts, respectively. 
Exhibit 2.A. Number of family firms by year 
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Exhibit 3. Evolution outcomes of sample firms 
The sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the 
IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at least 5%.  A family 
IPO has five possible outcomes numbered in the blue blocks: 1) the firm remains as a public family firm until the end of the sample period, 2) the family exits the 
firm and the firm becomes a public nonfamily firm, 3) the family firm fails and the stock exchange delists the firm, 4) the family exits the firm when the firm 















Exhibit 4. Family firm evolution outcomes by IPO cohort year 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, 
and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the 
firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of 
outstanding equity is at least 5%.  In the exhibit, the lower blue bars represent the percentage of family firms in 
which the family maintains control, including 1) firms that remains as public family firms until the end of the 
sample period, and 2) firms that go private as family firms.  The middle red bars represent the percentage of family 
firms in which family exit occurs, including 1) firms that become public nonfamily firms, and 2) firms that merge 
into other firms or go private.  The upper green bars represent the percentage of family firms that fail and are 
delisted by the stock exchange. 
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Exhibit 5. Family firm evolution outcomes between different time periods 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, 
and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the 
firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of 
outstanding equity is at least 5%.  In each exhibits, the lower blue bars represent the percentage of family firms in 
which the family maintains control, including 1) firms that remains as public family firms until the end of the 
sample period, and 2) firms that go private as family firms.  The middle red bars represent the percentage of family 
firms in which family exit occurs, including 1) firms that become public nonfamily firms, and 2) firms that merge 
into other firms or go private.  The upper green bars represent the percentage of family firms that fail and are 
delisted by the stock exchange.  Exhibit 5.A describes the 1993 IPO cohort, Exhibit 5.B describes the 1997 IPO 
cohort, and Exhibit 5.C describes the 2001 IPO cohort. 
Exhibit 5.A. Evolution outcomes between different time periods (IPO year = 1993) 
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Exhibit 5 – Continued 
 
Exhibit 5.B. Evolution outcomes between different time periods (IPO year = 1997) 
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Exhibit 6. Family firm evolution outcomes by firm age at the event 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, 
and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the 
firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of 
outstanding equity is at least 5%.  Firm age is measured as the number of years between the firm’s founding and the 
event year.  In the exhibit, the lower blue bars represent the percentage of family firms in which the family 
maintains control, including 1) firms that remains as public family firms until the end of the sample period, and 2) 
firms that go private as family firms.  The middle red bars represent the percentage of family firms in which family 
exit occurs, including 1) firms that become public nonfamily firms, and 2) firms that merge into other firms or go 
private.  The upper green bars represent the percentage of family firms that fail and are delisted by the stock 
exchange. 
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Exhibit 7. Family firm evolution outcomes by firm age at the IPO 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, 
and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the 
firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of 
outstanding equity is at least 5%.  Firm age is measured as the number of years between the firm’s founding and the 
IPO year.  In the exhibit, the lower blue bars represent the percentage of family firms in which the family maintains 
control, including 1) firms that remains as public family firms until the end of the sample period, and 2) firms that 
go private as family firms.  The middle red bars represent the percentage of family firms in which family exit occurs, 
including 1) firms that become public nonfamily firms, and 2) firms that merge into other firms or go private.  The 
upper green bars represent the percentage of family firms that fail and are delisted by the stock exchange. 
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Exhibit 8. Family firm evolution outcomes by Fama-French 17 Industry Definitions 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, 
and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the 
firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of 
outstanding equity is at least 5%.  In Exhibit 8.A, the lower blue bars represent the percentage of family firms in 
which the family maintains control, including 1) firms that remains as public family firms until the end of the 
sample period, and 2) firms that go private as family firms.  The middle red bars represent the percentage of family 
firms in which family exit occurs, including 1) firms that become public nonfamily firms, and 2) firms that merge 
into other firms or go private.  The upper green bars represent the percentage of family firms that fail and are 
delisted by the stock exchange.  Exhibit 8.B provides the industry definitions. 
Exhibit 8.A. Evolution outcomes by Fama-French 17 Industry Definitions 
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Industry Definition Industry Definition 
1 Food 2 Mining and Minerals 
3 Oil and Petroleum Products 4 Textiles, Apparel & Footwear 
5 Consumer Durables 6 Chemicals 
7 Drugs, Soap, Perfumes, Tobacco 8 Construction and Construction Materials 
9 Steel Works 10 Fabricated Products 
11 Machinery and Business Equipment 12 Automobiles 
13 Transportation 14 Utilities 
15 Retail Stores 16 Banks, Insurance Companies, and Other Financials 
17 Other   
Exhibit 9. Family firm evolution outcomes by industries with and without high private benefits of control 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, 
and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the 
firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of 
outstanding equity is at least 5%.  In Exhibit 9.A, the lower blue bars represent the percentage of family firms in 
which the family maintains control, including 1) firms that remains as public family firms until the end of the 
sample period, and 2) firms that go private as family firms.  The middle red bars represent the percentage of family 
firms in which family exit occurs, including 1) firms that become public nonfamily firms, and 2) firms that merge 
into other firms or go private.  The upper green bars represent the percentage of family firms that fail and are 
delisted by the stock exchange.  Exhibit 9.B provides the industry definitions. 
Exhibit 9.A. Evolution outcomes by industries with and without high private benefits of control 
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SIC Code Definition SIC Code Definition 
13 Oil & Gas Extraction 27 Printing & Publishing 
28 Chemical & Allied Products 29 Petroleum & Coal Products 
37 Transportation Equipment 48 Communications 
78 Motion Pictures 79 Amusement & Recreation Services 
Exhibit 10. Time-series changes in family characteristics (mean values) by IPO cohort year 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, 
and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the 
firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of 
outstanding equity is at least 5%.  Exhibit 10.A presents the changes of total family cash flow rights.  Exhibit 10.B 
presents the changes of total family voting rights.  Exhibit 10.C presents the changes of total number of family 
executives and directors.  Exhibit 10.D presents the changes of family firms with family CEO. 
Exhibit 10.A. Total family cash flow rights (%) since IPO (t) 
 
Exhibit 10.B. Total family voting rights (%) since IPO (t) 
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Exhibit 10 – Continued 
 
Exhibit 10.C. Total number of family executives and directors since IPO (t) 
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Exhibit 11. Time-series changes of factor scores (mean values) by IPO cohort year 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, 
and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the 
firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of 
outstanding equity is at least 5%.  The factors are generated by principal component analysis (PCA).  Exhibit 11.A 
presents the changes of Factor 1 (Extended Family).  Exhibit 11.B presents the changes of Factor 2 (Founder).  
Exhibit 11.C presents the changes of Factor 3 (Private Benefits of Control).   
Exhibit 11.A. Factor 1 (Extended Family) since IPO (t) 
 
Exhibit 11.B. Factor 2 (Founder) since IPO (t) 
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Exhibit 11 – Continued 
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Table 1. Survival time of sample firms 
The sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the 
IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at least 5%.  Survival 
time is measured as the number of months between IPO and last sample observation.  Panel A provides the statistics for different groups based on evolution 
outcomes and Panel B provides the statistics for comparisons between different groups. 
A. Survival time: # Months between IPO and last sample observation mean p50 min p25 p75 max sd N 
(a) IPO firm survival time 100.57 80 0 42 167 234 68.53 604 
(b) Family IPO firm survival time 102.16 81 0 42 170 234 69.74 510 
(c) Nonfamily IPO firm survival time 91.94 80 8 39 131 226 61.18 94 
A.1. Family IPO firms mean p50 min p25 p75 max sd N 
(d) Survival time as public family firm until 2011 192.78 183 122 174 223 231 30.96 74 
(e) Survival time until delisting for going private as family firm 71.00 70 12 39 79 204 44.21 24 
(f) Survival time until family exit/becoming public nonfamily firm 69.33 54 0 28 104 216 56.65 123 
(g) Survival time after family exit/becoming public nonfamily firm 70.51 60 6 24 96 230 54.34 123 
(h) Survival time until delisting for merger (family exit) 67.24 53 4 29 86 218 51.96 120 
(i) Survival time until delisting for merger (minority family afterwards) 47.39 32 3 15 51 170 46.27 18 
(j) Survival time until delisting for going private (family exit) 106.05 93 19 50 167 198 61.48 19 
(k) Survival time until delisting for firm failure 60.56 49 0 30 82 169 40.12 132 
A.2. Nonfamily IPO firms mean p50 min p25 p75 max sd N 
(l) Survival time until 2011 176.71 176 125 134 220 226 40.10 17 
(m) Survival time until delisting for merger 64.13 54 8 33 86 205 42.28 46 
(n) Survival time until delisting for firm failure 86.71 75 10 40 119 219 52.71 31 
B. Survival time comparison between different groups diff. in mean p-value of t test diff. in median p-value of Wilcoxon test 
(b) - (c) 10.22 0.18 1.00 0.31 
(e) - (j) -35.05** 0.04 -23.50 0.13 
(f) - (g) -1.18 0.87 -6.00 0.72 
(f) - (h) 2.09 0.77 1.50 0.98 
(f) - (i) 21.94 0.12 22.50* 0.10 
(h) - (i) 19.85 0.12 21.00* 0.06 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics for firm characteristics and stock ownership 
The sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the 
IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at least 5%.  Panel A 
provides statistics for firm characteristics and Panel B provides statistics for stock ownership.  Appendix A provides data sources and variable definitions.  All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. 
A. Firm characteristics mean p50 min p10 p25 p75 p90 max sd N 
Family firm (0/1) 0.73 
       
0.44 5827 
Total assets (millions) 408.30 104.24 2.44 14.09 35.76 348.80 999.41 5,557.17 855.41 5787 
Firm age (years) 20.06 15 1 5 9 24 39 98 18.01 5827 
# Segments 1.27 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 0.62 5827 
CAPEX intensity (%) 7.18 4.32 0.11 0.99 2.14 8.48 16.98 44.82 8.38 5738 
R&D intensity (%) 9.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.68 26.09 104.28 17.33 5787 
SG&A (%) 40.41 31.94 1.30 6.94 16.55 53.63 82.45 191.82 34.70 5247 
Leverage (%) 21.60 11.87 0.00 0.00 0.36 35.46 57.55 116.18 25.32 5787 
Cash holdings (%) 25.19 15.44 0.00 0.86 3.29 41.25 66.70 93.68 25.88 5787 
Dividend payout based on EBITDA (%) 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.87 3.70 5646 
Industry median mkt-to-book 2.11 2.05 0.92 1.47 1.72 2.43 2.79 4.05 0.54 5809 
Ind. with high pvt. bft. of control (0/1) 0.19        0.39 5809 
Dual class stock (0/1) 0.05 
       
0.22 5827 
Tobin's Q 2.28 1.65 0.58 0.90 1.14 2.68 4.46 11.30 1.86 5171 
ROA_EBITDA (%) 1.12 10.36 -181.09 -30.58 -1.65 17.25 24.71 40.85 33.01 5766 
Sales growth (%) 27.07 14.91 -60.58 -16.04 0.70 37.49 77.95 327.83 54.98 4938 
Stock return (%) 17.61 -1.61 -83.91 -57.95 -34.24 41.30 104.59 477.71 86.27 4316 
Cash flow volatility 4.62 2.45 0.36 0.82 1.36 5.01 9.76 45.83 6.63 4905 
Annual stock return volatility 0.72 0.65 0.25 0.37 0.48 0.87 1.16 2.10 0.34 5165 
Idiosyncratic risk 0.69 0.61 0.21 0.34 0.44 0.83 1.12 2.08 0.35 5165 
Market risk 0.92 0.85 -0.52 0.13 0.43 1.35 1.86 2.95 0.69 5165 
        Continued on next page 
           
           
Table 2 – Continued           
           
           
B. Ownership (% of shares or votes outstanding) mean p50 min p10 p25 p75 p90 max sd N 
Total family cash flow rights 16.57 7.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 27.10 52.05 77.89 20.72 5771 
Total family voting rights 17.70 7.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.22 55.4 88.56 22.74 5771 
Co-founding family cash flow rights 1.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.4 29.40 4.97 5771 
Co-founding family voting rights 1.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.34 28.80 4.91 5771 
Nonfamily active blkholder cash flow rights 7.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.07 27.8 63.38 14.18 5771 
Nonfamily active blkholder voting rights 7.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.89 28.43 66.79 14.64 5771 
Nonfamily passive blkholder cash flow rights 16.24 13.45 0.00 0.00 5.10 25.20 37.1 58.41 14.47 5771 














Table 3. Comparisons of firm characteristics between family firms and nonfamily firms 
The sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the 
IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at least 5%.  Panel A 
provides statistics for firms at the IPO, Panel B provides statistics for all post-IPO firm-years, and Panel C provides statistics for firms at the end of the sample 
period.  Appendix A provides data sources and variable definitions.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. 
A. At the IPO 
Family IPOs Nonfamily IPOs 
diff. in mean 
diff. in median 
(Wilcoxon) mean p50 N mean p50 N 
Total assets (millions) 47.50 19.84 486 230.66 34.91 91 -183.16*** -15.07*** 
Firm age (years) 11.49 8.00 510 25.82 14.00 94 -14.33*** -6.00*** 
# Segments 1.03 1.00 510 1.14 1.00 94 -0.10*** 0.00*** 
CAPEX intensity (%) 9.47 6.13 477 8.13 5.15 88 1.34 0.97 
R&D intensity (%) 14.68 0.00 486 12.98 0.00 91 1.70 0.00 
SG&A (%) 62.01 53.64 435 52.97 38.66 82 9.04 14.98** 
Leverage (%) 33.54 25.91 486 38.89 37.86 91 -5.35 -11.95* 
Cash holdings (%) 21.04 8.82 486 16.79 4.03 91 4.25 4.79** 
Industry median mkt-to-book 2.19 2.14 496 2.03 2.10 93 0.15** 0.04** 
Ind. with high pvt. bft. of control (0/1) 0.19 0.00 496 0.17 0.00 93 0.02 0.00 
Dual class stock (0/1) 0.06 0.00 510 0.04 0.00 94 0.02 0.00 
ROA_EBITDA (%) -3.41 13.75 481 -2.46 13.24 90 -0.95 0.50 
IPO proceeds (millions) 37.71 27.60 510 57.11 40.20 94 -19.39*** -12.60*** 
IPO offer price 11.47 11.00 510 12.35 12.00 94 -0.88* -1.00* 
IPO first-day return (%) 14.31 8.21 510 15.51 7.60 94 -1.20 0.61 
B. All post-IPO firm-years 
Family firm-years Nonfamily firm-years 
diff. in mean 
diff. in median 
(Wilcoxon) mean p50 N mean p50 N 
Total assets (millions) 422.66 117.41 3738 501.94 147.84 1472 -79.27 -30.43 
Firm age (years) 17.77 15.00 3749 28.49 20.00 1474 -10.72*** -5.00*** 
# Segments 1.27 1.00 3749 1.34 1.00 1474 -0.07 0.00*** 
CAPEX intensity (%) 7.44 4.32 3707 5.71 3.74 1466 1.73*** 0.57*** 
R&D intensity (%) 7.91 0.00 3738 9.71 0.57 1472 -1.80 -0.57*** 
       
Continued on next page 
Table 3 – Continued         
         
         
SG&A (%) 37.88 30.56 3434 39.06 31.51 1296 -1.17 -0.94 
Leverage (%) 20.69 10.74 3738 18.88 8.63 1472 1.82 2.12*** 
Cash holdings (%) 25.23 15.93 3738 26.97 17.86 1472 -1.74 -1.93 
Dividend payout based on EBITDA (%) 0.90 0.00 3673 1.06 0.00 1456 -0.16 0.00** 
Industry median mkt-to-book 2.12 2.05 3748 2.07 2.04 1472 0.05 0.01*** 
Ind. with high pvt. bft. of control (0/1) 0.19 0.00 3748 0.19 0.00 1472 0.00 0.00 
Dual class stock (0/1) 0.05 0.00 3749 0.03 0.00 1474 0.02 0.00*** 
ROA_EBITDA (%) 2.21 10.43 3726 0.06 9.14 1469 2.15 1.28** 
Tobin’s Q 2.30 1.66 3696 2.24 1.63 1464 0.06 0.03 
Sales growth (%) 29.58 16.84 3565 20.53 10.84 1373 9.05*** 6.00*** 
Stock return (%) 17.61 -1.95 3071 17.64 -0.29 1245 -0.03 -1.65 
Annual stock return volatility 0.72 0.65 3701 0.73 0.63 1464 -0.01 0.02* 
Idiosyncratic risk 0.69 0.62 3701 0.69 0.60 1464 -0.01 0.02** 
Market risk 0.92 0.85 3701 0.94 0.87 1464 -0.02 -0.02 
C. At the end of 2011 
Family firms Nonfamily firms 
diff. in mean 
diff. in median 
(Wilcoxon) mean p50 N mean p50 N 
Total assets (millions) 1,186.86 386.56 73 1,020.12 408.67 63 166.74 -22.11 
Firm age (years) 29.11 25.00 74 34.68 28.00 63 -5.57* -3.00* 
# Segments 1.64 1.00 74 1.51 1.00 63 0.13 0.00 
CAPEX intensity (%) 4.70 3.63 73 5.56 4.31 63 -0.86 -0.68 
R&D intensity (%) 7.88 0.55 73 10.11 0.79 63 -2.23 -0.23 
SG&A (%) 33.19 33.81 68 37.21 26.98 57 -4.03 6.83 
Leverage (%) 17.11 7.80 73 14.04 1.33 63 3.08 6.48 
Cash holdings (%) 23.52 15.22 73 24.41 17.48 63 -0.89 -2.26 
Dividend payout based on EBITDA (%) 2.64 0.00 73 2.28 0.00 61 0.36 0.00 
Industry median mkt-to-book 1.74 1.86 74 1.80 1.86 63 -0.05 0.00 
Ind. with high pvt. bft. of control (0/1) 0.22 0.00 74 0.17 0.00 63 0.04 0.00 
Dual class stock (0/1) 0.07 0.00 74 0.02 0.00 63 0.05 0.00 
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ROA_EBITDA (%) 5.33 10.41 73 1.34 11.88 63 3.99 -1.48 
Tobin's Q 1.92 1.44 73 2.10 1.37 62 -0.18 0.07 
Sales growth (%) 19.69 9.12 71 12.91 11.45 61 6.77 -2.33 
Stock return (%) 7.91 1.30 66 -3.06 -12.85 60 10.97 14.15 
Annual stock return volatility 0.55 0.49 74 0.58 0.54 63 -0.03 -0.05 
Idiosyncratic risk 0.44 0.38 74 0.47 0.39 63 -0.03 0.00 
Market risk 1.20 1.22 74 1.24 1.23 63 -0.04 -0.01 













Table 4. Summary statistics for family characteristics 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  
The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the 
founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding 
equity is at least 5%.  Panel A provides statistics for family firms at the IPO, Panel B provides statistics for all post-IPO family firm-years, and Panel C provides 
statistics for family firms at the end of the sample period.  Appendix A provides data sources and variable definitions.  All ownership variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% percentiles. 
A. Family firms at the IPO mean p50 min p10 p25 p75 p90 max sd N 
Total family cash flow rights (%) 29.13 21.20 0.02 3.00 8.07 49.13 65.82 77.89 23.61 510 
Total family voting rights (%) 30.51 21.75 0.02 3.03 8.18 51.60 67.81 88.56 25.44 510 
Family ownership wedge: voting rights-cash flow rights 1.35 0.00 -12.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 49.61 6.87 510 
Founder's cash flow rights (%) 24.10 16.75 0.00 1.64 6.15 39.20 59.32 73.00 21.56 510 
Founder's voting rights (%) 25.30 16.81 0.00 1.68 6.20 41.40 63.04 85.59 23.31 510 
Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 4.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 15.62 62.98 12.89 510 
Nonfounder family members' voting rights (%) 5.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 15.62 74.47 14.02 510 
# Family executives and directors 1.35 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 6.00 0.79 510 
# Family executives 1.01 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 0.79 510 
# Family directors 1.26 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 6.00 0.74 510 
Founder CEO (0/1) 0.56 
       
0.50 510 
Founder Chair (0/1) 0.61 
       
0.49 510 
# Nonfounder family executives 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4.00 0.57 510 
# Nonfounder family directors 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.00 0.66 510 
Family CEO (0/1) 0.61 
       
0.49 510 
Latest family CEO generation 0.68 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.60 510 
Family descendant (0/1) 0.15 
       
0.36 510 
# Family descendants 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 8.00 1.01 510 
Co-founding family cash flow rights (%) 4.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.80 16.95 29.40 7.81 510 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) 4.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.80 16.41 28.80 7.69 510 
Family firm name (0/1) 0.13 
       
0.33 510 
Estate planning vehicles (0/1) 0.04               0.20 510 
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B. All post-IPO family firm-years mean p50 min p10 p25 p75 p90 max sd N 
Total family cash flow rights (%) 21.83 13.98 0.02 1.67 5.15 34.89 55.91 77.89 20.67 3700 
Total family voting rights (%) 23.40 14.49 0.02 1.65 5.18 36.60 59.68 88.56 23.03 3700 
Family ownership wedge: voting rights-cash flow rights 1.54 0.00 -16.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 51.95 7.56 3700 
Founder's cash flow rights (%) 17.13 10.04 0.00 0.31 3.14 26.36 45.36 73.00 18.24 3700 
Founder's voting rights (%) 18.39 10.28 0.00 0.30 3.14 27.77 49.34 85.59 20.24 3700 
Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 4.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 16.18 62.98 12.23 3700 
Nonfounder family members' voting rights (%) 4.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 16.28 74.47 13.39 3700 
# Family executives and directors 1.36 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 6.00 0.75 3700 
# Family executives 0.92 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 0.78 3700 
# Family directors 1.28 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 6.00 0.72 3700 
Founder CEO (0/1) 0.52 
       
0.50 3700 
Founder Chair (0/1) 0.64 
       
0.48 3700 
# Nonfounder family executives 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.00 0.59 3700 
# Nonfounder family directors 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.00 0.72 3700 
Family CEO (0/1) 0.59 
       
0.49 3700 
Latest family CEO generation 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.64 3700 
Family descendant (0/1) 0.19 
       
0.39 3700 
# Family descendants 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 8.00 1.01 3700 
Co-founding family cash flow rights (%) 2.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.00 29.40 5.29 3700 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) 2.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.97 28.80 5.24 3700 
Family firm name (0/1) 0.13 
       
0.34 3700 
Estate planning vehicles (0/1) 0.03 
       
0.17 3700 
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C. Family firms at the end of 2011 mean p50 min p10 p25 p75 p90 max sd N 
Total family cash flow rights (%) 13.16 7.00 0.02 0.74 2.00 18.58 31.53 62.39 15.20 74 
Total family voting rights (%) 15.39 7.00 0.02 0.74 2.00 19.09 44.81 85.28 19.87 74 
Family ownership wedge: voting rights-cash flow rights 2.22 0.00 -0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 49.93 9.49 74 
Founder's cash flow rights (%) 9.91 4.61 0.00 0.00 0.61 15.31 26.80 62.39 13.04 74 
Founder's voting rights (%) 11.64 4.61 0.00 0.00 0.61 15.31 29.87 69.12 16.93 74 
Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 3.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 10.38 51.43 9.07 74 
Nonfounder family members' voting rights (%) 3.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 10.38 74.47 10.94 74 
# Family executives and directors 1.26 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 0.68 74 
# Family executives 0.74 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 0.78 74 
# Family directors 1.16 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 0.68 74 
Founder CEO (0/1) 0.38 
       
0.49 74 
Founder Chair (0/1) 0.54 
       
0.50 74 
# Nonfounder family executives 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 0.54 74 
# Nonfounder family directors 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 0.71 74 
Family CEO (0/1) 0.47 
       
0.50 74 
Latest family CEO generation 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.67 74 
Family descendant (0/1) 0.27 
       
0.45 74 
# Family descendants 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 0.83 74 
Co-founding family cash flow rights (%) 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.62 1.63 74 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.62 1.63 74 
Family firm name (0/1) 0.14 
       
0.34 74 





Table 5. Correlation matrix of family characteristics 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  
The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the 
founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding 
equity is at least 5%.  Panel A is based on 510 family IPO observations.  Panel B is based on 4,210 family firm-years. 
Panel A. All family firms at the IPO (n=510) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Total family cash flow rights (%) 
           (2) # Family executives and directors 0.45 
          (3) Family CEO (0/1) 0.35 0.33 
         (4) # Nonfounder family executives 0.35 0.71 0.24 
        (5) # Nonfounder family directors 0.37 0.71 0.17 0.76 
       (6) Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 0.43 0.42 0.12 0.63 0.70 
      (7) Family descendant (0/1) 0.34 0.49 0.07 0.55 0.57 0.54 
     (8) Founder CEO (0/1) 0.22 0.17 0.90 -0.03 -0.09 -0.19 -0.13 
    (9) Founder Chair (0/1) 0.32 0.17 0.34 -0.06 -0.04 -0.13 -0.05 0.42 
   (10) Founder's cash flow rights (%) 0.82 0.24 0.30 -0.02 -0.04 -0.16 0.02 0.37 0.43 
  (11) Family firm name (0/1) 0.24 0.23 0.14 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.10 0.04 0.13 
 (12) Family ownership wedge 0.13 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.19 
Panel B. All family firm-years (n=4,210) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Total family cash flow rights (%) 
           (2) # Family executives and directors 0.40 
          (3) Family CEO (0/1) 0.28 0.28 
         (4) # Nonfounder family executives 0.33 0.71 0.26 
        (5) # Nonfounder family directors 0.35 0.75 0.16 0.74 
       (6) Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 0.47 0.42 0.09 0.59 0.68 
      (7) Family descendant (0/1) 0.35 0.51 0.09 0.57 0.63 0.57 
     (8) Founder CEO (0/1) 0.15 0.09 0.86 -0.08 -0.16 -0.23 -0.16 
    (9) Founder Chair (0/1) 0.21 0.10 0.34 -0.10 -0.15 -0.22 -0.15 0.45 
   (10) Founder's cash flow rights (%) 0.80 0.17 0.25 -0.03 -0.07 -0.15 0.01 0.32 0.39 
  (11) Family firm name (0/1) 0.18 0.24 0.15 0.20 0.24 0.18 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.09 
 (12) Family ownership wedge 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.21 
Table 6. Principal component analysis of family characteristics 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, 
and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the 
firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of 
outstanding equity is at least 5%.  Principal component analysis (PCA) generates factors that extract the most 
information contained by the original variables.  The first factor is the linear combination of the original variables 
and it explains the highest proportion of the total variance, the second factor is the linear combination that explains 
the highest proportion of the remaining variance, and so forth.  I keep factors with eigenvalues greater than one.  
Panel A presents the PCA of family characteristics based on 510 family IPO observations.  Panel B presents the 
PCA based on 4,210 family firm-years.  Eigenvalue is the variance of a factor.  Proportion is the proportion of the 
total variance that each factor explains.  Cumulative proportion is the cumulative proportion of the total variance 
explained.  The factor loadings are multiplied by 100 and rounded to the nearest integer. 
Panel A. PCA of family characteristics at the IPO (n=510) 








Eigenvalue 3.04 1.86 1.03 
Proportion 0.34 0.21 0.11 
Cumulative proportion 0.34 0.55 0.66 








# Nonfounder family executives 87 1 10 
# Nonfounder family directors 89 -2 11 
Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 83 -19 5 
Family descendant (0/1) 76 -3 11 
Founder CEO (0/1) -8 77 -1 
Founder Chair (0/1) -3 80 -2 
Founder's cash flow rights (%) -3 75 17 
Family firm name (0/1) 23 13 64 
Family ownership wedge 2 -2 86 
Panel B. PCA of family characteristics in all family firm-years (n=4,210) 








Eigenvalue 3.13 1.79 1.01 
Proportion 0.35 0.20 0.11 
Cumulative proportion 0.35 0.55 0.66 
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# Nonfounder family executives 87 2 3 
# Nonfounder family directors 89 -7 10 
Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 80 -22 7 
Family descendant (0/1) 78 -7 19 
Founder CEO (0/1) -12 76 0 
Founder Chair (0/1) -12 79 5 
Founder's cash flow rights (%) 0 72 9 
Family firm name (0/1) 24 13 64 
Family ownership wedge 1 0 87 
Table 7. Family control horizons: the impact of individual family characteristics 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  
The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the 
founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding 
equity is at least 5%.  Control horizon is measured as the number of months between family IPO and the firm’s last sample observation as family firm.  I use Cox 
proportional hazards models to estimate the hazard ratio of family ending its control at time t conditional on the family having maintained its control until time t.  
A hazard ratio less (greater) than one suggests a smaller (greater) hazard and hence a longer (shorter) control horizon.  The events of family ending its control 
include 1) the family exits the firm and the firm becomes a public nonfamily firm, and 2) the family exits the firm when the firm merges into another firm or goes 
private.  Family characteristics and co-founding family ownership are values at the IPO.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  
All regressions include IPO cohort dummies and Fama-French 17 Industry dummies.  z-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in 
parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Hazard Ratio: Cox proportional hazards estimation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
# Nonfounder family executives 0.87 
        
 
(-0.96) 
        # Nonfounder family directors 
 
0.81 
       
  
(-1.63) 
       Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 
  
0.99** 
      
   
(-1.98) 
      Family descendant (0/1) 
   
0.86 
     
    
(-0.65) 
     Founder CEO (0/1) 
    
0.74** 
    
     
(-2.24) 
    Founder Chair (0/1) 
     
0.85 
   
      
(-1.21) 
   Founder's cash flow rights (%) 
      
0.99*** 
  
       
(-3.02) 
  Family firm name (0/1) 
       
0.97 
 
        
(-0.16) 
 Family ownership wedge 
        
1.02** 
         
(2.44) 
       Continued on next page 
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Co-founding family voting rights (%) 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
 
(-1.25) (-1.38) (-1.33) (-1.18) (-1.46) (-1.22) (-1.51) (-1.14) (-1.07) 
Nonfamily active blkholder voting rights (%) 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 
 
(5.65) (5.43) (5.40) (5.54) (5.83) (5.77) (5.16) (5.58) (5.94) 
Nonfamily passive blkholder voting rights (%) 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01** 1.01*** 1.01*** 
 
(2.68) (2.62) (2.53) (2.69) (2.85) (2.72) (2.12) (2.82) (3.02) 
Annual stock return volatility 1.43* 1.42* 1.42* 1.42* 1.45* 1.45* 1.46* 1.43* 1.45* 
 
(1.70) (1.65) (1.66) (1.68) (1.74) (1.76) (1.81) (1.69) (1.77) 
Leverage (%) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
(-0.90) (-0.87) (-0.91) (-0.87) (-0.92) (-0.95) (-0.97) (-0.98) (-1.22) 
ROA_EBITDA (%) 1.01** 1.01** 1.01** 1.01** 1.01** 1.01** 1.01** 1.01** 1.01** 
 
(2.35) (2.34) (2.35) (2.35) (2.41) (2.36) (2.38) (2.32) (2.41) 
# Segments 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.85 0.89 0.86 0.90 0.86 0.86 
 
(-1.30) (-1.29) (-1.43) (-1.32) (-0.97) (-1.25) (-0.92) (-1.26) (-1.26) 
R&D intensity (%) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
(0.60) (0.55) (0.46) (0.65) (0.60) (0.61) (0.35) (0.69) (0.83) 
Industry median mkt-to-book 1.77*** 1.76*** 1.75*** 1.76*** 1.78*** 1.78*** 1.78*** 1.77*** 1.80*** 
 
(2.83) (2.82) (2.79) (2.81) (2.86) (2.85) (2.84) (2.83) (2.91) 
Ind. with high pvt. bft. of control (0/1) 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.98 0.94 0.92 0.88 0.96 0.92 
 
(-0.02) (-0.00) (0.07) (-0.09) (-0.26) (-0.37) (-0.53) (-0.17) (-0.36) 
log(1+Assets) 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.91* 0.92 0.91* 
 
(-1.55) (-1.49) (-1.52) (-1.57) (-1.63) (-1.56) (-1.67) (-1.55) (-1.67) 
log(1+Firm age) 5.85 7.11 18.83 6.56 3.76 4.14 1.55 3.95 1.38 
 
(0.47) (0.53) (0.77) (0.49) (0.36) (0.39) (0.12) (0.37) (0.09) 
log(1+Firm age
2
) 0.43 0.39 0.25 0.41 0.52 0.50 0.78 0.51 0.83 
 
(-0.49) (-0.54) (-0.78) (-0.51) (-0.39) (-0.41) (-0.14) (-0.39) (-0.11) 
          Observations 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of subjects 492 492 492 492 492 492 492 492 492 
No. of events 261 261 261 261 261 261 261 261 261 
Table 8. Family control horizons: the impact of factors generated from individual family characteristics 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, 
and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the 
firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of 
outstanding equity is at least 5%.  Control horizon is measured as the number of months between family IPO and the 
firm’s last sample observation as family firm.  The factors are generated by principal component analysis (PCA) to 
extract the information contained by individual family characteristics.  I use Cox proportional hazards models to 
estimate the hazard ratio of family ending its control at time t conditional on the family having maintained its control 
until time t.  A hazard ratio less (greater) than one suggests a smaller (greater) hazard and hence a longer (shorter) 
control horizon.  The events of family ending its control include 1) the family exits the firm and the firm becomes a 
public nonfamily firm, and 2) the family exits the firm when the firm merges into another firm or goes private.  PCA 
factors, family characteristics, and co-founding family ownership are values at the IPO.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All regressions include IPO cohort dummies and Fama-French 17 
Industry dummies.  z-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks 
denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Hazard Ratio: Cox proportional hazards estimation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.82** 
    
 
(-2.34) 
    Factor 2 (Founder) 0.80*** 
    
 
(-3.13) 
    Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 1.11 
    
 
(1.49) 
    # Nonfounder family executives 
 
0.85 
   
  
(-1.09) 




   
(-1.76) 
  Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 
   
0.98*** 
 
    
(-2.65) 
 Family descendant (0/1) 
    
0.75 
     
(-1.11) 
Founder CEO (0/1) 
 
0.73** 
   
  
(-2.35) 




   
(-1.41) 
  Founder's cash flow rights (%) 
   
0.99*** 0.99*** 
    
(-3.76) (-3.18) 
Family firm name (0/1) 
 
0.95 0.96 1.07 0.93 
  
(-0.22) (-0.17) (0.27) (-0.32) 
Family ownership wedge 
 
1.02** 1.03** 1.02** 1.03*** 
  
(2.41) (2.55) (2.30) (2.61) 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) 0.98* 0.98 0.99 0.98* 0.99 
 
(-1.83) (-1.55) (-1.43) (-1.80) (-1.54) 
Nonfamily active blkholder voting rights (%) 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 
 
(5.40) (5.85) (5.62) (4.62) (4.96) 
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Nonfamily passive blkholder voting rights (%) 1.01** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01* 1.01** 
 
(2.11) (2.86) (2.66) (1.64) (2.04) 
Annual stock return volatility 1.48* 1.47* 1.47* 1.47* 1.48* 
 
(1.85) (1.83) (1.82) (1.87) (1.88) 
Leverage (%) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
(-0.76) (-1.07) (-1.07) (-1.08) (-1.06) 
ROA_EBITDA (%) 1.01** 1.01** 1.01** 1.01** 1.01** 
 
(2.48) (2.44) (2.39) (2.46) (2.39) 
# Segments 0.87 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.88 
 
(-1.14) (-1.01) (-1.29) (-1.12) (-1.03) 
R&D intensity (%) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
(0.18) (0.58) (0.54) (0.03) (0.32) 
Industry median mkt-to-book 1.79*** 1.82*** 1.81*** 1.80*** 1.81*** 
 
(2.88) (2.96) (2.93) (2.88) (2.91) 
Ind. with high pvt. bft. of control (0/1) 0.91 0.94 0.91 0.89 0.87 
 
(-0.41) (-0.30) (-0.43) (-0.51) (-0.62) 
log(1+Assets) 0.91* 0.91* 0.92 0.90* 0.90* 
 
(-1.67) (-1.72) (-1.59) (-1.80) (-1.78) 
log(1+Firm age) 10.47 2.66 3.16 5.85 1.39 
 
(0.62) (0.26) (0.30) (0.45) (0.08) 
log(1+Firm age
2
) 0.33 0.61 0.57 0.43 0.83 
 
(-0.64) (-0.28) (-0.32) (-0.46) (-0.10) 
      Observations 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of subjects 492 492 492 492 492 










Table 9. Family firm evolution outcomes: family firm failure 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  
The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the 
founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding 
equity is at least 5%.  I use conditional logistic regressions to predict family firm failure.  The outcome variable equals one if the family firm fails and the stock 
exchange delists the firm.  The factors are generated by principal component analysis (PCA) to extract the information contained by individual family 
characteristics.  In models (1) to (5), the outcome occurs in year t+1.  In models (6) to (10), the outcome occurs in year t+2.  All independent variables are in year 
t.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All regressions include firm fixed effects by using industry strata.  z-test statistics 
from robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, 
respectively. 
(1) - (5): Outcome in t+1 Odds Ratio from conditional logit regression, outcome: 1=family firm failure 
(6) - (10): Outcome in t+2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.93 
    
0.91 
    
 
(-0.56) 
    
(-0.79) 
    Factor 2 (Founder) 0.94 
    
0.99 
    
 
(-0.41) 
    
(-0.07) 
    Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 1.05 
    
1.05 
    
 
(0.49) 
    
(0.57) 
    # Nonfounder family executives 
 
0.83 
    
0.83 
   
  
(-0.71) 
    
(-0.79) 
   # Nonfounder family directors 
  
0.73 
    
0.77 
  
   
(-1.42) 
    
(-1.15) 
  Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 
   
1.00 
    
1.00 
 
    
(0.11) 
    
(-0.08) 
 Family descendant (0/1) 
    
1.10 
    
0.97 
     
(0.28) 
    
(-0.09) 
Founder CEO (0/1) 
 
0.78 
    
0.96 
   
  
(-0.57) 
    
(-0.10) 
   Founder Chair (0/1) 
  
0.92 
    
0.96 
  
   
(-0.18) 
    
(-0.08) 
  Founder's cash flow rights (%) 
   
1.00 1.00 
   
1.00 1.00 
    
(0.10) (0.10) 
   
(0.05) (0.09) 
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Table 9 – Continued           
Family firm name (0/1) 
 
1.25 1.25 1.15 1.16 
 
1.14 1.16 1.11 1.11 
  
(0.60) (0.60) (0.36) (0.40) 
 
(0.35) (0.39) (0.27) (0.28) 
Family ownership wedge 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 
  
(0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.06) 
 
(0.44) (0.37) (0.45) (0.46) 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 
 
(1.32) (1.09) (1.31) (1.21) (1.36) (0.72) (0.66) (0.69) (0.67) (0.74) 
Nonfamily active blkholder voting rights (%) 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
(1.43) (1.34) (1.48) (1.06) (1.28) (-0.30) (-0.27) (-0.29) (-0.14) (-0.15) 
Nonfamily passive blkholder voting rights (%) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
 
(-0.26) (-0.25) (-0.28) (-0.03) (-0.04) (-0.66) (-0.60) (-0.63) (-0.33) (-0.39) 
Annual stock return volatility 6.32 6.40 6.32 6.46 6.46 3.69 3.72 3.64 3.74 3.74 
 
(1.20) (1.21) (1.17) (1.19) (1.21) (0.81) (0.82) (0.77) (0.82) (0.82) 
Leverage (%) 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02** 1.02** 
 
(4.52) (4.45) (4.20) (3.05) (3.46) (3.12) (3.05) (2.90) (2.12) (2.46) 
ROA_EBITDA (%) 0.99* 0.99* 0.99* 0.99* 0.99* 0.99** 0.99** 0.99** 0.99** 0.99** 
 
(-1.89) (-1.85) (-1.86) (-1.67) (-1.77) (-2.23) (-2.20) (-2.24) (-2.01) (-2.14) 
# Segments 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 
 
(-0.49) (-0.50) (-0.54) (-0.47) (-0.51) (-0.40) (-0.38) (-0.41) (-0.38) (-0.40) 
R&D intensity (%) 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97*** 0.97** 0.97** 0.97** 0.97** 
 
(-1.50) (-1.48) (-1.46) (-1.37) (-1.44) (-2.58) (-2.54) (-2.48) (-2.41) (-2.52) 
Industry median mkt-to-book 1.28 1.27 1.27 1.28 1.28 2.48 2.48 2.47 2.48 2.48 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
Ind. with high pvt. bft. of control (0/1) 0.71 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.88 
 
(-0.58) (-0.55) (-0.54) (-0.53) (-0.53) (-0.17) (-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.19) (-0.18) 
log(1+Assets) 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89 
 
(-0.22) (-0.21) (-0.20) (-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.29) (-0.29) (-0.30) (-0.26) (-0.27) 
log(1+Firm age) 1.01 1.00 1.03 0.99 0.98 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.76 0.76 
 
(0.01) (-0.00) (0.03) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.31) (-0.32) (-0.29) (-0.35) (-0.34) 
           Observations 3,642 3,642 3,642 3,642 3,642 3,163 3,163 3,163 3,163 3,163 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 
Table 10. Family firm evolution outcomes: family exit 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  
The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the 
founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding 
equity is at least 5%.  I use conditional logistic regressions to predict family exit.  The outcome variable equals one if 1) the family exits the firm and the firm 
becomes a public nonfamily firm, or 2) the family exits the firm when the firm merges into another firm or goes private.  The factors are generated by principal 
component analysis (PCA) to extract the information contained by individual family characteristics.  In models (1) to (5), the outcome occurs in year t+1.  In 
models (6) to (10), the outcome occurs in year t+2.  All independent variables are in year t.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
percentiles.  All regressions include firm fixed effects by using industry strata.  z-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
(1) - (5): Outcome in t+1 Odds Ratio from conditional logistic regression, outcome: 1=family exit 
(6) - (10): Outcome in t+2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.66*** 
    
0.71*** 
    
 
(-2.81) 
    
(-2.76) 
    Factor 2 (Founder) 0.57*** 
    
0.70*** 
    
 
(-6.72) 
    
(-4.06) 
    Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 1.01 
    
1.03 
    
 
(0.07) 
    
(0.38) 
    # Nonfounder family executives 
 
0.52*** 
    
0.67 
   
  
(-2.66) 
    
(-1.64) 
   # Nonfounder family directors 
  
0.60*** 
    
0.66** 
  
   
(-2.95) 
    
(-2.31) 
  Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 
   
0.98** 
    
0.97** 
 
    
(-2.37) 
    
(-2.11) 
 Family descendant (0/1) 
    
0.55** 
    
0.62* 
     
(-2.42) 
    
(-1.79) 
Founder CEO (0/1) 
 
0.37*** 
    
0.53** 
   
  
(-3.96) 
    
(-2.51) 
   Founder Chair (0/1) 
  
0.54** 
    
0.71 
  
   
(-2.42) 
    
(-1.17) 
  Founder's cash flow rights (%) 
   
0.97** 0.97** 
   
0.98* 0.98 
    
(-2.37) (-2.39) 
   
(-1.68) (-1.61) 
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Family firm name (0/1) 
 
1.14 1.04 1.05 0.99 
 
0.97 0.95 0.99 0.90 
  
(0.43) (0.17) (0.18) (-0.02) 
 
(-0.12) (-0.22) (-0.03) (-0.41) 
Family ownership wedge 
 
1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 
 
1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
  
(0.36) (0.55) (0.54) (0.52) 
 
(0.94) (0.99) (0.98) (1.01) 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) 0.93* 0.93* 0.94* 0.93* 0.94* 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.97 
 
(-1.92) (-1.82) (-1.76) (-1.80) (-1.80) (-1.15) (-1.03) (-0.96) (-1.05) (-0.98) 
Nonfamily active blkholder voting rights (%) 1.01 1.02* 1.02** 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 
 
(1.53) (1.86) (2.12) (1.19) (1.45) (1.07) (1.31) (1.42) (0.74) (0.94) 
Nonfamily passive blkholder voting rights (%) 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 
 
(0.94) (1.40) (1.51) (0.52) (0.76) (0.94) (1.31) (1.33) (0.52) (0.79) 
Annual stock return volatility 1.79 1.88 1.78 1.92 1.94 1.31 1.39 1.30 1.36 1.37 
 
(0.39) (0.43) (0.40) (0.46) (0.46) (0.15) (0.19) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) 
Leverage (%) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
(-0.20) (-0.48) (-0.34) (-0.12) (-0.23) (-0.20) (-0.50) (-0.36) (-0.11) (-0.28) 
ROA_EBITDA (%) 1.01* 1.01 1.01 1.01** 1.01** 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
(1.65) (1.54) (1.46) (2.25) (1.97) (0.53) (0.43) (0.33) (0.83) (0.60) 
# Segments 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.81 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.80 
 
(-0.53) (-0.55) (-0.62) (-0.52) (-0.55) (-1.16) (-1.16) (-1.29) (-1.11) (-1.13) 
R&D intensity (%) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 
 
(-0.14) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14) (-0.57) (-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.43) (-0.36) 
Industry median mkt-to-book 1.96 1.95 1.94 1.93 1.96 1.37 1.39 1.36 1.35 1.38 
 
(0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.38) (0.39) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) 
Ind. with high pvt. bft. of control (0/1) 1.04 1.16 1.00 0.97 0.93 1.08 1.14 1.05 1.04 0.98 
 
(0.09) (0.37) (-0.01) (-0.09) (-0.16) (0.18) (0.33) (0.11) (0.10) (-0.04) 
log(1+Assets) 0.95 0.97 1.00 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.91 0.93 
 
(-0.17) (-0.10) (-0.02) (-0.25) (-0.17) (-0.22) (-0.15) (-0.11) (-0.30) (-0.22) 
log(1+Firm age) 1.21 1.11 1.22 1.20 1.22 1.04 0.97 1.06 1.06 1.04 
 
(0.26) (0.15) (0.29) (0.27) (0.28) (0.06) (-0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) 
           Observations 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,619 3,142 3,142 3,142 3,142 3,142 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Table 11. Family firm evolution outcomes in t+1: family exit and family firm failure 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  
The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the 
founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding 
equity is at least 5%.  I use multinomial logistic regressions to predict family exit or family firm failure.  The base outcome is family maintaining its control of 
the public firm.  The outcome variable equals one if 1) the family exits the firm and the firm becomes a public nonfamily firm, or 2) the family exits the firm 
when the firm merges into another firm or goes private.  The outcome variable equals two if the family firm fails and the stock exchange delists the firm.  The 
factors are generated by principal component analysis (PCA) to extract the information contained by individual family characteristics.  In all models, the outcome 
occurs in year t+1.  The odd-numbered models predict the outcome of family exit.  The even-numbered models predict the outcome of family firm failure.  All 
independent variables are in year t.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All regressions include IPO cohort dummies and 
Fama-French 17 Industry dummies.  z-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at 
the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Odd-numbered models: Outcome=1 Relative Risk Ratio from multinomial  logit regression, outcome: 1=family exit, 2=family firm failure 
Even-numbered models: Outcome=2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.66*** 0.90 
        
 
(-3.73) (-0.80) 
        Factor 2 (Founder) 0.57*** 0.90 
        
 
(-7.14) (-0.88) 
        Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 1.01 1.05 
        
 
(0.08) (0.63) 
        # Nonfounder family executives 
  
0.52*** 0.80 
      
   
(-2.75) (-0.90) 
      # Nonfounder family directors 
    
0.60*** 0.70 
    
     
(-3.11) (-1.59) 
    Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 
      
0.98*** 1.00 
  
       
(-2.91) (0.08) 
  Family descendant (0/1) 
        
0.55** 1.06 
         
(-2.41) (0.18) 
Founder CEO (0/1) 
  
0.36*** 0.72 
      
   
(-6.78) (-1.47) 
      Founder Chair (0/1) 
    
0.53*** 0.87 
    
     
(-4.42) (-0.58) 
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Founder's cash flow rights (%) 
      
0.97*** 1.00 0.97*** 1.00 
       
(-4.69) (0.07) (-4.27) (0.05) 
Family firm name (0/1) 
  
1.14 1.28 1.04 1.26 1.05 1.17 0.99 1.16 
   
(0.53) (0.74) (0.18) (0.69) (0.22) (0.45) (-0.04) (0.46) 
Family ownership wedge 
  
1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 
   
(0.38) (0.12) (0.56) (0.16) (0.54) (0.14) (0.53) (0.11) 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) 0.93*** 1.03* 0.93*** 1.03 0.94*** 1.03* 0.94*** 1.03* 0.94*** 1.03* 
 
(-2.87) (1.73) (-2.92) (1.59) (-2.71) (1.78) (-2.75) (1.90) (-2.64) (1.93) 
Nonfamily active blkholder voting rights (%) 1.01*** 1.01* 1.02*** 1.01* 1.02*** 1.02** 1.01** 1.02** 1.01*** 1.02** 
 
(2.59) (1.87) (3.32) (1.94) (3.82) (2.04) (2.54) (2.04) (2.92) (2.09) 
Nonfamily passive blkholder voting rights (%) 1.01* 1.00 1.02*** 1.00 1.02*** 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01* 1.00 
 
(1.83) (-0.28) (3.05) (-0.21) (3.18) (-0.26) (1.32) (0.00) (1.82) (0.02) 
Annual stock return volatility 2.07*** 6.90*** 2.18*** 7.01*** 2.06*** 6.90*** 2.23*** 7.06*** 2.24*** 7.06*** 
 
(3.14) (6.56) (3.31) (6.58) (3.16) (6.53) (3.53) (6.56) (3.56) (6.58) 
Leverage (%) 1.00 1.02*** 1.00 1.02*** 1.00 1.02*** 1.00 1.02*** 1.00 1.02*** 
 
(-0.01) (6.59) (-0.54) (6.40) (-0.25) (6.56) (0.10) (6.06) (-0.10) (6.15) 
ROA_EBITDA (%) 1.01 0.99*** 1.00 0.99*** 1.00 0.99*** 1.01* 0.99*** 1.01 0.99*** 
 
(1.48) (-3.43) (1.28) (-3.41) (1.12) (-3.46) (1.79) (-3.46) (1.56) (-3.48) 
# Segments 0.92 0.83 0.91 0.83 0.90 0.81 0.91 0.83 0.91 0.83 
 
(-0.70) (-0.75) (-0.71) (-0.78) (-0.83) (-0.87) (-0.76) (-0.79) (-0.74) (-0.79) 
R&D intensity (%) 1.00 0.98* 1.00 0.98* 1.00 0.98* 1.00 0.98* 1.00 0.98* 
 
(-0.50) (-1.74) (0.01) (-1.71) (-0.08) (-1.75) (-0.03) (-1.65) (0.10) (-1.66) 
Industry median mkt-to-book 2.02*** 1.37 2.01*** 1.36 1.99*** 1.36 1.98*** 1.36 2.02*** 1.36 
 
(3.48) (0.96) (3.45) (0.95) (3.44) (0.95) (3.36) (0.94) (3.44) (0.95) 
Ind. with high pvt. bft. of control (0/1) 1.01 0.71 1.13 0.76 0.97 0.72 0.95 0.73 0.91 0.72 
 
(0.04) (-0.86) (0.53) (-0.73) (-0.12) (-0.82) (-0.24) (-0.81) (-0.39) (-0.83) 
log(1+Assets) 0.95 0.89 0.97 0.90 0.99 0.90 0.93 0.90 0.95 0.90 
 
(-0.81) (-1.04) (-0.50) (-0.98) (-0.09) (-0.92) (-1.27) (-0.93) (-0.86) (-0.93) 
log(1+Firm age) 1.23 1.03 1.12 1.02 1.23* 1.05 1.22 1.01 1.23 1.00 
 
(1.61) (0.16) (0.89) (0.09) (1.70) (0.28) (1.58) (0.05) (1.62) (0.01) 
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Constant 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.02*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.02*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 
 
(-6.90) (-4.42) (-5.76) (-4.28) (-5.94) (-4.22) (-5.61) (-4.25) (-5.92) (-4.33) 
           Observations 3,644 3,644 3,644 3,644 3,644 3,644 3,644 3,644 3,644 3,644 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2














Table 12. Family firm evolution outcomes in t+2: family exit and family firm failure 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  
The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the 
founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding 
equity is at least 5%.  I use multinomial logistic regressions to predict family exit or family firm failure.  The base outcome is family maintaining its control of 
the public firm.  The outcome variable equals one if 1) the family exits the firm and the firm becomes a public nonfamily firm, or 2) the family exits the firm 
when the firm merges into another firm or goes private.  The outcome variable equals two if the family firm fails and the stock exchange delists the firm.  The 
factors are generated by principal component analysis (PCA) to extract the information contained by individual family characteristics.  In all models, the outcome 
occurs in year t+2.  The odd-numbered models predict the outcome of family exit.  The even-numbered models predict the outcome of family firm failure.  All 
independent variables are in year t.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All regressions include IPO cohort dummies and 
Fama-French 17 Industry dummies.  z-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at 
the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Odd-numbered models: Outcome=1 Relative Risk Ratio from multinomial  logit regression, outcome: 1=family exit, 2=family firm failure 
Even-numbered models: Outcome=2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.71*** 0.89 
        
 
(-3.07) (-0.99) 
        Factor 2 (Founder) 0.69*** 0.96 
        
 
(-4.50) (-0.32) 
        Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 1.03 1.06 
        
 
(0.40) (0.71) 
        # Nonfounder family executives 
  
0.66* 0.81 
      
   
(-1.81) (-0.98) 
      # Nonfounder family directors 
    
0.66*** 0.75 
    
     
(-2.58) (-1.51) 
    Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 
      
0.97*** 1.00 
  
       
(-2.79) (-0.33) 
  Family descendant (0/1) 
        
0.62* 0.94 
         
(-1.85) (-0.20) 
Founder CEO (0/1) 
  
0.52*** 0.91 
      
   
(-4.30) (-0.41) 
      Founder Chair (0/1) 
    
0.70** 0.93 
    
     
(-2.28) (-0.29) 
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Founder's cash flow rights (%) 
      
0.98*** 1.00 0.98*** 1.00 
       
(-3.89) (-0.06) (-3.42) (0.04) 
Family firm name (0/1) 
  
0.96 1.15 0.94 1.17 0.98 1.12 0.89 1.11 
   
(-0.15) (0.42) (-0.25) (0.47) (-0.06) (0.34) (-0.47) (0.32) 
Family ownership wedge 
  
1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
   
(1.00) (0.49) (1.03) (0.43) (1.02) (0.50) (1.05) (0.53) 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) 0.96** 1.02 0.96** 1.02 0.97* 1.02 0.96** 1.02 0.97* 1.02 
 
(-2.07) (1.17) (-1.97) (1.19) (-1.82) (1.19) (-1.99) (1.29) (-1.79) (1.31) 
Nonfamily active blkholder voting rights (%) 1.01** 1.00 1.01*** 1.00 1.02*** 1.00 1.01* 1.00 1.01** 1.00 
 
(2.16) (-0.18) (2.78) (-0.12) (3.03) (-0.15) (1.83) (-0.08) (2.22) (-0.04) 
Nonfamily passive blkholder voting rights (%) 1.01* 0.99 1.02*** 0.99 1.02*** 0.99 1.01 0.99 1.01* 0.99 
 
(1.88) (-0.78) (2.91) (-0.70) (2.89) (-0.77) (1.35) (-0.60) (1.95) (-0.56) 
Annual stock return volatility 1.43 3.82*** 1.51 3.86*** 1.42 3.78*** 1.48 3.88*** 1.50 3.89*** 
 
(1.31) (4.70) (1.52) (4.64) (1.32) (4.66) (1.47) (4.74) (1.52) (4.73) 
Leverage (%) 1.00 1.02*** 1.00 1.02*** 1.00 1.02*** 1.00 1.02*** 1.00 1.02*** 
 
(-0.15) (4.33) (-0.73) (4.23) (-0.46) (4.42) (-0.05) (3.90) (-0.35) (3.94) 
ROA_EBITDA (%) 1.00 0.99*** 1.00 0.99*** 1.00 0.99*** 1.00 0.99*** 1.00 0.99*** 
 
(0.19) (-3.62) (0.06) (-3.62) (-0.06) (-3.63) (0.43) (-3.61) (0.22) (-3.63) 
# Segments 0.80 0.84 0.81 0.84 0.79* 0.82 0.79 0.83 0.80 0.84 
 
(-1.54) (-0.75) (-1.52) (-0.74) (-1.75) (-0.81) (-1.63) (-0.77) (-1.57) (-0.75) 
R&D intensity (%) 0.99 0.97*** 0.99 0.97*** 0.99 0.97*** 0.99 0.97*** 0.99 0.97*** 
 
(-1.37) (-2.87) (-1.02) (-2.86) (-1.08) (-2.89) (-1.18) (-2.81) (-1.01) (-2.81) 
Industry median mkt-to-book 1.44* 2.58*** 1.47* 2.58*** 1.43* 2.57*** 1.41 2.56*** 1.45* 2.57*** 
 
(1.69) (3.14) (1.76) (3.15) (1.65) (3.14) (1.59) (3.13) (1.71) (3.14) 
Ind. with high pvt. bft. of control (0/1) 1.07 0.90 1.13 0.92 1.04 0.90 1.03 0.89 0.97 0.89 
 
(0.31) (-0.29) (0.54) (-0.25) (0.16) (-0.29) (0.14) (-0.32) (-0.11) (-0.34) 
log(1+Assets) 0.93 0.88 0.95 0.88 0.96 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.93 0.88 
 
(-1.12) (-1.17) (-0.82) (-1.12) (-0.62) (-1.11) (-1.64) (-1.11) (-1.19) (-1.08) 
log(1+Firm age) 1.04 0.79 0.97 0.78 1.05 0.80 1.05 0.77 1.03 0.77 
 
(0.28) (-1.26) (-0.26) (-1.32) (0.40) (-1.18) (0.37) (-1.40) (0.26) (-1.38) 
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Constant 0.05*** 0.00*** 0.07*** 0.00*** 0.07*** 0.00*** 0.09*** 0.00*** 0.07*** 0.00*** 
 
(-4.04) (-4.19) (-3.46) (-4.13) (-3.54) (-4.04) (-3.06) (-4.06) (-3.41) (-4.13) 
           Observations 3,165 3,165 3,165 3,165 3,165 3,165 3,165 3,165 3,165 3,165 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2















Table 13. Family firm evolution outcomes in t+1: family firm privatization, family exit, and family firm 
failure 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, 
and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the 
firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of 
outstanding equity is at least 5%.  I use multinomial logistic regressions to predict family firm evolution outcomes.  
The base outcome is family maintaining its control of the public firm.  The outcome variable equals one if the family 
firm goes private as a family firm.  The outcome variable equals two if the family exits the firm and the firm 
becomes a public nonfamily firm.  The outcome variable equals three if the family exits the firm when the firm 
merges into another firm or goes private.  The outcome variable equals four if the family firm fails and the stock 
exchange delists the firm.  The factors are generated by principal component analysis (PCA) to extract the 
information contained by individual family characteristics.  In all models, the outcome occurs in year t+1.  All 
independent variables are in year t.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All 
regressions include IPO cohort dummies and Fama-French 17 Industry dummies.  z-test statistics from robust 
standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% 
(**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 




(2): exit via 
open market 




Factor 1 (Extended family) 1.28 0.33*** 0.85 0.90 
 
(1.12) (-4.55) (-1.39) (-0.81) 
Factor 2 (Founder) 1.58* 0.27*** 0.83** 0.90 
 
(1.76) (-8.75) (-1.97) (-0.89) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 0.90 0.81 1.11 1.05 
 
(-0.58) (-1.52) (1.20) (0.62) 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) 0.98 0.76* 0.97 1.03* 
 
(-0.36) (-1.65) (-1.36) (1.71) 
Nonfamily active blkholder voting rights (%) 1.03 1.00 1.02*** 1.01* 
 
(1.43) (-0.08) (3.34) (1.85) 
Nonfamily passive blkholder voting rights (%) 0.98 1.01* 1.01 1.00 
 
(-0.93) (1.88) (0.83) (-0.29) 
Annual stock return volatility 1.45 2.35*** 1.65 6.97*** 
 
(0.56) (2.62) (1.64) (6.57) 
Leverage (%) 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.02*** 
 
(1.34) (1.21) (-1.05) (6.61) 
ROA_EBITDA (%) 1.03 1.00 1.01* 0.99*** 
 
(1.14) (-0.12) (1.65) (-3.45) 
# Segments 1.57 1.18 0.72* 0.84 
 
(1.58) (0.91) (-1.86) (-0.72) 
R&D intensity (%) 0.96 0.98* 1.00 0.98* 
 
(-0.52) (-1.92) (0.64) (-1.77) 
Industry median mkt-to-book 0.27* 1.80* 2.13*** 1.36 
 
(-1.72) (1.79) (3.09) (0.95) 
Ind. with high pvt. bft. of control (0/1) 2.96 1.12 1.03 0.72 
 
(1.54) (0.28) (0.09) (-0.84) 
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log(1+Assets) 0.73 0.77** 1.07 0.89 
 
(-1.35) (-2.52) (0.93) (-1.05) 
log(1+Firm age) 4.40*** 1.48* 1.17 1.05 
 
(2.70) (1.69) (1.02) (0.26) 
Constant 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(-2.38) (-5.38) (-6.18) (-4.43) 
     Observations 3,644 3,644 3,644 3,644 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2




















Table 14. Family firm evolution outcomes in t+2: family firm privatization, family exit, and family firm 
failure 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, 
and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the 
firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of 
outstanding equity is at least 5%.  I use multinomial logistic regressions to predict family firm evolution outcomes.  
The base outcome is family maintaining its control of the public firm.  The outcome variable equals one if the family 
firm goes private as a family firm.  The outcome variable equals two if the family exits the firm and the firm 
becomes a public nonfamily firm.  The outcome variable equals three if the family exits the firm when the firm 
merges into another firm or goes private.  The outcome variable equals four if the family firm fails and the stock 
exchange delists the firm.  The factors are generated by principal component analysis (PCA) to extract the 
information contained by individual family characteristics.  In all models, the outcome occurs in year t+2.  All 
independent variables are in year t.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All 
regressions include IPO cohort dummies and Fama-French 17 Industry dummies.  z-test statistics from robust 
standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% 
(**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 




(2): exit via 
open market 




Factor 1 (Extended family) 1.26 0.41*** 0.91 0.89 
 
(1.27) (-4.23) (-0.75) (-0.95) 
Factor 2 (Founder) 1.36 0.46*** 0.91 0.97 
 
(1.46) (-5.87) (-0.90) (-0.29) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 0.95 0.91 1.11 1.06 
 
(-0.27) (-0.69) (1.19) (0.72) 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) 0.95 0.85** 1.00 1.02 
 
(-1.04) (-2.05) (-0.04) (1.12) 
Nonfamily active blkholder voting rights (%) 0.97 1.01 1.01** 1.00 
 
(-0.75) (0.80) (2.02) (-0.14) 
Nonfamily passive blkholder voting rights (%) 0.97* 1.00 1.02** 0.99 
 
(-1.75) (0.25) (2.36) (-0.82) 
Annual stock return volatility 2.92* 1.45 1.37 3.86*** 
 
(1.71) (0.93) (0.90) (4.72) 
Leverage (%) 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.02*** 
 
(0.39) (1.30) (-1.27) (4.34) 
ROA_EBITDA (%) 1.01 0.99 1.01 0.99*** 
 
(0.60) (-1.53) (1.45) (-3.65) 
# Segments 1.23 0.98 0.66** 0.84 
 
(0.72) (-0.11) (-1.98) (-0.74) 
R&D intensity (%) 0.96 0.98** 1.00 0.97*** 
 
(-0.52) (-2.19) (0.05) (-2.91) 
Industry median mkt-to-book 1.31 1.46 1.41 2.60*** 
 
(0.46) (1.13) (1.26) (3.16) 
Ind. with high pvt. bft. of control (0/1) 3.88* 1.02 1.14 0.90 
 
(1.73) (0.05) (0.46) (-0.30) 
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log(1+Assets) 0.80 0.81** 1.02 0.88 
 
(-1.02) (-2.09) (0.27) (-1.18) 
log(1+Firm age) 4.22*** 1.35 0.90 0.80 
 
(2.72) (1.35) (-0.69) (-1.17) 
Constant 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.00*** 
 
(-3.78) (-3.70) (-3.72) (-4.21) 
     Observations 3,165 3,165 3,165 3,165 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2




















Table 15. Interaction effects of family factors and Tobin’s Q on evolution outcomes 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, 
and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the 
firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of 
outstanding equity is at least 5%.  I use multinomial logistic regressions to predict family exit or family firm failure.  
The base outcome is family maintaining its control of the public firm.  The outcome variable equals one if 1) the 
family exits the firm and the firm becomes a public nonfamily firm, or 2) the family exits the firm when the firm 
merges into another firm or goes private.  The outcome variable equals two if the family firm fails and the stock 
exchange delists the firm.  The outcome occurs in year t+1 or t+2.  The factors are generated by principal component 
analysis (PCA) to extract the information contained by individual family characteristics.  All independent variables 
are in year t.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All regressions include IPO 
cohort dummies and Fama-French 17 Industry dummies.  z-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by 
firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, 
respectively. 
Relative Risk Ratio from multinomial  logistic regression, outcome: 1=family exit, 2=family firm failure 
 
(1): family 
exit in t+1 
(2): family firm 
failure in t+1 
(3): family 
exit in t+2 
(4): family firm 
failure in t+2 
Factor 1×Lowest tercile of Tobin's Q (0/1) 0.54*** 0.96 0.68** 0.92 
 
(-2.83) (-0.31) (-2.12) (-0.70) 
Factor 1×Middle tercile of Tobin's Q (0/1) 0.78* 0.78 0.72** 0.70* 
 
(-1.86) (-1.23) (-2.12) (-1.95) 
Factor 1×Highest tercile of Tobin's Q (0/1) 0.64** 0.71 0.73 0.93 
 
(-2.00) (-1.11) (-1.64) (-0.28) 
Factor 2×Lowest tercile of Tobin's Q (0/1) 0.53*** 0.82 0.67*** 0.84 
 
(-4.59) (-1.29) (-2.94) (-1.15) 
Factor 2×Middle tercile of Tobin's Q (0/1) 0.67*** 0.77 0.74** 0.89 
 
(-3.11) (-1.38) (-2.25) (-0.51) 
Factor 2×Highest tercile of Tobin's Q (0/1) 0.52*** 0.92 0.66*** 1.20 
 
(-5.42) (-0.49) (-3.32) (1.03) 
Factor 3×Lowest tercile of Tobin's Q (0/1) 0.90 1.04 0.93 1.05 
 
(-0.81) (0.34) (-0.52) (0.44) 
Factor 3×Middle tercile of Tobin's Q (0/1) 1.06 1.23 1.03 1.18 
 
(0.60) (1.60) (0.25) (1.17) 
Factor 3×Highest tercile of Tobin's Q (0/1) 1.06 1.17 1.20 1.12 
 
(0.43) (0.80) (1.26) (0.46) 
Lowest tercile of Tobin's Q (0/1) 1.09 1.58** 1.04 2.93*** 
 
(0.45) (2.09) (0.24) (4.56) 
Highest tercile of Tobin's Q (0/1) 0.64** 0.39*** 0.55*** 0.61* 
 
(-2.22) (-3.40) (-3.16) (-1.87) 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) 0.95** 1.01 0.96** 1.01 
 
(-2.37) (0.58) (-2.22) (0.65) 
Nonfamily active blkholder voting rights (%) 1.01** 1.02** 1.01** 1.01 
 
(2.34) (2.52) (1.99) (0.57) 
Nonfamily passive blkholder voting rights (%) 1.00 0.99 1.01 0.98* 
 
(0.77) (-1.17) (1.14) (-1.79) 
   Continued on next page 
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log(1+Assets) 0.93 0.62*** 0.91* 0.70*** 
 
(-1.52) (-4.65) (-1.81) (-3.43) 
log(1+Firm age) 1.08 0.78 0.91 0.57*** 
 
(0.69) (-1.64) (-0.73) (-3.32) 
Constant 0.09*** 0.53 0.23*** 0.70 
 
(-5.37) (-0.79) (-2.97) (-0.42) 
     Observations 3,687 3,687 3,198 3,198 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2




















Table 16. Interaction effects of family factors and ROA on evolution outcomes 
The family IPO sample consists of 258 family firms that go public in 1993, 222 family firms that go public in 1997, 
and 30 family firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the 
firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of 
outstanding equity is at least 5%.  I use multinomial logistic regressions to predict family exit or family firm failure.  
The base outcome is family maintaining its control of the public firm.  The outcome variable equals one if 1) the 
family exits the firm and the firm becomes a public nonfamily firm, or 2) the family exits the firm when the firm 
merges into another firm or goes private.  The outcome variable equals two if the family firm fails and the stock 
exchange delists the firm.  The outcome occurs in year t+1 or t+2.  The factors are generated by principal component 
analysis (PCA) to extract the information contained by individual family characteristics.  All independent variables 
are in year t.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All regressions include IPO 
cohort dummies and Fama-French 17 Industry dummies.  z-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by 
firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, 
respectively. 
Relative Risk Ratio from multinomial  logistic regression, outcome: 1=family exit, 2=family firm failure 
 
(1): family 
exit in t+1 
(2): family firm 
failure in t+1 
(3): family 
exit in t+2 
(4): family firm 
failure in t+2 
Factor 1×Lowest tercile of ROA (0/1) 0.59 1.24 0.84 1.24 
 
(-1.64) (1.09) (-0.60) (0.95) 
Factor 1×Middle tercile of ROA (0/1) 0.52*** 0.89 0.64** 0.89 
 
(-2.84) (-0.57) (-2.23) (-0.80) 
Factor 1×Highest tercile of ROA (0/1) 0.67*** 0.93 0.72** 0.93 
 
(-3.09) (-0.33) (-2.54) (-0.44) 
Factor 2×Lowest tercile of ROA (0/1) 0.52*** 0.98 0.69** 1.10 
 
(-4.14) (-0.16) (-2.49) (0.60) 
Factor 2×Middle tercile of ROA (0/1) 0.48*** 0.74 0.72** 0.88 
 
(-4.53) (-1.38) (-2.00) (-0.63) 
Factor 2×Highest tercile of ROA (0/1) 0.58*** 0.79 0.72*** 0.90 
 
(-5.27) (-0.91) (-3.29) (-0.55) 
Factor 3×Lowest tercile of ROA (0/1) 1.00 1.03 1.02 1.05 
 
(0.02) (0.22) (0.11) (0.31) 
Factor 3×Middle tercile of ROA (0/1) 1.05 1.36** 1.22* 1.30** 
 
(0.35) (2.53) (1.78) (2.50) 
Factor 3×Highest tercile of ROA (0/1) 0.95 0.57 0.91 0.78 
 
(-0.53) (-1.46) (-0.85) (-1.00) 
Lowest tercile of ROA_EBITDA (0/1) 1.03 2.59*** 1.08 1.58* 
 
(0.10) (3.58) (0.26) (1.83) 
Highest tercile of ROA_EBITDA (0/1) 1.26 0.19*** 1.06 0.27*** 
 
(1.09) (-4.71) (0.30) (-4.63) 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) 0.94*** 1.02 0.97** 1.02* 
 
(-2.64) (1.38) (-2.03) (1.84) 
Nonfamily active blkholder voting rights (%) 1.01 1.00 1.01 0.99 
 
(1.51) (0.43) (1.38) (-1.05) 
Nonfamily passive blkholder voting rights (%) 1.01 0.99 1.01* 0.99* 
 
(1.28) (-1.28) (1.74) (-1.68) 
   Continued on next page 
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log(1+Assets) 0.97 0.88 0.97 0.89 
 
(-0.51) (-1.36) (-0.69) (-1.32) 
log(1+Firm age) 1.27** 1.35** 1.08 1.03 
 
(2.08) (2.27) (0.72) (0.21) 
Constant 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 
 
(-7.66) (-3.87) (-5.64) (-3.00) 
     Observations 4,162 4,162 3,665 3,665 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2




















Table 17. Tobin’s Q and family characteristics (specification following Villalonga and Amit, 2006) 
The sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the 
IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at least 5%.  I follow 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) and use OLS regressions to examine the relations between Tobin’s Q and family characteristics.  Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market 
value of assets to book value of assets.  The market value is the sum of book value of assets and market value of common stock minus the sum of book value of 
common stock and deferred taxes.  Q adj. for init. book equity uses the initial book value of equity in the IPO year as the lower bond of the post-IPO book equity.  
A firm’s book equity is set to the initial value if it falls below the initial value in a given year.  Q with book equity>0 is calculated only for firms with positive 
book equity.  Q with assets>5 mil is calculated only for firms with assets greater than five millions.  Family excess voting rights (0/1) is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the family has voting rights greater than its cash flow rights and zero otherwise.  Family excess voting rights (%) is the percentage of family voting 
rights above its cash flow rights.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All regressions include year dummies and Fama-
French 17 Industry dummies.  t-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% 
(***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


































































Family CEO (0/1) -0.11 -0.13 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.13 -0.14 
 
(-1.19) (-1.38) (-0.40) (-0.77) (-0.87) (-1.13) (-1.45) (-1.51) 
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.00*** -0.00** -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00** -0.00** 
 
(-2.83) (-2.46) (-3.66) (-3.16) (-3.42) (-3.13) (-2.57) (-2.21) 
Dividends/book value of equity (%) 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 
(2.72) (2.67) (2.75) (2.70) (3.05) (3.02) (2.67) (2.64) 
Continued on next page 
                  
Table 17 – Continued         
         
         
Debt/market value of equity -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.18*** 
 
(-7.26) (-7.18) (-9.10) (-8.97) (-7.72) (-7.57) (-7.45) (-7.37) 
Market risk 0.57*** 0.58*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.57*** 0.58*** 
 
(10.57) (10.35) (10.48) (10.36) (10.55) (10.41) (10.73) (10.49) 
Diversification (0/1) -0.15* -0.16* -0.15** -0.15** -0.15* -0.15* -0.16* -0.16** 
 
(-1.90) (-1.92) (-1.98) (-2.00) (-1.85) (-1.89) (-1.95) (-2.00) 
R&D/sales (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(4.38) (4.44) (3.00) (3.12) (4.17) (4.21) (4.37) (4.42) 
CAPX/PPE (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(7.33) (7.38) (8.49) (8.54) (7.50) (7.51) (7.26) (7.30) 
log(1+Assets) -0.13*** -0.13*** 0.04 0.04 -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 
 
(-3.49) (-3.51) (1.36) (1.33) (-3.16) (-3.20) (-3.08) (-3.10) 
Sales growth (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(8.17) (8.14) (8.91) (8.87) (8.22) (8.21) (8.80) (8.75) 
log(1+Firm age) -0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 
 
(-0.91) (-0.96) (0.03) (0.03) (-0.98) (-1.00) (-0.65) (-0.76) 
Constant 2.09*** 2.07*** 1.03*** 0.98*** 1.94*** 1.90*** 1.95*** 1.95*** 
 
(6.20) (6.18) (3.65) (3.52) (6.05) (5.98) (5.92) (5.94) 
         Observations 4,749 4,749 4,749 4,749 4,547 4,547 4,720 4,720 
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 18. Industry median adjusted Tobin’s Q and family characteristics (specification following Villalonga and Amit, 2006) 
The sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the 
IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at least 5%.  I follow 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) and use OLS regressions to examine the relations between Tobin’s Q and family characteristics.  All the dependent variables are 
adjusted by subtracting the industry median value in a given Fama-French 17 Industry and year.  Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of 
assets.  The market value is the sum of book value of assets and market value of common stock minus the sum of book value of common stock and deferred taxes.  
Q adj. for init. book equity uses the initial book value of equity in the IPO year as the lower bond of the post-IPO book equity.  A firm’s book equity is set to the 
initial value if it falls below the initial value in a given year.  Q with book equity>0 is calculated only for firms with positive book equity.  Q with assets>5 mil is 
calculated only for firms with assets greater than five millions.  Family excess voting rights (0/1) is a dummy variable that equals one if the family has voting 
rights greater than its cash flow rights and zero otherwise.  Family excess voting rights (%) is the percentage of family voting rights above its cash flow rights.  
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  t-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
All dependent variables are adjusted 
by industry median value Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


































































Family CEO (0/1) -0.05 -0.10 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 
 
(-0.55) (-1.09) (0.55) (-0.29) (-0.09) (-0.74) (-0.73) (-1.19) 
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.01*** -0.00** -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.00** 
 
(-3.05) (-2.16) (-3.82) (-2.70) (-3.70) (-2.90) (-2.88) (-1.99) 
Dividends/book value of equity (%) 0.11** 0.10** 0.10** 0.09** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10** 0.10** 
 
(2.56) (2.39) (2.40) (2.22) (2.80) (2.63) (2.53) (2.36) 
Continued on next page 
                  
Table 18 – Continued         
         
         
Debt/market value of equity -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.14*** -0.15*** 
 
(-5.97) (-5.91) (-7.55) (-7.43) (-6.68) (-6.55) (-6.01) (-5.93) 
Market risk 0.44*** 0.46*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 
 
(8.64) (8.53) (8.53) (8.52) (8.50) (8.43) (8.65) (8.53) 
Diversification (0/1) -0.14* -0.14* -0.18** -0.18** -0.16** -0.16** -0.15* -0.15* 
 
(-1.75) (-1.75) (-2.36) (-2.36) (-1.96) (-1.97) (-1.84) (-1.85) 
R&D/sales (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(4.56) (4.65) (2.61) (2.79) (4.16) (4.26) (4.50) (4.59) 
CAPX/PPE (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(6.60) (6.62) (8.24) (8.29) (6.91) (6.89) (6.55) (6.57) 
log(1+Assets) -0.11*** -0.11*** 0.02 0.03 -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
 
(-3.18) (-3.14) (0.83) (0.91) (-2.91) (-2.90) (-2.74) (-2.70) 
Sales growth (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(8.33) (8.29) (9.26) (9.17) (8.35) (8.31) (8.77) (8.73) 
log(1+Firm age) -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
 
(-0.70) (-0.70) (0.01) (0.11) (-0.78) (-0.71) (-0.49) (-0.53) 
Constant 0.59** 0.50** -0.33 -0.45** 0.48** 0.39 0.44* 0.37 
 
(2.35) (2.01) (-1.58) (-2.23) (1.98) (1.59) (1.76) (1.50) 
         Observations 4,749 4,749 4,749 4,749 4,547 4,547 4,720 4,720 
Adjusted R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Ind. dummies No No No No No No No No 
Year dummies No No No No No No No No 






Table 19. Tobin’s Q and family characteristics (specification following Anderson and Reeb, 2003) 
The sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 firms that go 
public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer 
reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, 
executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at 
least 5%.  I follow Anderson and Reeb (2003) and use OLS regressions to examine the relations between Tobin’s Q 
and family characteristics.  Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets.  The market 
value is the sum of book value of assets and market value of common stock minus the sum of book value of 
common stock and deferred taxes.  Q adj. for init. book equity uses the initial book value of equity in the IPO year as 
the lower bond of the post-IPO book equity.  A firm’s book equity is set to the initial value if it falls below the initial 
value in a given year.  Q with book equity>0 is calculated only for firms with positive book equity.  Q with assets>5 
mil is calculated only for firms with assets greater than five millions.  Family ownership wedge (0/1) is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the family has voting rights greater than its cash flow rights and zero otherwise.  Family 
ownership wedge (%) is the percentage of family voting rights above its cash flow rights.  All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All regressions include year dummies and Fama-French 17 Industry 
dummies.  t-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote 








Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 























































Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 
(-2.66) (-2.80) (-3.05) (-3.36) (-3.53) (-3.61) 
R&D/sales (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(5.65) (5.66) (5.65) (4.63) (4.64) (4.59) 
Debt/total assets (%) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 
(-5.63) (-5.73) (-5.54) (-10.41) (-10.66) (-10.39) 
Annual stock return volatility -0.22* -0.22* -0.23* -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.40*** 
 
(-1.76) (-1.76) (-1.82) (-3.90) (-3.92) (-3.93) 
log(1+Assets) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
 
(-0.02) (-0.05) (-0.07) (4.62) (4.63) (4.62) 
log(1+Firm age) -0.34*** -0.25*** -0.32*** -0.27*** -0.19** -0.26*** 
 
(-3.81) (-2.67) (-3.61) (-3.63) (-2.39) (-3.46) 
     Continued on next page 
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Constant 3.58*** 3.32*** 3.56*** 2.56*** 2.31*** 2.54*** 
 
(8.26) (7.39) (8.26) (7.13) (6.24) (7.13) 
       Observations 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934 
Adjusted R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.19 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




















(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 























































Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.01*** 
 
(-3.67) (-3.83) (-3.94) (-2.40) (-2.54) (-2.81) 
R&D/sales (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(5.50) (5.49) (5.51) (5.71) (5.71) (5.71) 
Debt/total assets (%) -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 
(-12.55) (-12.82) (-12.47) (-5.96) (-6.05) (-5.89) 
Annual stock return volatility -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.22* -0.22* -0.23* 
 
(-1.33) (-1.35) (-1.37) (-1.78) (-1.76) (-1.85) 
log(1+Assets) 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 
(2.05) (2.04) (1.99) (0.49) (0.45) (0.45) 
log(1+Firm age) -0.32*** -0.24*** -0.31*** -0.32*** -0.24** -0.30*** 
 
(-4.15) (-2.83) (-4.00) (-3.70) (-2.58) (-3.50) 
Constant 3.14*** 2.89*** 3.13*** 3.40*** 3.15*** 3.38*** 
 
(7.94) (7.00) (7.92) (7.96) (7.09) (7.94) 
       Observations 4,725 4,725 4,725 4,901 4,901 4,901 
Adjusted R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 20. ROA and family characteristics (specification following Anderson and Reeb, 2003) 
The sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 firms that go 
public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer 
reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, 
executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at 
least 5%.  I follow Anderson and Reeb (2003) and use OLS regressions to examine the relations between ROA and 
family characteristics.  ROA (EBITDA) is the ratio of Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and 
Amortization to total assets.  ROA adj. for init. book equity uses the initial book value of equity in the IPO year as 
the lower bond of the post-IPO book equity.  A firm’s book equity is set to the initial value if it falls below the initial 
value in a given year.  ROA with book equity>0 is calculated only for firms with positive book equity.  ROA with 
assets>5 mil is calculated only for firms with assets greater than five millions.  Family ownership wedge (0/1) is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the family has voting rights greater than its cash flow rights and zero otherwise.  
Family ownership wedge (%) is the percentage of family voting rights above its cash flow rights.  All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All regressions include year dummies and Fama-French 17 
Industry dummies.  t-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Family firm (0/1) -0.79   -0.53   
 
(-0.72)   (-0.67)   
Young family firms (0/1)  -5.56***   -5.00***  
(age<9 years)  (-2.70)   (-3.44)  
Old family firms (0/1)  -0.28   -0.06  
(age≥9 years)  (-0.27)   (-0.07)  
CEO hire (0/1)   -1.77   -0.97 
 
  (-1.41)   (-1.06) 
CEO founder (0/1)   -0.38   -0.50 
 
  (-0.30)   (-0.55) 
CEO descendant (0/1)   2.46   1.95 
 
  (1.10)   (1.15) 
Nonfamily blkholder 
voting rights (%) 
-0.10*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
(-3.86) (-3.69) (-3.57) (-5.16) (-5.00) (-4.89) 
R&D/sales (%) -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
 
(-9.75) (-9.77) (-9.77) (-10.73) (-10.79) (-10.73) 
Debt/total assets (%) -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 
(-3.47) (-3.36) (-3.55) (-2.98) (-2.81) (-3.12) 
Annual stock return 
volatility 
-20.44*** -20.45*** -20.37*** -16.88*** -16.88*** -16.83*** 
(-11.41) (-11.46) (-11.37) (-12.40) (-12.51) (-12.38) 
log(1+Assets) 4.53*** 4.56*** 4.55*** 2.44*** 2.46*** 2.45*** 
 
(7.30) (7.35) (7.34) (6.73) (6.83) (6.79) 
log(1+Firm age) 4.60*** 3.05*** 4.46*** 4.04*** 2.59*** 3.92*** 
 
(5.47) (3.49) (5.23) (6.22) (4.11) (5.97) 
Constant -14.68** -10.05* -14.43** -4.39 -0.05 -4.18 
 
(-2.38) (-1.65) (-2.33) (-1.01) (-0.01) (-0.96) 
Continued on next page 
Table 20 – Continued       
       
       
Observations 4,938 4,938 4,938 4,937 4,937 4,937 
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 

















(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Family firm (0/1) -0.30   -0.97   
 
(-0.30)   (-0.98)   
Young family firms (0/1)  -5.57***   -5.21***  
(age<9 years)  (-3.11)   (-2.88)  
Old family firms (0/1)  0.29   -0.53  
(age≥9 years)  (0.31)   (-0.56)  
CEO hire (0/1)   -0.79   -2.04* 
 
  (-0.70)   (-1.79) 
CEO founder (0/1)   -0.29   -0.39 
 
  (-0.26)   (-0.35) 
CEO descendant (0/1)   2.50   1.88 
 
  (1.21)   (0.90) 
Nonfamily blkholder 
voting rights (%) 
-0.11*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 
(-4.77) (-4.58) (-4.56) (-4.75) (-4.60) (-4.42) 
R&D/sales (%) -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.12*** 
 
(-10.49) (-10.46) (-10.51) (-10.40) (-10.44) (-10.45) 
Debt/total assets (%) -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
 
(-3.94) (-3.83) (-4.21) (-3.19) (-3.08) (-3.27) 
Annual stock return 
volatility 
-20.70*** -20.67*** -20.66*** -19.90*** -19.95*** -19.82*** 
(-11.98) (-12.02) (-11.94) (-11.96) (-12.02) (-11.94) 
log(1+Assets) 3.52*** 3.55*** 3.56*** 3.73*** 3.76*** 3.74*** 
 
(7.17) (7.25) (7.23) (6.95) (7.00) (6.98) 
log(1+Firm age) 4.32*** 2.59*** 4.18*** 4.39*** 3.02*** 4.27*** 
 
(5.44) (3.26) (5.20) (5.71) (3.93) (5.48) 
Constant -9.31* -4.12 -9.07 -10.02* -5.83 -9.82* 
 
(-1.66) (-0.75) (-1.61) (-1.78) (-1.05) (-1.74) 
 
      
Observations 4,729 4,729 4,729 4,905 4,905 4,905 
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.47 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 21. Tobin’s Q and family factors (specification following Villalonga and Amit, 2006) 
The sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the 
IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at least 5%.  I follow 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) and use OLS regressions to examine the relations between Tobin’s Q and family factors.  The factors are generated by principal 
component analysis (PCA) to extract the information contained by individual family characteristics.  Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value of assets to book 
value of assets.  The market value is the sum of book value of assets and market value of common stock minus the sum of book value of common stock and 
deferred taxes.  Q adj. for init. book equity uses the initial book value of equity in the IPO year as the lower bond of the post-IPO book equity.  A firm’s book 
equity is set to the initial value if it falls below the initial value in a given year.  Q with book equity>0 is calculated only for firms with positive book equity.  Q 
with assets>5 mil is calculated only for firms with assets greater than five millions.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All 
regressions include year dummies and Fama-French 17 Industry dummies.  t-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  
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Table 21 – Continued         
         
         
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00** -0.00** 
 
(-2.51) (-2.61) (-3.32) (-3.40) (-3.23) (-3.30) (-2.26) (-2.36) 
Dividends/book value of equity (%) 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 
(2.75) (2.76) (2.72) (2.73) (3.07) (3.08) (2.71) (2.71) 
Debt/market value of equity -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.18*** -0.18*** 
 
(-7.50) (-7.49) (-9.28) (-9.28) (-7.83) (-7.83) (-7.69) (-7.69) 
Market risk 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 
 
(10.53) (10.52) (10.51) (10.49) (10.61) (10.59) (10.68) (10.67) 
Diversification (0/1) -0.15* -0.15* -0.14* -0.14* -0.14* -0.14* -0.16** -0.16* 
 
(-1.92) (-1.91) (-1.94) (-1.92) (-1.82) (-1.81) (-1.98) (-1.96) 
R&D/sales (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(4.41) (4.39) (3.05) (3.04) (4.17) (4.12) (4.40) (4.38) 
CAPX/PPE (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(7.20) (7.24) (8.36) (8.35) (7.38) (7.39) (7.12) (7.15) 
log(1+Assets) -0.14*** -0.14*** 0.02 0.02 -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 
(-3.84) (-3.82) (0.79) (0.80) (-3.56) (-3.55) (-3.47) (-3.46) 
Sales growth (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(8.08) (8.07) (8.78) (8.78) (8.17) (8.17) (8.69) (8.68) 
log(1+Firm age) -0.07 -0.07 -0.00 -0.00 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 
 
(-1.00) (-1.04) (-0.05) (-0.08) (-1.08) (-1.10) (-0.74) (-0.77) 
Constant 2.07*** 2.10*** 0.99*** 1.02*** 1.92*** 1.94*** 1.93*** 1.96*** 
 
(5.96) (6.03) (3.37) (3.44) (5.77) (5.84) (5.65) (5.72) 
         Observations 4,749 4,749 4,749 4,749 4,547 4,547 4,720 4,720 
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Table 22. Industry median adjusted Tobin’s Q and family factors (specification following Villalonga and Amit, 2006) 
The sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the 
IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at least 5%.  I follow 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) and use OLS regressions to examine the relations between Tobin’s Q and family factors.  The factors are generated by principal 
component analysis (PCA) to extract the information contained by individual family characteristics.  All the dependent variables are adjusted by subtracting the 
industry median value in a given Fama-French 17 Industry and year.  Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets.  The market value is 
the sum of book value of assets and market value of common stock minus the sum of book value of common stock and deferred taxes.  Q adj. for init. book 
equity uses the initial book value of equity in the IPO year as the lower bond of the post-IPO book equity.  A firm’s book equity is set to the initial value if it falls 
below the initial value in a given year.  Q with book equity>0 is calculated only for firms with positive book equity.  Q with assets>5 mil is calculated only for 
firms with assets greater than five millions.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  t-test statistics from robust standard errors 
(clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
All dependent variables are adjusted  





Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




































































































































Continued on next page 
         
Table 22 – Continued         
         
         
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00** -0.00** 
 
(-2.54) (-2.69) (-3.24) (-3.37) (-3.30) (-3.41) (-2.39) (-2.52) 
Dividends/book value of equity (%) 0.11** 0.11** 0.10** 0.10** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11** 0.11** 
 
(2.55) (2.56) (2.32) (2.33) (2.77) (2.78) (2.52) (2.53) 
Debt/market value of equity -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.20*** -0.19*** -0.15*** -0.15*** 
 
(-5.97) (-5.96) (-7.52) (-7.52) (-6.66) (-6.65) (-5.99) (-5.98) 
Market risk 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 
 
(8.66) (8.62) (8.59) (8.57) (8.56) (8.52) (8.66) (8.63) 
Diversification (0/1) -0.15* -0.15* -0.18** -0.18** -0.16** -0.16* -0.15* -0.15* 
 
(-1.81) (-1.79) (-2.37) (-2.34) (-1.98) (-1.96) (-1.90) (-1.88) 
R&D/sales (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(4.57) (4.54) (2.64) (2.63) (4.14) (4.08) (4.51) (4.48) 
CAPX/PPE (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(6.56) (6.61) (8.24) (8.25) (6.86) (6.89) (6.51) (6.56) 
log(1+Assets) -0.12*** -0.12*** 0.01 0.01 -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 
 
(-3.43) (-3.41) (0.46) (0.48) (-3.20) (-3.18) (-3.03) (-3.01) 
Sales growth (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(8.21) (8.21) (9.07) (9.08) (8.26) (8.27) (8.63) (8.64) 
log(1+Firm age) -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 
 
(-0.85) (-0.87) (-0.13) (-0.14) (-0.93) (-0.94) (-0.63) (-0.66) 
Constant 0.64** 0.67*** -0.28 -0.26 0.55** 0.57** 0.50** 0.53** 
 
(2.53) (2.64) (-1.33) (-1.23) (2.20) (2.28) (1.97) (2.08) 
         Observations 4,749 4,749 4,749 4,749 4,547 4,547 4,720 4,720 
Adjusted R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 
Ind. dummies No No No No No No No No 
Year dummies No No No No No No No No 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Table 23. ROA and family factors (specification following Anderson and Reeb, 2003) 
The sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the 
IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at least 5%.  I follow 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and use OLS regressions to examine the relations between ROA and family factors.  The factors are generated by principal 
component analysis (PCA) to extract the information contained by individual family characteristics.  ROA (EBITDA) is the ratio of Earnings Before Interest, 
Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization to total assets.  ROA adj. for init. book equity uses the initial book value of equity in the IPO year as the lower bond of the 
post-IPO book equity.  A firm’s book equity is set to the initial value if it falls below the initial value in a given year.  ROA with book equity>0 is calculated only 
for firms with positive book equity.  ROA with assets>5 mil is calculated only for firms with assets greater than five millions.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All regressions include year dummies and Fama-French 17 Industry dummies.  t-test statistics from robust standard 
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 Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 
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Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 

















































Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.09*** 
 
(-3.34) (-3.09) (-4.63) (-4.46) (-4.33) (-4.15) (-4.02) (-3.81) 
      Continued on next page 
Table 23 – Continued         
         
         
R&D/sales (%) -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 
(-9.71) (-9.55) (-10.58) (-10.50) (-10.47) (-10.32) (-10.37) (-10.21) 
Debt/total assets (%) -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.09*** 
 
(-3.63) (-3.63) (-3.20) (-3.23) (-4.26) (-4.28) (-3.40) (-3.41) 
Annual stock return volatility -20.39*** -20.29*** -16.82*** -16.79*** -20.67*** -20.59*** -19.79*** -19.73*** 
 
(-11.44) (-11.38) (-12.43) (-12.41) (-11.96) (-11.93) (-11.97) (-11.94) 
log(1+Assets) 4.60*** 4.60*** 2.49*** 2.49*** 3.60*** 3.60*** 3.81*** 3.81*** 
 
(7.44) (7.41) (6.86) (6.85) (7.32) (7.31) (7.10) (7.07) 
log(1+Firm age) 4.60*** 4.62*** 3.97*** 3.97*** 4.24*** 4.27*** 4.34*** 4.34*** 
 
(5.41) (5.38) (6.09) (6.07) (5.25) (5.26) (5.60) (5.56) 
Constant -15.27** -15.71** -4.64 -4.81 -9.47* -9.89* -10.63* -10.90* 
 
(-2.51) (-2.55) (-1.08) (-1.11) (-1.71) (-1.77) (-1.93) (-1.96) 
         Observations 4,938 4,938 4,937 4,937 4,729 4,729 4,905 4,905 
Adjusted R-squared 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.47 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 









Table 24. Tobin’s Q, family ownership, and family factors in firm fixed effects regressions (specification based on Villalonga and Amit, 2006) 
The sample consists of 510 family IPOs and 3,749 post-IPO family firm-years.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the family IPO’s last sample 
observation as a family firm.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the 
firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at least 5%.  I use firm fixed effects OLS regressions to examine the relations 
between Tobin’s Q, family ownership, and family factors.  The factors are generated by principal component analysis (PCA) to extract the information contained 
by individual family characteristics.  The test specification is based on Villalonga and Amit (2006).  The control variables are the same as in Table 21 except that 
I exclude Dividends/book value of equity, Diversification, and R&D/sales for their low cross-time variation.  Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value of assets to 
book value of assets.  The market value is the sum of book value of assets and market value of common stock minus the sum of book value of common stock and 
deferred taxes.  Q adj. for init. book equity uses the initial book value of equity in the IPO year as the lower bond of the post-IPO book equity.  A firm’s book 
equity is set to the initial value if it falls below the initial value in a given year.  Q with book equity>0 is calculated only for firms with positive book equity.  Q 
with assets>5 mil is calculated only for firms with assets greater than five millions.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All 
regressions include year dummies and firm fixed effects.  t-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
  Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
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Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 
(-4.63) (-3.92) (-5.08) (-4.58) (-5.20) (-4.73) (-4.39) (-3.72) 
Debt/market value of equity -0.05** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.05** -0.06*** 
 
(-2.49) (-2.97) (-3.62) (-3.97) (-2.90) (-3.47) (-2.54) (-3.02) 
Market risk 0.36*** 0.39*** 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.40*** 
 
(6.17) (6.69) (5.79) (6.22) (6.20) (6.72) (6.67) (7.21) 
      Continued on next page 
         
Table 24 – Continued         
         
         
CAPX/PPE (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(5.82) (5.78) (7.17) (7.15) (6.49) (6.47) (5.63) (5.58) 
log(1+Assets) -0.47*** -0.43*** -0.13** -0.10 -0.37*** -0.34*** -0.46*** -0.43*** 
 
(-5.91) (-5.37) (-1.99) (-1.57) (-5.28) (-4.70) (-6.00) (-5.44) 
Sales growth (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(6.00) (6.03) (6.24) (6.25) (6.25) (6.25) (6.36) (6.39) 
log(1+Firm age) -0.66** -0.70** -0.62** -0.66** -0.64** -0.69** -0.58** -0.62** 
 
(-2.24) (-2.28) (-2.36) (-2.37) (-2.25) (-2.29) (-2.05) (-2.09) 
Constant 5.95*** 5.33*** 4.50*** 4.00*** 5.46*** 4.89*** 5.74*** 5.13*** 
 
(7.57) (6.90) (6.87) (6.15) (7.54) (6.85) (7.58) (6.89) 
         Observations 3,408 3,408 3,408 3,408 3,274 3,274 3,391 3,391 
Number of firms 478 478 478 478 476 476 473 473 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 









Table 25. ROA, family ownership, and family factors in firm fixed effects regressions (specification based on Anderson and Reeb, 2003) 
The sample consists of 510 family IPOs and 3,749 post-IPO family firm-years.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the family IPO’s last sample 
observation as a family firm.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the 
firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at least 5%.  I use firm fixed effects OLS regressions to examine the relations 
between ROA, family ownership, and family factors.  The factors are generated by principal component analysis (PCA) to extract the information contained by 
individual family characteristics.  The test specification is based on Anderson and Reeb (2003).  The control variables are the same as in Table 23 except that I 
exclude R&D/sales for its low cross-time variation.  ROA (EBITDA) is the ratio of Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization to total assets.  
ROA adj. for init. book equity uses the initial book value of equity in the IPO year as the lower bond of the post-IPO book equity.  A firm’s book equity is set to 
the initial value if it falls below the initial value in a given year.  ROA with book equity>0 is calculated only for firms with positive book equity.  ROA with 
assets>5 mil is calculated only for firms with assets greater than five millions.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All 
regressions include year dummies and firm fixed effects.  t-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote 
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Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.01 -0.04 -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.04 -0.06* -0.04 -0.06* 
 
(-0.32) (-1.17) (-2.96) (-3.62) (-1.15) (-1.71) (-1.35) (-1.95) 
Debt/total assets (%) -0.23*** -0.22*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.20*** -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.18*** 
 
(-5.04) (-4.74) (-4.57) (-4.26) (-7.41) (-6.85) (-5.05) (-4.80) 
Annual stock return volatility -13.71*** -14.25*** -10.04*** -10.38*** -13.90*** -14.25*** -11.77*** -12.15*** 
 
(-5.84) (-5.67) (-7.23) (-7.06) (-7.37) (-7.15) (-6.45) (-6.39) 
log(1+Assets) 10.38*** 9.82*** 3.23*** 2.99*** 7.32*** 6.88*** 8.10*** 7.70*** 
 
(6.29) (6.14) (4.41) (4.33) (6.06) (5.88) (6.26) (6.11) 
      Continued on next page 
         
Table 25 – Continued         
         
         
log(1+Firm age) 4.76 5.21 7.60** 7.87** 5.20 5.48 5.19 5.47 
 
(1.00) (1.12) (2.44) (2.58) (1.19) (1.28) (1.24) (1.33) 
Constant -35.28*** -26.28** -13.42* -10.02 -21.50** -15.28 -26.71** -20.36** 
 
(-2.86) (-2.28) (-1.90) (-1.42) (-2.16) (-1.53) (-2.57) (-2.02) 
         Observations 3,644 3,644 3,644 3,644 3,493 3,493 3,606 3,606 
Number of firms 492 492 492 492 491 491 490 490 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
With R-squared 0.20 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 
  
Table 26. Impact of family exit on firm performance (specification following Pagano et al., 1998) 
The sample consists of 123 firms that go public as family firms and become nonfamily firms following family exit.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder 
or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is 
at least 5%.  I follow Pagano et al. (1998) and use OLS regressions to examine the impact of family exit on firm performance.  I estimate the following model: 
                                                               , where      ,        ,        ,        , and         are dummy 
variables that equal one if family exit happens in year t, t-1, t-2, t-3, or t-n (n≥4), respectively.     is firm fixed effects and    is year fixed effects.  The last row 
reports the p-value of the F-test that the post-exit dummies are jointly zero.  Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets.  The market 
value is the sum of book value of assets and market value of common stock minus the sum of book value of common stock and deferred taxes.  ROA (EBITDA) is 
the ratio of Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization to total assets.  Q adj. for init. book equity (ROA adj. for init. book equity) uses the 
initial book value of equity in the IPO year as the lower bond of the post-IPO book equity.  A firm’s book equity is set to the initial value if it falls below the 
initial value in a given year.  Q with book equity>0 (ROA with book equity>0) is calculated only for firms with positive book equity.  Q with assets>5 mil (ROA 
with assets>5 mil) is calculated only for firms with assets greater than five millions.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All 
regressions include year dummies and firm fixed effects.  t-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
  Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      0.08 -0.06 0.09 0.05 -0.98 0.96 -0.93 -0.06 
 
(0.62) (-0.48) (0.69) (0.36) (-0.44) (0.57) (-0.47) (-0.03) 
        0.05 -0.15 -0.01 -0.04 -1.99 1.51 -1.47 -0.01 
 
(0.28) (-0.99) (-0.03) (-0.23) (-0.67) (0.75) (-0.53) (-0.01) 
        0.41* 0.04 0.26 0.18 -7.41* -0.49 -0.42 -0.85 
 
(1.78) (0.22) (1.29) (0.95) (-1.66) (-0.19) (-0.13) (-0.28) 
        0.60** 0.27 0.60* 0.44 -9.02* -3.77 -5.86 -5.31 
 
(1.98) (0.99) (1.92) (1.62) (-1.69) (-1.15) (-1.30) (-1.26) 
       (n≥4) 0.42 0.12 0.38 0.28 -9.58* -3.51 -6.23 -5.46 
 (1.44) (0.46) (1.31) (1.05) (-1.78) (-0.93) (-1.31) (-1.27) 
Constant 3.06*** 2.71*** 3.00*** 2.96*** -0.29 2.96 10.28*** 10.47*** 
 
(14.38) (13.43) (13.49) (14.24) (-0.06) (0.82) (2.70) (4.39) 
       
Continued on next page 
         
         
Table 26 – Continued         
         
         
Observations 1,456 1,456 1,371 1,436 1,574 1,571 1,441 1,536 
Number of firms 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 
F-test: post-exit dummies 
are jointly zero 















Table 27. Summary statistics for family firm mergers 
The sample consists of 184 family firm mergers.  Panel A provides the summary statistics for the 122 mergers that involve public acquirers with stock traded on 
an American stock exchange.  Panel B provides the summary statistics for the 62 mergers that involve private acquirers or foreign acquirers whose stock is not 
traded in the U.S.  Panel C provides the statistics for the comparisons between mergers in Panel A and mergers in Panel B.  Cash deal is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the method of payment is all cash and zero otherwise.  Target high-tech is a dummy variable that equals one if the target’s primary SIC Code is in a 
high-tech industry defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004) and zero otherwise.  Tender offer is a dummy variable that equals one for tender offer and zero 
otherwise.  Diversifying merger is a dummy variable that equals one if the target and the acquirer are from different two-digit SIC industries.  Target size is target 
stock price multiplied by number of shares outstanding 15 days before the merger announcement, adjusted to the 2013 dollar value.  Relative size is the ratio of 
target size to acquirer size.  Combined wealth effect is the combined abnormal return of the target and the acquirer, weighted by target size and acquirer size.  
Cumulative abnormal return is calculated based on the market model.  The estimation period is 240 trading days beginning 300 days before the merger 
announcement with a minimum of 30 trading day observations. 
A: Acquirers’ stock traded in the U.S. mean p50 min p10 p25 p75 p90 max sd N 
Cash deal (0/1) 0.38        0.49 122 
Target high-tech (0/1) 0.50        0.50 122 
Tender offer (0/1) 0.24        0.43 122 
Diversifying merger (0/1) 0.40        0.49 122 
Target size (millions) 563 240 7 24 95 658 1,239 6,627 943 122 
Target co-founding family voting rights (%) 2.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.80 6.80 28.80 5.41 122 
Target nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) 23.54 19.58 0.00 0.00 10.40 36.08 50.20 79.69 18.63 122 
Target Tobin's Q 2.46 1.74 0.58 0.89 1.25 3.08 4.85 11.30 1.95 120 
Target firm age 15.02 12 3 5 9 19 26 78 10.98 122 
Acquirer size (millions) 26,662 2,523 21 151 538 11,268 44,842 411,990 78,334 122 
Relative size 0.29 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.38 0.79 5.72 0.59 122 
Combined wealth effect over window (-1, +1) 2.04 1.24 -18.20 -4.92 -1.96 4.98 10.69 28.41 7.84 122 
Combined wealth effect over window (-2, +2) 1.85 0.88 -21.89 -8.52 -2.48 5.25 13.20 28.39 8.51 122 
B: Other acquirers  mean p50 min p10 p25 p75 p90 max sd N 
Cash deal (0/1) 0.90        0.30 62 
Target high-tech (0/1) 0.26        0.44 62 
Tender offer (0/1) 0.39        0.49 62 
Diversifying merger (0/1) 0.58        0.50 62 
        Combined on next page 
Table 27 – Continued           
           
           
Target size (millions) 575 141 3 16 39 421 1,478 6,627 1,198 62 
Target co-founding family voting rights (%) 1.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.80 25.20 4.26 62 
Target nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) 20.09 15.57 0.00 0.00 7.25 29.12 40.30 74.19 17.60 62 
Target Tobin's Q 1.89 1.40 0.58 0.76 0.95 2.01 3.15 11.30 1.75 60 
Target firm age 22.23 20 3 7 13 27 34 98 16.70 62 
C: Comparisons between A and B  diff. in mean diff. in median (Wilcoxon)      
Cash deal (0/1) -0.53*** -1.00*** 
     Target high-tech (0/1) 0.24*** 0.50*** 
     Tender offer (0/1) -0.15** 0.00** 
     Diversifying merger (0/1) -0.18** -1.00** 
     Target size (millions) -12.39 99.23** 
     Target co-founding family voting rights (%) 1.07 0.00** 
     Target nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) 3.45 4.01 
     Target Tobin's Q 0.58* 0.33*** 
     Target firm age -7.20*** -8.00*** 







Table 28. Combined wealth effect and family characteristics 
The sample consists of 120 family mergers that involve public acquirers with stock traded on an American stock 
exchange and have valid data.  Combined wealth effect is the combined abnormal return of the target and the 
acquirer, weighted by target size and acquirer size.  Cumulative abnormal return is calculated based on the market 
model.  The estimation period is 240 trading days beginning 300 days before the merger announcement with a 
minimum of 30 trading day observations.  Family stay is a dummy variable that equals one for the transitional 
mergers, where the family remains as the majority family after the merger.  All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All regressions include year dummies.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at 
the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Combined wealth effect 
(-1, +1) (-1, +1) (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-2, +2) (-2, +2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
































































Family stay (0/1) 1.91 2.00 2.18 2.07 2.28 2.47 
 
(0.61) (0.64) (0.68) (0.63) (0.69) (0.73) 
Relative size 3.31** 3.36** 3.40** 4.77*** 4.81*** 4.92*** 
 
(2.36) (2.40) (2.36) (3.25) (3.28) (3.26) 
log(1+Target size) -1.14 -1.16 -1.01 -1.86** -1.87** -1.70** 
 
(-1.59) (-1.64) (-1.37) (-2.50) (-2.51) (-2.21) 
Cash deal (0/1) 5.21** 5.47** 5.96** 4.92* 5.41** 5.96** 
 
(2.20) (2.32) (2.43) (1.99) (2.20) (2.31) 
Target high-tech (0/1) 1.91 2.04 2.01 1.39 1.47 1.34 
 
(1.09) (1.17) (1.11) (0.76) (0.80) (0.71) 
Tender offer (0/1) -1.23 -1.32 -1.81 -1.27 -1.48 -1.93 
 
(-0.51) (-0.55) (-0.74) (-0.51) (-0.59) (-0.75) 
Diversifying merger (0/1) 0.80 0.71 0.66 0.26 0.10 0.18 
 
(0.46) (0.41) (0.37) (0.14) (0.06) (0.10) 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.25 0.26* 0.24 
 
(0.69) (0.81) (0.70) (1.60) (1.67) (1.53) 
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 
 
(-0.72) (-0.68) (-0.50) (-1.03) (-1.13) (-1.13) 
Target Tobin's Q -0.22 -0.22 -0.52 0.14 0.14 -0.14 
 
(-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.98) (0.28) (0.27) (-0.24) 
    Continued on next page 
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log(1+Target firm age) 0.02 -0.04 0.24 -0.27 -0.24 0.38 
 
(0.01) (-0.03) (0.10) (-0.17) (-0.15) (0.15) 
Constant 2.98 3.33 4.35 10.24 11.01 11.49 
 
(0.26) (0.29) (0.34) (0.85) (0.91) (0.85) 
       Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 
Adjusted R-squared 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.09 0.09 0.06 






















Table 29. Combined wealth effect and factors for family characteristics 
The sample consists of 120 family mergers that involve public acquirers with stock traded on an American stock 
exchange and have valid data.  Combined wealth effect is the combined abnormal return of the target and the 
acquirer, weighted by target size and acquirer size.  Cumulative abnormal return is calculated based on the market 
model.  The estimation period is 240 trading days beginning 300 days before the merger announcement with a 
minimum of 30 trading day observations.  The factors are generated by principal component analysis (PCA) to 
extract the information contained by individual family characteristics.  Family stay is a dummy variable that equals 
one for the transitional mergers, where the family remains as the majority family after the merger.  All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All regressions include year dummies.  Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Combined wealth effect 
(-1, +1) (-2, +2) 
(1) (2) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.32 0.63 
 
(0.32) (0.59) 
Factor 2 (Founder) -0.02 -0.42 
 
(-0.02) (-0.43) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 0.07 0.14 
 
(0.07) (0.13) 
Family stay (0/1) 1.90 2.21 
 
(0.59) (0.65) 
Relative size 3.32** 4.82*** 
 
(2.33) (3.23) 
log(1+Target size) -1.12 -1.78** 
 
(-1.52) (-2.32) 
Cash deal (0/1) 5.41** 5.62** 
 
(2.21) (2.19) 
Target high-tech (0/1) 1.92 1.32 
 
(1.08) (0.70) 
Tender offer (0/1) -1.31 -1.47 
 
(-0.54) (-0.58) 
Diversifying merger (0/1) 0.74 0.09 
 
(0.42) (0.05) 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) 0.11 0.26 
 
(0.70) (1.63) 
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.04 -0.06 
 
(-0.71) (-1.16) 
Target Tobin's Q -0.23 0.07 
 
(-0.45) (0.14) 
log(1+Target firm age) -0.02 -0.36 
 
(-0.01) (-0.22) 
Constant 3.36 11.39 
 
(0.29) (0.93) 
   Observations 120 120 
Adjusted R-squared -0.01 0.06 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
 
Table 30. Family characteristics and investments: R&D expenditures and CAPEX expenditures 
The sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 firms that go public in 2001.  The sample period is from the 
IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s 
relatives is a director, executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at least 5%.  I follow 
Anderson et al. (2012) and use OLS regressions to examine the relations between firm investments and family characteristics.  R&D is the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to total assets.  If a firm does not report R&D expenditures in a certain year, I set the missing value to zero.  CAPEX is the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets.  Lone founder is a dummy variable that equals one if the founder is the only family member in the firm and zero otherwise.  Multiple 
family members is a dummy variable that equals one for the other family firms.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All 
regressions include year dummies and Fama-French 17 Industry dummies.  t-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
 
R&D R&D R&D R&D CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) -0.27 
   
0.51* 
   
 
(-0.33) 
   
(1.79) 


































Family CEO (0/1) 
 
-0.60 





   
(1.10) 
  Lone founder (0/1) 
  
1.03 
   
0.80** 
 
   
(1.09) 
   
(2.49) 
 Multiple family members (0/1) 
  
-1.70* 
   
0.19 
 
   
(-1.92) 
   
(0.54) 
 CEO hire (0/1) 
   
1.71* 
   
0.46 
    
(1.81) 
   
(1.32) 
CEO founder (0/1) 
   
0.43 
   
0.70* 
    
(0.39) 
   
(1.87) 
CEO descendant (0/1) 
   
1.76 
   
-0.35 
    
(1.20) 
   
(-0.41) 
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) 0.05*** 0.02 0.04** 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 
 
(2.93) (0.84) (2.37) (0.82) (-1.49) (-1.42) (-1.83) (-1.41) 
Continued on next page 
Table 30 – Continued         
         
         
Leverage (%) -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 
(-4.69) (-4.02) (-4.62) (-4.00) (-6.41) (-6.32) (-6.34) (-6.29) 
Cash flow (%) -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00* -0.00 -0.00* 
 
(-13.71) (-13.46) (-13.65) (-13.48) (-1.70) (-1.68) (-1.64) (-1.65) 
Dividend payout based on EBITDA (%) -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.05* -0.04 -0.04* -0.05* 
 
(-0.52) (0.01) (-0.39) (0.05) (-1.70) (-1.59) (-1.65) (-1.69) 
Asset tangibility (%) -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.07*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
 
(-4.08) (-3.97) (-3.91) (-4.04) (15.99) (16.08) (16.12) (16.59) 
log(1+Assets) -0.53* -0.55* -0.53* -0.57* 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 
 
(-1.79) (-1.84) (-1.80) (-1.91) (1.28) (1.24) (1.29) (1.15) 
log(1+Firm age) -0.66 -0.72 -0.49 -0.58 -0.92*** -0.98*** -0.89*** -0.88*** 
 
(-1.24) (-1.41) (-0.93) (-1.12) (-4.41) (-4.70) (-4.24) (-3.98) 
Constant 15.56*** 17.76*** 15.07*** 16.79*** 4.58*** 4.92*** 4.48*** 4.44*** 
 
(7.11) (8.11) (6.75) (7.23) (3.50) (3.84) (3.32) (3.44) 
         Observations 5,589 5,589 5,589 5,589 5,554 5,554 5,554 5,554 
Adjusted R-squared 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 








Table 31. Family characteristics and investments: R&D component 
The sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 firms that go 
public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer 
reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, 
executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at 
least 5%.  I follow Anderson et al. (2012) and use OLS regressions to examine the relations between firm 
investments and family characteristics.  The dependent variable is R&D expenditures as a percentage of the sum of 
R&D expenditures and CAPEX expenditures.  If a firm does not report R&D expenditures in a certain year, I set the 
missing value to zero.  Lone founder is a dummy variable that equals one if the founder is the only family member 
in the firm and zero otherwise.  Multiple family members is a dummy variable that equals one for the other family 
firms.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All regressions include year 
dummies and Fama-French 17 Industry dummies.  t-test statistics from robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are 
in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
R&D/(R&D+CAPEX)% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family firm (0/1) -3.15 
   
 
(-1.33) 




























   
(0.43) 




   
(-2.96) 
 CEO hire (0/1) 
   
5.22* 
    
(1.93) 
CEO founder (0/1) 
   
-0.14 
    
(-0.05) 
CEO descendant (0/1) 
   
-0.52 
    
(-0.11) 
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) 0.09* -0.06 0.05 -0.06 
 
(1.88) (-1.25) (1.13) (-1.26) 
Leverage (%) -0.22*** -0.18*** -0.22*** -0.18*** 
 
(-5.51) (-4.51) (-5.49) (-4.53) 
Cash flow (%) -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 
(-10.07) (-9.20) (-9.96) (-9.23) 
Dividend payout based on EBITDA (%) -0.37 -0.24 -0.35 -0.25 
 
(-1.24) (-0.82) (-1.14) (-0.85) 
Asset tangibility (%) -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.52*** -0.52*** 
 
(-9.66) (-9.47) (-9.61) (-9.48) 
log(1+Assets) -1.67* -1.78* -1.67* -1.86** 
 
(-1.76) (-1.91) (-1.79) (-2.00) 
  Continued on next page 
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log(1+Firm age) -5.75*** -5.85*** -5.22*** -5.23*** 
 
(-3.38) (-3.56) (-3.10) (-3.13) 
Constant 61.66*** 69.72*** 60.06*** 66.09*** 
 
(6.94) (7.73) (6.80) (7.05) 
     Observations 5,538 5,538 5,538 5,538 
Adjusted R-squared 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.52 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 32. Family factors and investments: R&D expenditures and CAPEX expenditures 
The sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 firms that go 
public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer 
reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, 
executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at 
least 5%.  I follow Anderson et al. (2012) and use OLS regressions to examine the relations between firm 
investments and family characteristics.  The factors are generated by principal component analysis (PCA) to extract 
the information contained by individual family characteristics.  R&D is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets.  
If a firm does not report R&D expenditures in a certain year, I set the missing value to zero.  CAPEX is the ratio of 
capital expenditures to total assets.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles.  All 
regressions include year dummies and Fama-French 17 Industry dummies.  t-test statistics from robust standard 
errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% 
(*) level, respectively. 
  R&D R&D CAPEX CAPEX 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 




































































Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) 0.03 0.03 -0.01* -0.02** 
 
(1.61) (1.56) (-1.77) (-2.21) 
Leverage (%) -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 
(-4.39) (-4.43) (-6.24) (-6.16) 
Cash flow (%) -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 
 
(-13.59) (-13.65) (-1.55) (-1.46) 
Dividend payout based on EBITDA (%) -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
 
(-0.28) (-0.25) (-1.61) (-1.55) 
Asset tangibility (%) -0.06*** -0.06*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
 
(-3.87) (-3.83) (16.35) (16.29) 
log(1+Assets) -0.58* -0.59** 0.14 0.14 
 
(-1.94) (-1.97) (1.15) (1.17) 
log(1+Firm age) -0.57 -0.48 -0.92*** -0.91*** 
 
(-1.11) (-0.95) (-4.26) (-4.29) 
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Constant 16.05*** 15.63*** 4.66*** 4.84*** 
 
(7.33) (7.22) (3.49) (3.62) 
     Observations 5,589 5,589 5,554 5,554 
Adjusted R-squared 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 























Table 33. Family factors and investments: R&D component 
The sample consists of 310 firms that go public in 1993, 254 firms that go public in 1997, and 40 firms that go 
public in 2001.  The sample period is from the IPO year to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted and no longer 
reported in CRSP.  I define a firm as family firm if the founder or any of the founder’s relatives is a director, 
executive, manager disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings, or the aggregate family ownership of outstanding equity is at 
least 5%.  I follow Anderson et al. (2012) and use OLS regressions to examine the relations between firm 
investments and family characteristics.  The factors are generated by principal component analysis (PCA) to extract 
the information contained by individual family characteristics.  The dependent variable is R&D expenditures as a 
percentage of the sum of R&D expenditures and CAPEX expenditures.  If a firm does not report R&D expenditures 
in a certain year, I set the missing value to zero.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
percentiles.  All regressions include year dummies and Fama-French 17 Industry dummies.  t-test statistics from 
robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are in parentheses.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% 








































Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) 0.01 0.02 
 
(0.24) (0.47) 
Leverage (%) -0.20*** -0.21*** 
 
(-5.16) (-5.22) 
Cash flow (%) -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 
(-9.70) (-9.62) 
Dividend payout based on EBITDA (%) -0.32 -0.32 
 
(-1.08) (-1.08) 
Asset tangibility (%) -0.52*** -0.52*** 
 
(-9.48) (-9.37) 
log(1+Assets) -1.85** -1.88** 
 
(-1.99) (-2.00) 
log(1+Firm age) -5.22*** -5.06*** 
 
(-3.10) (-2.99) 
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Constant 62.06*** 60.51*** 
 
(6.96) (6.92) 
   Observations 5,538 5,538 
Adjusted R-squared 0.51 0.51 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 























Appendix B: Robustness Tables 
This appendix presents the outline of robustness tables.  Section I examines family control horizons using strata for 
fixed effects.  Section II addresses the endogeneity issue with family ownership, e.g., family ownership might be 
partly determined by firm performance and firm risk.  I follow VA (2006) and use idiosyncratic risk and lagged Q as 
instruments for family ownership.  I use 2SLS regressions to model the influence of family ownership on Tobin’s Q 
in Table B-3.  I also consider unobserved firm characteristics together with endogenous family ownership and use 
2SLS regressions with firm fixed effects in Table B-4.  Section III examines firm performance excluding the 
subsample of mergers with family exit.  Section IV compares the results in different subsamples.  Table B-14 is 
based on the number of founding families at the IPO.  Table B-15 is based on different IPO cohort year.  Table B-16 
is based on firm age at the IPO.  Table B-17 is based on the sample excluding two special industries.   
Section I  
Family control horizon tests using strata for fixed effects: Replication of Tables 7 and 8 
B-1: The impact of individual family characteristics 
B-2: The impact of family factors 
Section II  
Tobin’s Q and family ownership controlling for endogeneity: Replication of Tables 17 and 24 
B-3: Tobin’s Q and family ownership controlling for endogeneity (2SLS) 
B-4: Tobin’s Q and family ownership controlling for endogeneity (2SLS with firm fixed effects) 
Section III 
Firm performance tests excluding the subsample of mergers with family exit: Replication of Tables 17 to 25 
B-5: Q and family characteristics (specification following VA (2006)) 
B-6: Industry median adjusted Q and family characteristics (specification following VA (2006)) 
B-7: Q and family characteristics (specification following AR (2003)) 
B-8: ROA and family characteristics (specification following AR (2003)) 
B-9: Q and family factors (specification following VA (2006)) 
B-10: Industry median adjusted Q and family factors (specification following VA (2006)) 
B-11: ROA and family factors (specification following AR (2003)) 
B-12: Q in fixed effects regressions (specification based on VA (2006)) 
B-13: ROA in fixed effects regressions (specification based on AR (2003)) 
Section IV  
Subsample tests: Replication of Tables 8, 11, 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, and 33 
B-14: Co-founder family firms and single-founder family firms at the IPO 
B-15: 1993 IPO cohort and 1997 IPO cohort 
B-16: Young firms (age<10) and old firms (age≥10) at the IPO 
B-17: Excluding two special industries: Chemicals (industry 6), which has three firms but has no family exit, and 
Transportation (industry 13), which has 10 firms but has no family maintaining control 
Table B-1. Family control horizons: the impact of individual family characteristics (using strata for fixed effects) 
This table presents the replicated results of Table 7 using strata for IPO cohort fixed effects and industry fixed effects. 
Hazard Ratio: Cox proportional hazards estimation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
# Nonfounder family executives 0.84 
        
 
(-1.26) 
        # Nonfounder family directors 
 
0.77** 
       
  
(-2.00) 
       Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 
  
0.99** 
      
   
(-2.21) 
      Family descendant (0/1) 
   
0.79 
     
    
(-1.03) 
     Founder CEO (0/1) 
    
0.73** 
    
     
(-2.33) 
    Founder Chair (0/1) 
     
0.89 
   
      
(-0.86) 
   Founder's cash flow rights (%) 
      
0.99*** 
  
       
(-3.17) 
  Family firm name (0/1) 
       
1.00 
 
        
(-0.02) 
 Family ownership wedge 
        
1.03** 
         
(2.56) 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) 0.99* 0.98* 0.98* 0.99 0.98* 0.99 0.98* 0.99 0.99 
 
(-1.70) (-1.88) (-1.82) (-1.62) (-1.89) (-1.59) (-1.95) (-1.53) (-1.46) 
Nonfamily active blkholder voting rights (%) 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 
 
(5.42) (5.20) (5.20) (5.36) (5.66) (5.64) (5.28) (5.47) (5.80) 
Nonfamily passive blkholder voting rights (%) 1.01*** 1.01** 1.01** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01** 1.01*** 1.01*** 
 
(2.58) (2.50) (2.44) (2.65) (2.90) (2.77) (2.09) (2.87) (3.06) 
Annual stock return volatility 1.38 1.36 1.36 1.38 1.41 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.39 
 
(1.31) (1.22) (1.26) (1.32) (1.40) (1.38) (1.38) (1.37) (1.34) 
Leverage (%) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
(-0.53) (-0.50) (-0.53) (-0.48) (-0.54) (-0.63) (-0.67) (-0.63) (-0.99) 
       Continued on next page 
Table B-1 – Continued           
          
          
ROA_EBITDA (%) 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 
 
(2.63) (2.59) (2.59) (2.63) (2.70) (2.65) (2.72) (2.62) (2.78) 
# Segments 0.80* 0.80* 0.79* 0.80* 0.84 0.82 0.85 0.82 0.82 
 
(-1.68) (-1.73) (-1.82) (-1.68) (-1.32) (-1.57) (-1.24) (-1.57) (-1.56) 
R&D intensity (%) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 
 
(0.83) (0.76) (0.70) (0.89) (0.91) (0.94) (0.64) (0.99) (1.13) 
Industry median mkt-to-book 2.25** 2.26** 2.25** 2.23** 2.32** 2.24** 2.26** 2.26** 2.25** 
 
(2.34) (2.35) (2.37) (2.31) (2.41) (2.32) (2.33) (2.35) (2.36) 
Ind. with high pvt. bft. of control (0/1) 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.93 0.92 0.87 0.95 0.92 
 
(-0.04) (-0.04) (0.01) (-0.12) (-0.32) (-0.37) (-0.61) (-0.24) (-0.36) 
log(1+Assets) 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91* 0.90* 0.91 0.90* 0.91 0.90* 
 
(-1.63) (-1.54) (-1.59) (-1.65) (-1.71) (-1.64) (-1.78) (-1.62) (-1.83) 
log(1+Firm age) 17.94 20.71 45.11 20.46 8.46 9.46 4.36 9.04 4.89 
 
(0.83) (0.88) (1.08) (0.84) (0.63) (0.66) (0.43) (0.64) (0.46) 
log(1+Firm age2) 0.26 0.24 0.17 0.24 0.36 0.34 0.49 0.35 0.46 
 
(-0.84) (-0.89) (-1.09) (-0.86) (-0.65) (-0.68) (-0.45) (-0.66) (-0.48) 
          Observations 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 
IPO cohort F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of subjects 492 492 492 492 492 492 492 492 492 
No. of events 261 261 261 261 261 261 261 261 261 
 
 
Table B-2. Family control horizons: the impact of family factors (using strata for fixed effects) 
This table presents the replicated results of Table 8 using strata for IPO cohort fixed effects and industry fixed 
effects. 
Hazard Ratio: Cox proportional hazards estimation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.79***         
 
(-2.77) 
    Factor 2 (Founder) 0.80*** 
    
 
(-3.22) 
    Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 1.14* 
    
 
(1.74) 
    # Nonfounder family executives 
 
0.79 
   
  
(-1.56) 




   
(-2.23) 
  Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 
   
0.98*** 
 
    
(-2.97) 
 Family descendant (0/1) 
    
0.68 
     
(-1.56) 
Founder CEO (0/1) 
 
0.71** 
   
  
(-2.57) 




   
(-1.18) 
  Founder's cash flow rights (%) 
   
0.99*** 0.99*** 
    
(-4.12) (-3.41) 
Family firm name (0/1) 
 
1.00 1.01 1.14 0.99 
  
(-0.00) (0.05) (0.57) (-0.05) 
Family ownership wedge 
 
1.03*** 1.03*** 1.03** 1.03*** 
  
(2.65) (2.82) (2.33) (2.79) 
Co-founding family voting rights (%) 0.98** 0.98** 0.98* 0.98** 0.98** 
 
(-2.34) (-2.03) (-1.89) (-2.40) (-2.03) 
Nonfamily active blkholder voting rights (%) 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 
 
(5.35) (5.64) (5.49) (4.74) (5.12) 
Nonfamily passive blkholder voting rights (%) 1.01* 1.01*** 1.01** 1.01 1.01* 
 
(1.88) (2.75) (2.52) (1.35) (1.88) 
Annual stock return volatility 1.33 1.38 1.35 1.32 1.35 
 
(1.13) (1.29) (1.21) (1.14) (1.23) 
Leverage (%) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
(-0.49) (-0.77) (-0.87) (-0.83) (-0.81) 
ROA_EBITDA (%) 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 
 
(2.79) (2.79) (2.72) (2.82) (2.80) 
# Segments 0.80* 0.83 0.80* 0.81 0.83 
 
(-1.71) (-1.49) (-1.78) (-1.60) (-1.46) 
R&D intensity (%) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
(0.37) (0.81) (0.78) (0.21) (0.53) 
   Continued on next page 
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Industry median mkt-to-book 2.18** 2.31** 2.22** 2.21** 2.19** 
 
(2.28) (2.43) (2.33) (2.34) (2.28) 
Ind. with high pvt. bft. of control (0/1) 0.92 0.96 0.92 0.89 0.87 
 
(-0.36) (-0.20) (-0.35) (-0.52) (-0.59) 
log(1+Assets) 0.89* 0.89* 0.90* 0.88** 0.88** 
 
(-1.89) (-1.91) (-1.73) (-2.06) (-2.02) 
log(1+Firm age) 58.26 14.37 13.90 26.22 9.64 
 
(1.16) (0.76) (0.76) (0.93) (0.62) 
log(1+Firm age2) 0.15 0.28 0.29 0.22 0.34 
 
(-1.17) (-0.78) (-0.76) (-0.93) (-0.64) 
      Observations 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 3,641 
IPO cohort F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of subjects 492 492 492 492 492 

















Table B-3. Tobin’s Q and family ownership controlling for endogeneity (2SLS) 
This table presents the replicated results of Table 17 in 2SLS regressions.  I follow Villalonga and Amit (2006) and model family ownership as an endogenous 
variable and examine the relations between Tobin’s Q and family ownership.  The bottom panel reports the statistics for the second-stage estimations, including 
the C-statistic for endogeneity test, the Anderson-Rubin F-statistic for endogenous variable relevance test, and the Hansen J-statistic for instrument validity test. 
  Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 
































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Endogenous Variable                 


















































 Control Variables         
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.45*** 0.43 -0.45*** 0.38 -0.45*** 0.49 -0.45*** 0.37 
 
(-13.85) (1.19) (-13.90) (1.29) (-13.43) (0.97) (-13.78) (1.18) 
Dividends/book value of equity (%) 1.33* -1.22 1.32* -1.10 1.39** -1.47 1.33* -1.04 
 
(1.91) (-1.08) (1.90) (-1.18) (2.00) (-0.92) (1.90) (-1.05) 
Debt/market value of equity 1.87*** -1.74 1.90*** -1.63 2.05*** -2.26 1.88*** -1.54 
 
(3.74) (-1.24) (3.78) (-1.37) (3.37) (-1.01) (3.76) (-1.25) 
Market risk -3.17*** 3.66 -3.26*** 3.28 -3.32*** 4.24 -3.09*** 3.25 
 
(-4.31) (1.33) (-4.38) (1.41) (-4.51) (1.08) (-4.19) (1.36) 
Diversification (0/1) 0.56 -0.60 0.57 -0.56 1.04 -1.21 0.60 -0.57 
 
(0.36) (-0.43) (0.37) (-0.44) (0.65) (-0.66) (0.38) (-0.46) 
R&D/sales (%) -0.03*** 0.03 -0.03*** 0.03 -0.03*** 0.04 -0.03*** 0.03 
 
(-4.61) (1.31) (-4.65) (1.37) (-4.40) (1.04) (-4.47) (1.30) 
CAPX/PPE (%) -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.03 
 
(-0.93) (1.11) (-1.01) (1.20) (-0.55) (0.80) (-0.88) (1.16) 
       Continued on next page 
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log(1+Assets) -0.04 -0.35 -0.07 -0.16 -0.06 -0.29 -0.08 -0.29 
 
(-0.06) (-0.62) (-0.11) (-0.31) (-0.09) (-0.44) (-0.13) (-0.59) 
Sales growth (%) -0.01** 0.02 -0.01** 0.02 -0.02*** 0.02 -0.01** 0.02 
 
(-2.28) (1.44) (-2.30) (1.54) (-2.81) (1.16) (-2.13) (1.51) 
log(1+Firm age) -1.87 1.65 -1.86 1.56 -1.34 1.37 -1.85 1.39 
 
(-1.29) (0.81) (-1.29) (0.89) (-0.88) (0.60) (-1.25) (0.79) 
Constant 29.70*** -24.32 29.68*** -22.97 27.59*** -26.62 30.46*** -21.31 
 
(3.56) (-1.05) (3.57) (-1.18) (3.22) (-0.87) (3.59) (-1.02) 
         Observations 4,276 4,276 4,276 4,276 4,036 4,036 4,241 4,241 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




















































Table B-4. Tobin’s Q and family ownership controlling for endogeneity (2SLS with firm fixed effects) 
This table presents the replicated results of Table 24 in 2SLS regressions with firm fixed effects.  I follow Villalonga and Amit (2006) and model family 
ownership as an endogenous variable and examine the relations between Tobin’s Q and family ownership.  The bottom panel reports the statistics for the second-
stage estimations, including the C-statistic for endogeneity test, the Anderson-Rubin F-statistic for endogenous variable relevance test, and the Hansen J-statistic 
for instrument validity test. 
  Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 
































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Endogenous Variable                 


















































 Control Variables         
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.14*** -0.08*** -0.14*** -0.08*** -0.13*** -0.06*** -0.14*** -0.07*** 
 
(-5.56) (-2.95) (-5.56) (-2.77) (-4.92) (-2.87) (-5.48) (-3.06) 
Debt/market value of equity 0.80*** 0.30* 0.79*** 0.30 1.28*** 0.37* 0.81*** 0.29* 
 
(2.85) (1.65) (2.84) (1.53) (4.09) (1.80) (2.88) (1.67) 
Market risk -1.73*** -0.58 -1.74*** -0.70* -1.77*** -0.40 -1.72*** -0.54 
 
(-3.88) (-1.53) (-3.92) (-1.66) (-3.76) (-1.20) (-3.83) (-1.51) 
CAPX/PPE (%) 0.01 0.01*** 0.01 0.01*** 0.01 0.01*** 0.01 0.01** 
 
(1.19) (2.66) (1.26) (2.74) (0.95) (3.13) (1.23) (2.49) 
log(1+Assets) -2.22*** -1.47*** -2.13*** -1.17** -2.51*** -1.21** -2.30*** -1.46*** 
 
(-3.08) (-2.73) (-2.91) (-2.00) (-3.23) (-2.57) (-3.20) (-2.79) 
Sales growth (%) -0.00 0.00** -0.00 0.00* -0.00 0.00*** -0.00 0.00** 
 
(-0.18) (2.38) (-0.27) (1.91) (-0.34) (2.81) (-0.18) (2.49) 
       Continued on next page 
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log(1+Firm age) 4.68 1.51 4.70 1.89 4.47 0.87 4.62 1.51 
 
(1.33) (0.75) (1.33) (0.89) (1.26) (0.55) (1.30) (0.78) 
         Observations 2,966 2,966 2,966 2,966 2,799 2,799 2,950 2,950 
Number of firms 390 390 390 390 378 378 386 386 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




















































Table B-5: Q and family characteristics (specification following Villalonga and Amit, 2006) 
This table presents the replicated results of Table 17 excluding the subsample of 157 mergers with family exit. 
 
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) -0.00  -0.03  -0.04  0.04  
 
(-0.00)  (-0.34)  (-0.32)  (0.33)  
Total family cash flow rights (%)  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
 
 (-1.50)  (-1.24)  (-1.43)  (-1.50) 
Family excess voting rights (0/1) -0.48***  -0.61***  -0.49***  -0.50***  
 
(-2.69)  (-3.91)  (-2.81)  (-2.81)  
Family excess voting rights (%)  -0.01*  -0.01***  -0.01**  -0.01* 
 
 (-1.90)  (-2.85)  (-2.00)  (-1.95) 
Family CEO (0/1) -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.00 
 
(-0.38) (0.16) (0.27) (0.57) (-0.10) (0.26) (-0.67) (0.03) 
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.00* -0.00** -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.00** -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00** 
 
(-1.76) (-2.48) (-2.67) (-3.13) (-2.55) (-3.15) (-1.52) (-2.29) 
Dividends/book value of equity (%) 0.09** 0.10*** 0.09** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.09** 0.10*** 
 
(2.55) (2.73) (2.48) (2.62) (2.81) (2.98) (2.47) (2.67) 
Debt/market value of equity -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.20*** -0.19*** -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.17*** -0.16*** 
 
(-6.75) (-6.54) (-8.40) (-8.25) (-7.31) (-7.08) (-6.99) (-6.77) 
Market risk 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.53*** 0.52*** 
 
(8.51) (8.21) (8.34) (8.23) (8.45) (8.27) (8.68) (8.35) 
Diversification (0/1) -0.17** -0.18** -0.16** -0.17** -0.17** -0.17** -0.18** -0.18** 
 
(-2.15) (-2.15) (-2.18) (-2.17) (-2.14) (-2.13) (-2.23) (-2.24) 
R&D/sales (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(4.21) (4.11) (2.97) (2.90) (3.86) (3.78) (4.20) (4.10) 
CAPX/PPE (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(6.25) (6.24) (7.37) (7.37) (6.33) (6.35) (6.18) (6.18) 
log(1+Assets) -0.14*** -0.14*** 0.03 0.03 -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.12*** 
 
(-3.53) (-3.58) (0.98) (0.90) (-3.36) (-3.46) (-3.04) (-3.09) 
Continued on next page 
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Sales growth (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(7.28) (7.23) (8.16) (8.15) (7.45) (7.41) (7.95) (7.91) 
log(1+Firm age) -0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 
 
(-0.68) (-0.75) (0.20) (0.19) (-0.68) (-0.68) (-0.40) (-0.51) 
Constant 2.36*** 2.45*** 1.70*** 1.74*** 2.06*** 2.09*** 2.25*** 2.36*** 
 
(6.89) (7.08) (5.72) (5.78) (5.76) (5.80) (6.66) (6.91) 
 
        
Observations 3,879 3,879 3,879 3,879 3,706 3,706 3,850 3,850 
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 












Table B-6: Industry median adjusted Q and family characteristics (specification following Villalonga and Amit, 2006) 
This table presents the replicated results of Table 18 excluding the subsample of 157 mergers with family exit. 
All dependent variables are adjusted 
by industry median value Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) -0.02  -0.06  -0.07  0.00  
 
(-0.18)  (-0.65)  (-0.59)  (0.03)  
Total family cash flow rights (%)  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
 
 (-0.69)  (-0.30)  (-0.71)  (-0.64) 
Family excess voting rights (0/1) -0.52**  -0.66***  -0.53**  -0.54**  
 
(-2.53)  (-3.51)  (-2.52)  (-2.58)  
Family excess voting rights (%)  -0.01*  -0.02***  -0.01*  -0.01* 
 
 (-1.89)  (-2.65)  (-1.86)  (-1.92) 
Family CEO (0/1) 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.03 
 
(0.22) (0.40) (1.10) (0.94) (0.57) (0.57) (0.01) (0.28) 
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.00* -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00* -0.00* 
 
(-1.84) (-2.08) (-2.73) (-2.59) (-2.67) (-2.80) (-1.69) (-1.94) 
Dividends/book value of equity (%) 0.11** 0.11** 0.10** 0.10** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.11** 0.11** 
 
(2.41) (2.46) (2.24) (2.24) (2.61) (2.64) (2.37) (2.43) 
Debt/market value of equity -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
 
(-5.21) (-4.89) (-6.68) (-6.41) (-6.09) (-5.75) (-5.24) (-4.91) 
Market risk 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 
 
(6.86) (6.58) (6.52) (6.44) (6.72) (6.53) (6.87) (6.57) 
Diversification (0/1) -0.18** -0.18** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.19** -0.19** -0.19** -0.19** 
 
(-2.23) (-2.24) (-2.72) (-2.70) (-2.40) (-2.39) (-2.34) (-2.35) 
R&D/sales (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(4.05) (4.02) (2.33) (2.33) (3.62) (3.60) (4.00) (3.95) 
CAPX/PPE (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(5.59) (5.60) (7.10) (7.12) (5.73) (5.75) (5.55) (5.56) 
log(1+Assets) -0.12*** -0.12*** 0.03 0.03 -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.10** -0.10** 
 
(-2.88) (-2.90) (0.92) (0.89) (-2.74) (-2.81) (-2.43) (-2.45) 
Continued on next page 
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Sales growth (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(7.30) (7.27) (8.44) (8.42) (7.39) (7.35) (7.79) (7.76) 
log(1+Firm age) -0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 
(-0.61) (-0.63) (0.22) (0.29) (-0.50) (-0.44) (-0.39) (-0.44) 
Constant 0.60** 0.63** -0.38* -0.41* 0.48* 0.47* 0.43 0.47* 
 
(2.17) (2.25) (-1.66) (-1.83) (1.78) (1.75) (1.55) (1.69) 
 
        
Observations 3,879 3,879 3,879 3,879 3,706 3,706 3,850 3,850 
Adjusted R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Ind. dummies No No No No No No No No 
Year dummies No No No No No No No No 












Table B-7: Q and family characteristics (specification following Anderson and Reeb, 2003) 
This table presents the replicated results of Table 19 excluding the subsample of 157 mergers with family exit. 
 
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) -0.08  -0.06  -0.07  -0.06  
 
(-0.79)  (-0.74)  (-0.76)  (-0.66)  
CEO hire (0/1)  -0.00  -0.02  -0.02  0.02 
  (-0.04)  (-0.22)  (-0.17)  (0.20) 
CEO founder (0/1)  -0.09  -0.07  -0.09  -0.09 
  (-0.78)  (-0.66)  (-0.78)  (-0.80) 
CEO descendant (0/1)  -0.43***  -0.26**  -0.27**  -0.40*** 
  (-3.23)  (-2.26)  (-2.30)  (-3.11) 
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.00* -0.00** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00* 
 (-1.72) (-2.01) (-2.43) (-2.62) (-2.95) (-3.16) (-1.48) (-1.80) 
R&D/sales (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (5.56) (5.55) (4.73) (4.70) (5.20) (5.19) (5.65) (5.66) 
Debt/total assets (%) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (-5.42) (-5.29) (-8.66) (-8.57) (-10.51) (-10.38) (-5.85) (-5.74) 
Annual stock return volatility -0.25* -0.25* -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.20 -0.20 -0.24* -0.24* 
 (-1.90) (-1.93) (-4.14) (-4.15) (-1.58) (-1.60) (-1.88) (-1.92) 
log(1+Assets) -0.03 -0.03 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.55) (-0.63) (3.49) (3.47) (1.10) (1.03) (0.05) (-0.02) 
log(1+Firm age) -0.32*** -0.30*** -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.28*** 
 (-3.14) (-3.02) (-3.02) (-2.93) (-3.44) (-3.35) (-3.01) (-2.88) 
Constant 3.76*** 3.74*** 2.84*** 2.83*** 3.35*** 3.34*** 3.49*** 3.48*** 
 (7.96) (7.99) (7.35) (7.36) (7.74) (7.74) (7.54) (7.55) 
         
Observations 4,012 4,012 4,012 4,012 3,833 3,833 3,979 3,979 
Adjusted R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.18 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table B-8: ROA and family characteristics (specification following Anderson and Reeb, 2003) 

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) -1.20  -0.91  -0.80  -1.38  
 
(-1.05)  (-1.10)  (-0.77)  (-1.33)  
CEO hire (0/1)  -1.87  -1.28  -1.16  -2.27* 
  (-1.41)  (-1.29)  (-0.94)  (-1.85) 
CEO founder (0/1)  -1.37  -1.18  -1.18  -1.24 
  (-1.01)  (-1.18)  (-0.95)  (-1.01) 
CEO descendant (0/1)  3.63  2.74  3.45  2.87 
  (1.44)  (1.39)  (1.45)  (1.20) 
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.07** -0.06** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.08*** 
 (-2.58) (-2.32) (-3.85) (-3.60) (-3.55) (-3.35) (-3.38) (-3.07) 
R&D/sales (%) -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 (-8.73) (-8.74) (-9.46) (-9.46) (-9.16) (-9.16) (-9.29) (-9.32) 
Debt/total assets (%) -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.04** -0.04** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.06** -0.07*** 
 (-2.86) (-3.00) (-2.17) (-2.40) (-2.99) (-3.41) (-2.48) (-2.62) 
Annual stock return volatility -20.63*** -20.59*** -16.72*** -16.71*** -20.37*** -20.37*** -20.06*** -20.00*** 
 (-10.68) (-10.65) (-11.21) (-11.19) (-10.76) (-10.72) (-11.13) (-11.13) 
log(1+Assets) 4.39*** 4.45*** 2.34*** 2.39*** 3.50*** 3.58*** 3.53*** 3.57*** 
 (6.58) (6.65) (6.02) (6.14) (6.52) (6.63) (6.11) (6.17) 
log(1+Firm age) 4.78*** 4.57*** 4.26*** 4.11*** 4.46*** 4.27*** 4.56*** 4.38*** 
 (5.04) (4.83) (5.89) (5.65) (4.95) (4.74) (5.27) (5.06) 
Constant -12.42* -12.02* -1.93 -1.62 -4.62 -4.25 -7.55 -7.20 
 (-1.95) (-1.90) (-0.41) (-0.34) (-0.78) (-0.72) (-1.30) (-1.25) 
         
Observations 4,016 4,016 4,015 4,015 3,838 3,838 3,983 3,983 
Adjusted R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table B-9: Q and family factors (specification following Villalonga and Amit, 2006) 






Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) above median (0/1) -0.15  -0.12  -0.15  -0.17*  
 
(-1.55)  (-1.44)  (-1.57)  (-1.78)  
Factor 2 (Founder) above median (0/1) 0.06  0.04  0.06  0.06  
 
(0.67)  (0.52)  (0.64)  (0.63)  
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) above median (0/1) 0.13  0.04  0.11  0.14  
 
(1.26)  (0.41)  (1.10)  (1.39)  
Factor 1 (Extended family) below median (0/1)  0.15  0.13  0.15  0.17* 
 
 (1.47)  (1.41)  (1.47)  (1.73) 
Factor 2 (Founder) below median (0/1)  -0.07  -0.04  -0.07  -0.05 
 
 (-0.74)  (-0.54)  (-0.77)  (-0.64) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) below median (0/1)  -0.14  -0.04  -0.12  -0.14 
 
 (-1.28)  (-0.39)  (-1.19)  (-1.35) 
Factor 1, 2, or 3 below median (0/1) -0.08  -0.03  -0.09  -0.05  
 
(-0.75)  (-0.37)  (-0.88)  (-0.52)  
Factor 1, 2, or 3 above median (0/1)  -0.04  -0.08  -0.06  -0.03 
 
 (-0.34)  (-0.75)  (-0.50)  (-0.29) 
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.00* -0.00* -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 
 
(-1.67) (-1.79) (-2.45) (-2.54) (-2.47) (-2.57) (-1.47) (-1.57) 
Dividends/book value of equity (%) 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09** 0.09** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 
(2.67) (2.68) (2.54) (2.55) (2.92) (2.93) (2.62) (2.62) 
Debt/market value of equity -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.17*** -0.17*** 
 
(-6.86) (-6.84) (-8.48) (-8.48) (-7.30) (-7.28) (-7.10) (-7.08) 
Market risk 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 
 
(8.45) (8.41) (8.34) (8.30) (8.48) (8.45) (8.59) (8.56) 
Diversification (0/1) -0.18** -0.18** -0.17** -0.16** -0.18** -0.17** -0.18** -0.18** 
 
(-2.19) (-2.16) (-2.14) (-2.12) (-2.17) (-2.14) (-2.28) (-2.25) 
      Continued on next page 
         
Table B-9 – Continued         
         
         
R&D/sales (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(4.20) (4.16) (2.98) (2.98) (3.85) (3.78) (4.20) (4.16) 
CAPX/PPE (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(6.00) (6.02) (7.08) (7.06) (6.10) (6.11) (5.91) (5.93) 
log(1+Assets) -0.15*** -0.15*** 0.02 0.02 -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
 
(-3.77) (-3.76) (0.56) (0.57) (-3.66) (-3.65) (-3.32) (-3.31) 
Sales growth (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(7.26) (7.23) (8.14) (8.13) (7.44) (7.43) (7.92) (7.90) 
log(1+Firm age) -0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 
 
(-0.70) (-0.71) (0.15) (0.15) (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.40) (-0.40) 
Constant 2.37*** 2.39*** 1.70*** 1.71*** 2.07*** 2.08*** 2.26*** 2.27*** 
 
(6.61) (6.68) (5.40) (5.45) (5.48) (5.52) (6.33) (6.38) 
 
        
Observations 3,879 3,879 3,879 3,879 3,706 3,706 3,850 3,850 
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 








Table B-10: Industry median adjusted Q and family factors (specification following Villalonga and Amit, 2006) 
This table presents the replicated results of Table 22 excluding the subsample of 157 mergers with family exit. 
All dependent variables are adjusted  





Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) above median (0/1) -0.06  -0.03  -0.06  -0.07  
 
(-0.58)  (-0.26)  (-0.61)  (-0.65)  
Factor 2 (Founder) above median (0/1) 0.08  0.07  0.08  0.07  
 
(0.88)  (0.76)  (0.83)  (0.76)  
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) above median (0/1) 0.08  -0.02  0.06  0.08  
 
(0.76)  (-0.17)  (0.61)  (0.76)  
Factor 1 (Extended family) below median (0/1)  0.07  0.04  0.07  0.08 
 
 (0.63)  (0.37)  (0.64)  (0.72) 
Factor 2 (Founder) below median (0/1)  -0.08  -0.06  -0.08  -0.06 
 
 (-0.84)  (-0.68)  (-0.87)  (-0.68) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) below median (0/1)  -0.08  0.03  -0.07  -0.07 
 
 (-0.69)  (0.28)  (-0.62)  (-0.64) 
Factor 1, 2, or 3 below median (0/1) -0.10  -0.06  -0.12  -0.08  
 
(-0.99)  (-0.66)  (-1.17)  (-0.79)  
Factor 1, 2, or 3 above median (0/1)  -0.01  -0.05  -0.04  -0.01 
 
 (-0.07)  (-0.42)  (-0.27)  (-0.09) 
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 
 
(-1.48) (-1.62) (-2.18) (-2.32) (-2.31) (-2.43) (-1.35) (-1.47) 
Dividends/book value of equity (%) 0.11** 0.11** 0.10** 0.10** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11** 0.11** 
 
(2.40) (2.40) (2.16) (2.17) (2.59) (2.60) (2.37) (2.37) 
Debt/market value of equity -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
 
(-5.09) (-5.07) (-6.57) (-6.57) (-5.93) (-5.92) (-5.11) (-5.10) 
Market risk 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 
 
(6.87) (6.82) (6.60) (6.56) (6.79) (6.75) (6.86) (6.82) 
Diversification (0/1) -0.19** -0.19** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.20** -0.20** -0.20** -0.20** 
 
(-2.33) (-2.29) (-2.74) (-2.70) (-2.48) (-2.43) (-2.44) (-2.41) 
Continued on next page 
         
Table B-10 – Continued         
         
         
R&D/sales (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(4.03) (4.00) (2.33) (2.33) (3.59) (3.52) (3.96) (3.94) 
CAPX/PPE (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(5.45) (5.50) (6.95) (6.96) (5.59) (5.63) (5.41) (5.45) 
log(1+Assets) -0.13*** -0.12*** 0.02 0.02 -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 
 
(-3.07) (-3.06) (0.62) (0.63) (-2.98) (-2.96) (-2.65) (-2.63) 
Sales growth (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(7.28) (7.26) (8.40) (8.40) (7.38) (7.37) (7.76) (7.74) 
log(1+Firm age) -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
 
(-0.67) (-0.66) (0.10) (0.13) (-0.60) (-0.57) (-0.44) (-0.42) 
Constant 0.66** 0.67** -0.32 -0.32 0.55** 0.55** 0.49* 0.50* 
 
(2.35) (2.38) (-1.38) (-1.36) (2.00) (2.01) (1.76) (1.77) 
 
        
Observations 3,879 3,879 3,879 3,879 3,706 3,706 3,850 3,850 
Adjusted R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Ind. dummies No No No No No No No No 
Year dummies No No No No No No No No 








Table B-11: ROA and family factors (specification following Anderson and Reeb, 2003) 

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) above 
median (0/1) 
2.36*  2.17**  2.15*  2.81**  
(1.75)  (2.21)  (1.82)  (2.38)  
Factor 2 (Founder) above median (0/1) -1.31  -0.94  -1.25  -0.98  
 
(-0.96)  (-0.93)  (-0.98)  (-0.78)  
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 
above median (0/1) 
-3.08***  -1.58*  -2.53**  -2.97***  
(-2.62)  (-1.78)  (-2.30)  (-2.74)  
Factor 1 (Extended family) below 
median (0/1) 
 -2.93**  -2.58**  -2.48**  -3.45*** 
 (-2.10)  (-2.56)  (-2.04)  (-2.86) 
Factor 2 (Founder) below median (0/1)  0.64  0.45  0.84  0.23 
 
 (0.48)  (0.43)  (0.67)  (0.18) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 
below median (0/1) 
 2.22*  0.91  2.02*  1.97* 
 (1.77)  (0.96)  (1.74)  (1.75) 
Factor 1, 2, or 3 below median (0/1) 0.09  -0.62  0.10  -0.48  
 
(0.07)  (-0.63)  (0.08)  (-0.40)  
Factor 1, 2, or 3 above median (0/1)  -0.55  0.01  -0.61  -0.17 
 
 (-0.38)  (0.01)  (-0.45)  (-0.13) 
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.06** -0.05* -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06** 
 
(-2.06) (-1.81) (-3.21) (-3.04) (-3.14) (-2.91) (-2.61) (-2.40) 
R&D/sales (%) -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 
(-8.68) (-8.48) (-9.29) (-9.19) (-9.11) (-8.92) (-9.23) (-9.04) 
Debt/total assets (%) -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.04** -0.05** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
 
(-3.06) (-3.08) (-2.47) (-2.50) (-3.49) (-3.52) (-2.76) (-2.78) 
Annual stock return volatility -20.46*** -20.37*** -16.56*** -16.54*** -20.24*** -20.17*** -19.78*** -19.72*** 
 
(-10.62) (-10.63) (-11.20) (-11.21) (-10.68) (-10.68) (-11.05) (-11.07) 
log(1+Assets) 4.50*** 4.51*** 2.43*** 2.42*** 3.62*** 3.63*** 3.66*** 3.65*** 
 
(6.75) (6.74) (6.23) (6.21) (6.75) (6.73) (6.32) (6.30) 
      Continued on next page 
         
Table B-11 – Continued         
         
         
log(1+Firm age) 4.70*** 4.71*** 4.14*** 4.12*** 4.34*** 4.36*** 4.44*** 4.41*** 
 
(4.94) (4.89) (5.72) (5.67) (4.77) (4.75) (5.13) (5.07) 
Constant -13.06** -13.44** -2.34 -2.41 -4.98 -5.33 -8.32 -8.48 
 
(-2.09) (-2.13) (-0.51) (-0.52) (-0.86) (-0.91) (-1.48) (-1.50) 
 
        
Observations 4,016 4,016 4,015 4,015 3,838 3,838 3,983 3,983 
Adjusted R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.48 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 













Table B-12: Q in fixed effects regressions (specification based on Villalonga and Amit, 2006) 
This table presents the replicated results of Table 24 excluding the subsample of 157 mergers with family exit. 
  Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total family cash flow rights (%) -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  
 
(-3.10)  (-2.81)  (-2.81)  (-3.06)  
Factor 1 (Extended family)  -0.09  -0.06  -0.08  -0.09 
 
 (-1.07)  (-0.90)  (-1.03)  (-1.10) 
Factor 2 (Founder)  -0.18*  -0.16*  -0.19**  -0.18* 
 
 (-1.83)  (-1.86)  (-2.08)  (-1.90) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control)  -0.06  -0.06  -0.08  -0.06 
 
 (-0.64)  (-0.77)  (-0.87)  (-0.65) 
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 
(-4.45) (-3.79) (-4.74) (-4.16) (-4.87) (-4.35) (-4.19) (-3.59) 
Debt/market value of equity -0.03 -0.05** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.04* -0.06** -0.03* -0.05** 
 
(-1.57) (-2.22) (-2.63) (-3.13) (-1.67) (-2.43) (-1.65) (-2.29) 
Market risk 0.38*** 0.41*** 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.39*** 0.42*** 0.40*** 0.43*** 
 
(5.50) (5.96) (5.21) (5.65) (5.71) (6.21) (6.00) (6.49) 
CAPX/PPE (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(4.22) (4.23) (5.50) (5.51) (4.82) (4.83) (3.95) (3.94) 
log(1+Assets) -0.44*** -0.40*** -0.14* -0.11 -0.37*** -0.33*** -0.44*** -0.40*** 
 
(-5.10) (-4.56) (-1.83) (-1.40) (-4.59) (-4.00) (-5.16) (-4.58) 
Sales growth (%) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 
(5.09) (5.12) (5.57) (5.55) (5.29) (5.27) (5.46) (5.48) 
log(1+Firm age) -0.72** -0.77** -0.64** -0.69** -0.66** -0.71** -0.63* -0.67* 
 
(-2.09) (-2.10) (-2.14) (-2.14) (-2.02) (-2.06) (-1.90) (-1.92) 
Constant 6.06*** 5.41*** 4.61*** 4.05*** 5.54*** 4.92*** 5.84*** 5.19*** 
 
(6.34) (5.71) (5.98) (5.24) (6.41) (5.74) (6.34) (5.69) 
      Continued on next page 
         
         
         
Table B-12 – Continued         
                  
         
Observations 2,538 2,538 2,538 2,538 2,433 2,433 2,521 2,521 
Number of firms 326 326 326 326 324 324 321 321 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 














Table B-13: ROA in fixed effects regressions (specification based on Anderson and Reeb, 2003) 
























  (1) (3) (4) (6) (7) (9) (10) (12) 
Total family cash flow rights (%) 0.23***  0.06  0.17**  0.15**  
 
(3.35)  (1.15)  (2.30)  (2.39)  
Factor 1 (Extended family)  1.00  -0.20  0.71  0.77 
 
 (0.97)  (-0.29)  (0.73)  (0.89) 
Factor 2 (Founder)  -0.16  -0.65  -0.17  -0.12 
 
 (-0.10)  (-0.56)  (-0.11)  (-0.10) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control)  0.27  -0.14  0.31  0.09 
 
 (0.15)  (-0.14)  (0.21)  (0.06) 
Nonfamily blkholder voting rights (%) 0.01 -0.03 -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 
 
(0.21) (-0.68) (-2.71) (-3.40) (-0.95) (-1.59) (-0.87) (-1.50) 
Debt/total assets (%) -0.23*** -0.21*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.21*** -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.17*** 
 
(-4.18) (-3.81) (-3.44) (-3.13) (-6.07) (-5.47) (-4.03) (-3.73) 
Annual stock return volatility -13.98*** -14.65*** -9.85*** -10.24*** -13.28*** -13.76*** -11.77*** -12.23*** 
 
(-4.99) (-4.80) (-5.97) (-5.77) (-5.88) (-5.70) (-5.34) (-5.26) 
log(1+Assets) 9.97*** 9.39*** 2.69*** 2.46*** 7.38*** 6.86*** 7.55*** 7.14*** 
 
(5.27) (5.07) (3.24) (3.09) (4.89) (4.66) (5.01) (4.82) 
log(1+Firm age) 5.03 5.30 7.81** 7.96** 5.94 6.12 5.46 5.61 
 
(0.89) (0.96) (2.13) (2.23) (1.16) (1.23) (1.09) (1.15) 
Constant -35.91** -25.74* -13.52 -10.02 -25.68** -17.77 -26.73** -19.83 
 
(-2.42) (-1.86) (-1.61) (-1.19) (-2.10) (-1.47) (-2.13) (-1.62) 
 
        
Observations 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,595 2,595 2,677 2,677 
Number of firms 338 338 338 338 337 337 336 336 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
With R-squared 0.19 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 
Table B-14. Replication of main results based on the number of founding families at the IPO 
This table presents the main results of Tables 8 (Panel A), 11 (Panel B), 17 (Panel C), 19 (Panel D), 20 (Panel E), 24 
(Panel F), 25 (Panel G), 26 (Panel H), 28 (Panel I), 29 (Panel J), 31 (Panel K), and 33 (Panel L) based on the number 
of founding families in a firm at the IPO.  The group of co-founding families at the IPO has 191 family firms.  The 
group of single family at the IPO has 319 family firms. 
Panel A: Table 8. Family control horizons: the impact of family factors 
Panel A.1 Hazard Ratio: Cox proportional hazards estimation 
Co-founding families (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 1.01     
 
(0.05)     
Factor 2 (Founder) 0.98     
 
(-0.12)     
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 1.53***     
 
(3.78)     
# Nonfounder family executives  1.60*    
 
 (1.69)    
# Nonfounder family directors   1.02   
 
  (0.03)   
Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%)    0.96  
 
   (-1.43)  
Family descendant (0/1)     1.28 
 
    (0.41) 
Founder CEO (0/1)  0.86    
 
 (-0.67)    
Founder Chair (0/1)   1.17   
 
  (0.64)   
Founder's cash flow rights (%)    0.99 0.98* 
 
   (-1.43) (-1.81) 
Family firm name (0/1)  3.02** 2.74** 2.96** 3.15*** 
 
 (2.42) (2.26) (2.50) (2.61) 
Family ownership wedge  1.04*** 1.04** 1.04*** 1.05*** 
 
 (2.64) (2.40) (2.74) (2.78) 
 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,336 1,336 1,336 1,336 1,336 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of subjects 184 184 184 184 184 
No. of events 96 96 96 96 96 
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Panel A.2 Hazard Ratio: Cox proportional hazards estimation 
Single family (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.77***     
 
(-2.76)     
Factor 2 (Founder) 0.69***     
 
(-4.16)     
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 0.98     
 
(-0.22)     
# Nonfounder family executives  0.80    
 
 (-1.32)    
# Nonfounder family directors   0.77*   
 
  (-1.70)   
Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%)    0.98**  
 
   (-2.25)  
Family descendant (0/1)     0.68 
 
    (-1.33) 
Founder CEO (0/1)  0.63***    
 
 (-2.61)    
Founder Chair (0/1)   0.60***   
 
  (-2.84)   
Founder's cash flow rights (%)    0.98*** 0.99*** 
 
   (-3.77) (-3.12) 
Family firm name (0/1)  0.75 0.74 0.79 0.70 
 
 (-1.06) (-1.14) (-0.88) (-1.32) 
Family ownership wedge  1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 
 
 (1.15) (1.36) (1.22) (1.51) 
 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,305 2,305 2,305 2,305 2,305 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of subjects 308 308 308 308 308 
No. of events 165 165 165 165 165 













Table B-14 – Continued 
Panel B: Table 11. Family firm evolution outcomes in t+1: family exit and family firm failure 
Relative Risk Ratio from multinomial  logit regression, outcome: 1=family exit, 2=family firm failure 
Panel B.1 Co-founding families (1) (2) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.53* 0.61 
 
(-1.86) (-1.35) 
Factor 2 (Founder) 0.74** 0.96 
 
(-2.09) (-0.19) 





Control variables Yes Yes 
Observations 1,336 1,336 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.18 0.18 
Panel B.2 Single family (1) (2) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.63*** 0.89 
 
(-3.61) (-0.78) 
Factor 2 (Founder) 0.49*** 0.90 
 
(-7.09) (-0.72) 





Control variables Yes Yes 
Observations 2,308 2,308 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.15 0.15 
Continued on next page 
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Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q with book 
equity>0 






Co-founding families (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) -0.00  -0.05  -0.05  0.07  
 
(-0.02)  (-0.21)  (-0.24)  (0.33)  
Total family cash flow rights (%)  0.00  0.00  -0.00  0.00 
 
 (0.53)  (0.20)  (-0.33)  (0.56) 
Family excess voting rights (0/1) -0.93***  -0.86***  -1.08***  -0.91***  
 
(-3.39)  (-3.31)  (-4.08)  (-3.32)  
Family excess voting rights (%)  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.04***  -0.03*** 
 
 (-3.30)  (-3.48)  (-4.03)  (-3.22) 
Family CEO (0/1) 0.16 0.15 0.25** 0.24** 0.20 0.20 0.13 0.13 
 
(1.22) (1.10) (2.16) (2.00) (1.59) (1.53) (1.00) (1.00) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,380 1,380 1,380 1,380 1,328 1,328 1,369 1,369 
Adjusted R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q with book 
equity>0 






Single family (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) 0.20  0.15  0.17  0.20  
 
(1.44)  (1.23)  (1.28)  (1.50)  
Total family cash flow rights (%)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
 (0.87)  (1.30)  (0.98)  (0.91) 
Family excess voting rights (0/1) -0.52***  -0.69***  -0.52***  -0.56***  
 
(-2.89)  (-4.46)  (-2.87)  (-3.08)  
Family excess voting rights (%)  -0.01**  -0.02***  -0.01**  -0.01** 
 
 (-2.33)  (-3.45)  (-2.25)  (-2.43) 
       Continued on next page 
        
Table B-14 – Continued         
Family CEO (0/1) -0.34** -0.29** -0.24** -0.24** -0.31** -0.28** -0.33** -0.28** 
 
(-2.57) (-2.47) (-1.99) (-2.26) (-2.39) (-2.46) (-2.59) (-2.48) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,369 3,369 3,369 3,369 3,219 3,219 3,351 3,351 
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel D: Table 19. Tobin’s Q and family characteristics (specification following Anderson and Reeb, 2003) 
Panel D.1 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q with book 
equity>0 






Co-founding families (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) 0.02  0.08  0.02  0.08  
 
(0.06)  (0.39)  (0.10)  (0.35)  
CEO hire (0/1)  -0.06  -0.03  -0.08  0.02 
 
 (-0.25)  (-0.13)  (-0.35)  (0.08) 
CEO founder (0/1)  0.11  0.20  0.12  0.15 
 
 (0.38)  (0.81)  (0.49)  (0.56) 
CEO descendant (0/1)  0.24  0.54**  0.42  0.31 
 
 (0.96)  (2.38)  (1.60)  (1.29) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,415 1,415 1,460 1,460 
Adjusted R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.21 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel D.2 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q with book 
equity>0 






Single family (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) -0.07  -0.06  -0.05  -0.07 
 
 
(-0.65)  (-0.64)  (-0.49)  (-0.65) 
        Continued on next page 
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CEO hire (0/1)  0.20  0.15  0.19  0.19 
 
 (1.31)  (1.16)  (1.33)  (1.31) 
CEO founder (0/1)  -0.19*  -0.15  -0.17  -0.19 
 
 (-1.68)  (-1.48)  (-1.57)  (-1.64) 
CEO descendant (0/1)  -0.46***  -0.35***  -0.31**  -0.45*** 
 
 (-3.52)  (-3.00)  (-2.48)  (-3.49) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,462 3,462 3,462 3,462 3,310 3,310 3,441 3,441 
Adjusted R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.19 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






ROA adj. for 
init. book equity 
ROA adj. for 









Co-founding families (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) 4.40  5.18**  4.51*  3.29  
 
(1.34)  (2.24)  (1.67)  (1.23)  
CEO hire (0/1)  2.53  3.96  3.08  1.40 
 
 (0.76)  (1.65)  (1.10)  (0.50) 
CEO founder (0/1)  5.88  6.04**  5.51*  4.91* 
 
 (1.64)  (2.43)  (1.89)  (1.70) 
CEO descendant (0/1)  16.30**  13.82**  14.20**  14.58** 
 
 (2.52)  (2.38)  (2.30)  (2.41) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,473 1,415 1,415 1,461 1,461 
Adjusted R-squared 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.52 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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ROA adj. for 
init. book equity 
ROA adj. for 









Single family (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) -1.41  -1.29  -1.10  -1.39  
 
(-1.20)  (-1.49)  (-1.02)  (-1.28)  
CEO hire (0/1)  -1.62  -1.02  -0.89  -1.60 
 
 (-1.16)  (-0.97)  (-0.68)  (-1.22) 
CEO founder (0/1)  -1.58  -1.75*  -1.56  -1.52 
 
 (-1.15)  (-1.70)  (-1.22)  (-1.18) 
CEO descendant (0/1)  0.39  0.16  0.64  0.10 
 
 (0.18)  (0.10)  (0.31)  (0.05) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,465 3,465 3,464 3,464 3,314 3,314 3,444 3,444 
Adjusted R-squared 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel F: Table 24. Tobin’s Q in firm fixed effects regressions (specification based on Villalonga and Amit, 2006) 
Panel F.1 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 















Co-founding families (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total family cash flow rights (%) -0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
 
(-0.39)  (-0.54)  (-0.49)  (-0.47)  
Factor 1 (Extended family)  -0.11  -0.10  -0.12  -0.10 
 
 (-0.45)  (-0.53)  (-0.52)  (-0.43) 
Factor 2 (Founder)  -0.02  -0.05  -0.13  -0.05 
 
 (-0.17)  (-0.43)  (-0.87)  (-0.38) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control)  -0.08  -0.14  -0.77  -0.09 
 
 (-0.19)  (-0.34)  (-0.90)  (-0.24) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       Continued on next page 
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Observations 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,206 1,156 1,156 1,197 1,197 
Number of firms 178 178 178 178 178 178 175 175 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 
Panel F.2 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 















Single family (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total family cash flow rights (%) -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  
 
(-3.58)  (-2.97)  (-3.15)  (-3.49)  
Factor 1 (Extended family)  -0.08  -0.07  -0.07  -0.09 
 
 (-0.93)  (-0.95)  (-0.88)  (-1.03) 
Factor 2 (Founder)  -0.14  -0.12  -0.15  -0.12 
 
 (-1.25)  (-1.15)  (-1.38)  (-1.17) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control)  -0.06  -0.07  -0.07  -0.06 
 
 (-0.70)  (-0.88)  (-0.76)  (-0.71) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,202 2,118 2,118 2,194 2,194 
Number of firms 300 300 300 300 298 298 298 298 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 
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Co-founding families (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total family cash flow rights (%) 0.18  0.02  0.04  0.10  
 
(0.91)  (0.14)  (0.22)  (0.59)  
Factor 1 (Extended family)  -2.60  -1.31  -2.10  -1.04 
 
 (-0.77)  (-0.59)  (-0.81)  (-0.42) 
Factor 2 (Founder)  -1.54  -2.31  -1.28  -1.23 
 
 (-0.56)  (-1.14)  (-0.42)  (-0.53) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control)  -11.94  -11.48*  -16.22  -14.14* 
 
 (-1.34)  (-1.91)  (-1.52)  (-1.74) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,336 1,336 1,336 1,336 1,272 1,272 1,310 1,310 
Number of firms 184 184 184 184 184 184 183 183 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
























Single family (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total family cash flow rights (%) 0.21***  0.08  0.19***  0.16***  
 
(3.04)  (1.58)  (2.89)  (2.66)  
Factor 1 (Extended family)  1.29  0.01  1.07  0.91 
 
 (1.40)  (0.01)  (1.12)  (1.07) 
Factor 2 (Founder)  0.58  -0.06  0.05  0.18 
 
 (0.60)  (-0.09)  (0.05)  (0.20) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control)  1.54  0.88  1.22  1.28 
 
 (1.37)  (1.34)  (1.13)  (1.31) 
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Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,308 2,308 2,308 2,308 2,221 2,221 2,296 2,296 
Number of firms 308 308 308 308 307 307 307 307 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 
Panel H: Table 26. Impact of family exit on firm performance (specification following Pagano et al., 1998) 
Panel H.1 Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 






ROA adj. for 





Co-founding families (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      0.18 0.10 0.25 0.14 1.56 1.84 0.49 2.67 
 
(0.81) (0.42) (1.09) (0.65) (0.37) (0.62) (0.14) (0.67) 
        0.26 0.21 0.12 0.04 5.51 4.81 9.54* 9.92 
 
(0.60) (0.65) (0.33) (0.10) (0.75) (1.03) (1.75) (1.62) 
        0.22 0.59 0.32 0.23 1.98 -1.45 4.60 4.36 
 
(0.64) (1.58) (0.91) (0.66) (0.26) (-0.25) (0.75) (0.63) 
        0.22 0.40 0.27 0.16 -5.14 -5.43 -3.10 -2.29 
 
(0.56) (1.13) (0.73) (0.43) (-0.55) (-0.79) (-0.39) (-0.26) 
       (n≥4) 0.10 0.52 0.13 0.00 -4.43 -7.88 0.25 -0.65 
 
(0.21) (1.09) (0.30) (0.01) (-0.40) (-0.93) (0.03) (-0.06) 
 
        
Observations 395 395 387 392 427 427 408 417 
Number of firms 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.06 
F-test: post-exit dummies 
are jointly zero 
0.79 0.44 0.41 0.67 0.57 0.13 0.17 0.14 
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Panel H.2 Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 






ROA adj. for 





Single family (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      0.06 -0.10 0.03 0.02 -1.67 0.90 -0.88 -0.71 
 
(0.36) (-0.76) (0.21) (0.15) (-0.63) (0.43) (-0.37) (-0.29) 
       -0.05 -0.29 -0.07 -0.07 -4.32 0.52 -5.15 -3.31 
 
(-0.24) (-1.60) (-0.34) (-0.37) (-1.42) (0.24) (-1.60) (-1.11) 
       0.49* -0.14 0.23 0.16 -10.95** -0.03 -1.85 -2.52 
 
(1.70) (-0.71) (0.98) (0.74) (-2.02) (-0.01) (-0.52) (-0.75) 
       0.78* 0.24 0.76* 0.58 -10.78* -3.05 -6.37 -5.85 
 
(1.98) (0.70) (1.81) (1.62) (-1.67) (-0.81) (-1.17) (-1.21) 
       (n≥4) 0.52 0.01 0.47 0.37 -11.28* -2.07 -7.88 -6.72 
 
(1.45) (0.03) (1.30) (1.13) (-1.81) (-0.48) (-1.40) (-1.41) 
 
        
Observations 1,061 1,061 984 1,044 1,147 1,144 1,033 1,119 
Number of firms 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 
F-test: post-exit dummies 
are jointly zero 
0.07 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.27 0.59 0.26 0.63 
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Panel I: Table 28. Combined wealth effect and family characteristics 
Panel I.1 (-1, +1) (-1, +1) (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-2, +2) (-2, +2) 
Co-founding families (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
# Family executives and directors -6.70   -5.87   
 
(-1.63)   (-1.28)   
# Family descendants  -10.61**   -12.08**  
 
 (-2.21)   (-2.31)  
Total family cash flow rights (%)   0.15   0.01 
 
  (0.74)   (0.04) 
Family excess voting rights (%)   -0.23   -0.02 
 
  (-0.58)   (-0.03) 
Young family firms (0/1)   -1.64   -0.65 
(age<9 years)   (-0.29)   (-0.10) 
CEO founder (0/1)   -7.21*   -5.82 
 
  (-1.87)   (-1.35) 
CEO descendant (0/1)   -18.95*   -17.70 
 
  (-1.84)   (-1.54) 
 
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Adjusted R-squared -0.21 -0.13 -0.24 -0.13 -0.01 -0.17 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel I.2 (-1, +1) (-1, +1) (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-2, +2) (-2, +2) 
Single family (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
# Family executives and directors 1.89   2.62*   
 
(1.35)   (1.83)   
# Family descendants  1.30   1.64*  
 
 (1.57)   (1.92)  
Total family cash flow rights (%)   0.05   0.07 
 
  (0.71)   (0.96) 
Family excess voting rights (%)   -0.15   -0.21 
 
  (-0.88)   (-1.28) 
Young family firms (0/1)   2.30   3.73 
(age<9 years)   (0.46)   (0.74) 
CEO founder (0/1)   -0.24   -1.92 
 
  (-0.08)   (-0.61) 
CEO descendant (0/1)   4.33   4.83 
 
  (0.87)   (0.96) 
 
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 0.10 -0.03 0.07 0.08 -0.02 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel J: Table 29. Combined wealth effect and factors for family characteristics 
Panel J.1 (-1, +1) (-2, +2) Panel J.2 (-1, +1) (-2, +2) 
Co-founding families (1) (2) Single family (1) (2) 



















Control variables Yes Yes Control variables Yes Yes 
Observations 60 60 Observations 60 60 
Adjusted R-squared -0.25 -0.13 Adjusted R-squared 0.08 0.08 
Year dummies Yes Yes Year dummies Yes Yes 
Panel K: Table 31. Family characteristics and investments: R&D component 
Panel K.1 R&D/(R&D+CAPEX)% Panel K.2 R&D/(R&D+CAPEX)% 
Co-founding families (1) (2) (3) (4) Single family (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family firm (0/1) -10.34    Family firm (0/1) -3.99    
 
(-1.53)    
 
(-1.55)    
Total family cash flow rights (%)  -0.68***  -0.67*** Total family cash flow rights (%)  -0.13*  -0.15** 
 
 (-4.84)  (-4.65) 
 
 (-1.82)  (-2.07) 
Family excess voting rights (%)  -1.22***  -1.22*** Family excess voting rights (%)  -0.18  -0.19 
 
 (-6.21)  (-6.21) 
 
 (-1.34)  (-1.41) 
Family CEO (0/1)  -2.31   Family CEO (0/1)  -6.02**   
 
 (-0.70)   
 
 (-2.19)   
Lone founder (0/1)   -7.67  Lone founder (0/1)   0.22  
 
  (-1.11)  
 
  (0.07)  
Multiple family members (0/1)   -18.15**  Multiple family members (0/1)   -7.26**  
 
  (-2.49)  
 
  (-2.47)  
CEO hire (0/1)    -2.74 CEO hire (0/1)    4.40 
 
   (-0.39) 
 
   (1.43) 
CEO founder (0/1)    -4.72 CEO founder (0/1)    -3.25 
 
   (-0.64) 
 
   (-0.97) 
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CEO descendant (0/1)    -2.38 CEO descendant (0/1)    -5.73 
 
   (-0.14) 
 
   (-1.14) 
 
    
 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,649 1,649 1,649 1,649 Observations 3,889 3,889 3,889 3,889 
Adjusted R-squared 0.48 0.54 0.49 0.54 Adjusted R-squared 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel L: Table 33. Family factors and investments: R&D component 
Panel L.1 R&D/(R&D+CAPEX)% Panel L.2 R&D/(R&D+CAPEX)% 
Co-founding families (1) (2) Single family (1) (2) 










Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) above 
median (0/1) 
-3.74  Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) above 
median (0/1) 
0.69  
(-1.08)  (0.26)  










Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) below 
median (0/1) 
 -4.93 Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) below 
median (0/1) 
 -2.01 
 (-1.27)  (-0.69) 










Control variables Yes Yes Control variables Yes Yes 
Observations 1,649 1,649 Observations 3,889 3,889 
Adjusted R-squared 0.50 0.50 Adjusted R-squared 0.52 0.52 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Ind. dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Year dummies Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Robust S.E. Yes Yes 
Table B-15. Replication of main results based on IPO cohort year 
This table presents the main results of Tables 8 (Panel A), 11 (Panel B), 17 (Panel C), 19 (Panel D), 20 (Panel E), 24 
(Panel F), 25 (Panel G), 26 (Panel H), 28 (Panel I), 29 (Panel J), 31 (Panel K), and 33 (Panel L) based on IPO cohort 
year.   
Panel A: Table 8. Family control horizons: the impact of family factors 
Panel A.1 Hazard Ratio: Cox proportional hazards estimation 
IPO cohort year=1993 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.73*** 
    
 
(-3.10) 
    Factor 2 (Founder) 0.69*** 
    
 
(-4.06) 
    Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 1.11 
    
 
(1.18) 
    # Nonfounder family executives 
 
0.70* 
   
  
(-1.78) 




   
(-2.64) 
  Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 
   
0.98** 
 
    
(-2.54) 
 Family descendant (0/1) 
    
0.56* 
     
(-1.72) 
Founder CEO (0/1) 
 
0.57*** 
   
  
(-3.05) 




   
(-2.46) 
  Founder's cash flow rights (%) 
   
0.98*** 0.98*** 
    
(-3.74) (-3.44) 
Family firm name (0/1) 
 
0.81 0.86 0.96 0.83 
  
(-0.64) (-0.46) (-0.13) (-0.59) 
Family ownership wedge 
 
1.03*** 1.03*** 1.03** 1.03*** 
  
(2.84) (2.99) (2.27) (2.72) 
      Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,078 2,078 2,078 2,078 2,078 
IPO cohort dummies No No No No No 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of subjects 246 246 246 246 246 
No. of events 148 148 148 148 148 
Panel A.2 Hazard Ratio: Cox proportional hazards estimation 
IPO cohort year=1997 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.97 
    
 
(-0.18) 
    Factor 2 (Founder) 0.97 
    
 
(-0.24) 
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Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 1.22 
    
 
(1.30) 
    # Nonfounder family executives 
 
0.98 
   
  
(-0.07) 




   
(0.07) 
  Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%) 
   
0.98 
 
    
(-1.14) 
 Family descendant (0/1) 
    
0.93 
     
(-0.18) 
Founder CEO (0/1) 
 
0.84 
   
  
(-0.77) 




   
(0.86) 
  Founder's cash flow rights (%) 
   
0.99 0.99 
    
(-1.49) (-1.15) 
Family firm name (0/1) 
 
1.48 1.37 1.49 1.45 
  
(1.18) (0.95) (1.18) (1.11) 
Family ownership wedge 
 
1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 
  
(1.00) (1.00) (1.07) (1.02) 
      Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,397 1,397 1,397 1,397 1,397 
IPO cohort dummies No No No No No 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of subjects 217 217 217 217 217 
No. of events 97 97 97 97 97 
Panel B: Table 11. Family firm evolution outcomes in t+1: family exit and family firm failure 
Relative Risk Ratio from multinomial  logit regression, outcome: 1=family exit, 2=family firm failure 
IPO cohort year=1993 (1) (2) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.59*** 0.83 
 
(-4.06) (-1.05) 
Factor 2 (Founder) 0.45*** 0.84 
 
(-7.27) (-0.87) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 0.96 1.03 
 
(-0.44) (0.24) 
   Control variables Yes Yes 
Observations 2,081 2,081 
IPO cohort dummies No No 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.16 0.16 
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Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q with book 
equity>0 






IPO cohort year=1993 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 



























































Family CEO (0/1) -0.17 -0.17* -0.10 -0.11 -0.16 -0.17* -0.19* -0.17* 
 
(-1.52) (-1.71) (-0.98) (-1.13) (-1.37) (-1.71) (-1.71) (-1.73) 
         Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,823 2,823 2,823 2,823 2,698 2,698 2,808 2,808 
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q with book 
equity>0 






IPO cohort year=1997 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
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Family CEO (0/1) -0.07 -0.07 0.01 -0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.08 
 
(-0.38) (-0.41) (0.08) (-0.02) (-0.27) (-0.21) (-0.53) (-0.48) 
         Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,650 1,650 1,650 1,650 1,586 1,586 1,637 1,637 
Adjusted R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel D: Table 19. Tobin’s Q and family characteristics (specification following Anderson and Reeb, 2003) 
Panel D.1 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q with book 
equity>0 






IPO cohort year=1993 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




























































         Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,926 2,926 2,926 2,926 2,797 2,797 2,909 2,909 
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.19 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel D.2 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q with book 
equity>0 






IPO cohort year=1997 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
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         Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,661 1,661 1,714 1,714 
Adjusted R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.18 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






ROA adj. for 
init. book equity 
ROA adj. for 









IPO cohort year=1993 (1) (3) (4) (6) (7) (9) (10) (12) 




























































         Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,925 2,925 2,925 2,925 2,796 2,796 2,908 2,908 
Adjusted R-squared 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.42 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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ROA adj. for 
init. book equity 
ROA adj. for 









IPO cohort year=1997 (1) (3) (4) (6) (7) (9) (10) (12) 




























































         Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,732 1,732 1,732 1,732 1,666 1,666 1,718 1,718 
Adjusted R-squared 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.52 0.52 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel F: Table 24. Tobin’s Q in firm fixed effects regressions (specification based on Villalonga and Amit, 2006) 
Panel F.1 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 















IPO cohort year=1993 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




























































         Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Observations 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,960 1,883 1,883 1,954 1,954 
Number of firms 240 240 240 240 240 240 239 239 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.19 
Panel F.2 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 















IPO cohort year=1997 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




























































         Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,291 1,291 1,291 1,291 1,243 1,243 1,281 1,281 
Number of firms 209 209 209 209 208 208 206 206 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.27 
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IPO cohort year=1993 (1) (3) (4) (6) (7) (9) (10) (12) 




























































         Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,081 2,081 2,081 2,081 1,999 1,999 2,067 2,067 
Number of firms 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
























IPO cohort year=1997 (1) (3) (4) (6) (7) (9) (10) (12) 
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Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,397 1,397 1,397 1,397 1,338 1,338 1,378 1,378 
Number of firms 217 217 217 217 217 217 216 216 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.21 0.26 0.26 
Panel H: Table 26. Impact of family exit on firm performance (specification following Pagano et al., 1998) 
Panel H.1 Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 






ROA adj. for 





IPO cohort year=1993 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      0.11 -0.09 0.10 0.05 -2.84 -0.87 -2.76 -1.37 
 
(0.64) (-0.60) (0.55) (0.33) (-1.10) (-0.44) (-1.18) (-0.57) 
        0.19 -0.06 0.04 0.08 -3.87 0.20 -2.79 -2.04 
 
(0.73) (-0.29) (0.16) (0.36) (-1.09) (0.08) (-0.84) (-0.64) 
        0.48* 0.09 0.31 0.29 -7.60 -2.03 -2.29 -1.43 
 
(1.68) (0.36) (1.12) (1.18) (-1.49) (-0.66) (-0.60) (-0.40) 
        0.89** 0.39 0.84* 0.68* -14.38** -6.04 -10.05* -8.55 
 
(2.04) (1.01) (1.78) (1.74) (-2.00) (-1.47) (-1.69) (-1.57) 
       (n≥4) 0.55 0.07 0.44 0.35 -14.93** -6.01 -12.30** -9.30* 
 
(1.32) (0.20) (1.02) (0.93) (-2.24) (-1.32) (-2.13) (-1.91) 
         Observations 984 984 921 968 1,057 1,055 963 1,027 
Number of firms 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 
F-test: post-exit dummies 
are jointly zero 
0.27 0.63 0.31 0.33 0.26 0.36 0.14 0.19 
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Panel H.2 Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 






ROA adj. for 





IPO cohort year=1997 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      -0.00 0.15 0.04 0.00 1.04 1.39 2.47 1.34 
 
(-0.00) (0.74) (0.18) (0.02) (0.21) (0.36) (0.57) (0.28) 
       -0.32 -0.09 -0.19 -0.39 1.54 0.54 0.57 3.91 
 
(-1.13) (-0.38) (-0.67) (-1.37) (0.22) (0.11) (0.09) (0.59) 
       0.32 0.27 0.12 -0.06 -6.29 -1.64 1.43 1.86 
 
(0.73) (0.89) (0.42) (-0.21) (-0.66) (-0.29) (0.22) (0.27) 
       -0.11 0.13 0.03 -0.15 -5.06 -5.20 -3.63 -4.93 
 
(-0.33) (0.37) (0.08) (-0.43) (-0.59) (-0.79) (-0.54) (-0.64) 
       (n≥4) 0.23 0.50 0.35 0.28 0.85 -0.17 2.90 0.60 
 
(0.68) (1.13) (0.98) (0.82) (0.07) (-0.02) (0.31) (0.06) 
         Observations 388 388 376 384 424 424 400 416 
Number of firms 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.08 0.20 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 
F-test: post-exit dummies 
are jointly zero 
0.11 0.06 0.14 0.04 0.31 0.34 0.45 0.20 








Table B-15 – Continued 
Panel I: Table 28. Combined wealth effect and family characteristics 
Panel I.1 (-1, +1) (-1, +1) (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-2, +2) (-2, +2) 
IPO cohort year=1993 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





























































       Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 
Adjusted R-squared 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.08 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel I.2 (-1, +1) (-1, +1) (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-2, +2) (-2, +2) 
IPO cohort year=1997 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





























































       Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Adjusted R-squared -0.16 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel J: Table 29. Combined wealth effect and factors for family characteristics 
Panel J.1 (-1, +1) (-2, +2) Panel J.2 (-1, +1) (-2, +2) 
IPO cohort year=1993 (1) (2) IPO cohort year=1997 (1) (2) 















      Control variables Yes Yes Control variables Yes Yes 
Observations 66 66 Observations 49 49 
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.10 Adjusted R-squared -0.18 -0.16 
Year dummies Yes Yes Year dummies Yes Yes 
Panel K: Table 31. Family characteristics and investments: R&D component 
Panel K.1 R&D/(R&D+CAPEX)% Panel K.2 R&D/(R&D+CAPEX)% 
IPO cohort year=1993 (1) (2) (3) (4) IPO cohort year=1997 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family firm (0/1) -7.03**       Family firm (0/1) 4.43       
 
(-2.45) 
    
(1.05) 












































    
(-0.54) 








   
(-1.30) 
    
(1.78) 








   
(-2.80) 
    
(-0.42) 
 CEO hire (0/1) 
   
0.13 CEO hire (0/1) 
   
11.95** 
    
(0.04) 
    
(2.38) 
CEO founder (0/1) 
   
-5.21 CEO founder (0/1) 
   
6.63 
    
(-1.47) 
    
(1.19) 
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CEO descendant (0/1) 
   
-5.99 CEO descendant (0/1) 
   
1.31 
    
(-1.09) 
    
(0.12) 
          Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,250 3,250 3,250 3,250 Observations 1,988 1,988 1,988 1,988 
Adjusted R-squared 0.57 0.59 0.57 0.59 Adjusted R-squared 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.45 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel L: Table 33. Family factors and investments: R&D component 
Panel L.1 R&D/(R&D+CAPEX)% Panel L.2 R&D/(R&D+CAPEX)% 
IPO cohort year=1993 (1) (2) IPO cohort year=1997 (1) (2) 





 Factor 2 (Founder) above median (0/1) -3.58 
 
















 Factor 1 (Extended family) below median (0/1) 
 







Factor 2 (Founder) below median (0/1) 
 







Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) below 
median (0/1)  
-4.11 Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) below 






Factor 1, 2, or 3 below median (0/1) -3.09 
 






 Factor 1, 2, or 3 above median (0/1) 
 







Control variables Yes Yes Control variables Yes Yes 
Observations 3,250 3,250 Observations 1,988 1,988 
Adjusted R-squared 0.58 0.58 Adjusted R-squared 0.44 0.44 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Ind. dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Year dummies Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Robust S.E. Yes Yes 
Table B-16. Replication of main results based on firm age at the IPO 
This table presents the main results of Tables 8 (Panel A), 11 (Panel B), 17 (Panel C), 19 (Panel D), 20 (Panel E), 24 
(Panel F), 25 (Panel G), 26 (Panel H), 28 (Panel I), 29 (Panel J), 31 (Panel K), and 33 (Panel L) based on firm age at 
the IPO.  The group of age <10 years at the IPO has 345 firms and 282 family firms.  The group of age≥10 years at 
the IPO has 259 firms and 228 family firms. 
Panel A: Table 8. Family control horizons: the impact of family factors 
Panel A.1 Hazard Ratio: Cox proportional hazards estimation 
Age<10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.74**     
 
(-2.28)     
Factor 2 (Founder) 0.77***     
 
(-2.67)     
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 1.10     
 
(0.99)     
# Nonfounder family executives  0.61*    
 
 (-1.67)    
# Nonfounder family directors   0.66   
 
  (-1.55)   
Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%)    0.98*  
 
   (-1.90)  
Family descendant (0/1)     0.90 
 
    (-0.28) 
Founder CEO (0/1)  0.65**    
 
 (-2.24)    
Founder Chair (0/1)   0.76   
 
  (-1.41)   
Founder's cash flow rights (%)    0.99** 0.99* 
 
   (-2.18) (-1.91) 
Family firm name (0/1)  0.72 0.71 0.78 0.69 
 
 (-0.75) (-0.79) (-0.57) (-0.89) 
Family ownership wedge  1.03** 1.03*** 1.03** 1.03*** 
 
 (2.57) (2.93) (2.37) (2.87) 
 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of subjects 271 271 271 271 271 
No. of events 142 142 142 142 142 
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Panel A.2 Hazard Ratio: Cox proportional hazards estimation 
Age≥10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.87 
    
 
(-1.21) 
    Factor 2 (Founder) 0.75** 
    
 
(-2.54) 
    Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 1.13     
 
(1.08)     
# Nonfounder family executives  1.03    
 
 (0.12)    
# Nonfounder family directors   0.84   
 
  (-1.10)   
Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%)    0.98*  
 
   (-1.71)  
Family descendant (0/1)     0.55* 
 
    (-1.68) 
Founder CEO (0/1)  0.72    
 
 (-1.56)    
Founder Chair (0/1)   0.79   
 
  (-1.04)   
Founder's cash flow rights (%)    0.98*** 0.98*** 
 
   (-3.30) (-2.91) 
Family firm name (0/1)  1.23 1.26 1.32 1.26 
 
 (0.67) (0.77) (0.87) (0.74) 
Family ownership wedge  1.01 1.02 1.02 1.02 
 
 (0.75) (0.86) (1.00) (1.30) 
 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. 221 221 221 221 221 
No. of subjects 119 119 119 119 119 
No. of events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 













Table B-16 – Continued 
Panel B: Table 11. Family firm evolution outcomes in t+1: family exit and family firm failure 
Relative Risk Ratio from multinomial  logit regression, outcome: 1=family exit, 2=family firm failure 
Panel B.1 Age<10 at the IPO (1) (2) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.68** 0.98 
 
(-2.15) (-0.12) 
Factor 2 (Founder) 0.57*** 0.98 
 
(-5.05) (-0.13) 





Control variables Yes Yes 
Observations 1,904 1,904 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.16 0.16 
Panel B.2 Age≥10 at the IPO (1) (2) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.65** 0.89 
 
(-2.50) (-0.54) 
Factor 2 (Founder) 0.49*** 0.71 
 
(-5.49) (-1.46) 





Control variables Yes Yes 
Observations 1,740 1,740 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.17 0.17 
Continued on next page 
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Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q with book 
equity>0 






Age<10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) 0.30*  0.18  0.24  0.33**  
 
(1.87)  (1.30)  (1.50)  (2.11)  
Total family cash flow rights (%)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
 (0.59)  (0.51)  (0.11)  (0.69) 
Family excess voting rights (0/1) -0.73***  -0.86***  -0.79***  -0.76***  
 
(-5.03)  (-6.83)  (-5.89)  (-5.33)  
Family excess voting rights (%)  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02*** 
 
 (-4.58)  (-5.05)  (-4.39)  (-4.61) 
Family CEO (0/1) -0.09 -0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.07 0.02 -0.12 -0.02 
 
(-0.65) (-0.01) (-0.10) (0.33) (-0.50) (0.17) (-0.87) (-0.14) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,231 2,231 2,231 2,231 2,111 2,111 2,210 2,210 
Adjusted R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.30 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q with book 
equity>0 






Age≥10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) -0.17  -0.11  -0.17  -0.15  
 
(-1.49)  (-1.11)  (-1.61)  (-1.33)  
Total family cash flow rights (%)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
 (0.53)  (0.70)  (0.54)  (0.60) 
Family excess voting rights (0/1) -0.67***  -0.70***  -0.62***  -0.68***  
 
(-2.98)  (-3.38)  (-2.95)  (-3.10)  
Family excess voting rights (%)  -0.02**  -0.02***  -0.02**  -0.02** 
 
 (-2.44)  (-2.87)  (-2.47)  (-2.57) 
       Continued on next page 
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Family CEO (0/1) -0.09 -0.21 -0.07 -0.18 -0.05 -0.18 -0.08 -0.21 
 
(-0.73) (-1.56) (-0.66) (-1.44) (-0.48) (-1.43) (-0.73) (-1.54) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,518 2,518 2,518 2,518 2,436 2,436 2,510 2,510 
Adjusted R-squared 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel D: Table 19. Tobin’s Q and family characteristics (specification following Anderson and Reeb, 2003) 
Panel D.1 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q with book 
equity>0 






Age<10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) 0.23  0.17  0.18  0.24  
 
(1.44)  (1.29)  (1.21)  (1.56)  
CEO hire (0/1)  0.30*  0.21  0.25  0.32* 
 
 (1.71)  (1.51)  (1.46)  (1.89) 
CEO founder (0/1)  0.19  0.14  0.14  0.19 
 
 (1.06)  (0.93)  (0.85)  (1.09) 
CEO descendant (0/1)  -0.51**  -0.23  -0.27  -0.46** 
 
 (-2.16)  (-1.19)  (-1.33)  (-1.97) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,349 2,349 2,349 2,349 2,223 2,223 2,325 2,325 
Adjusted R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel D.2 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q with book 
equity>0 






Age≥10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) -0.32***  -0.26***  -0.27**  -0.29*** 
 
 
(-2.89)  (-2.68)  (-2.57)  (-2.74) 
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CEO hire (0/1)  -0.25*  -0.19*  -0.24*  -0.23* 
 
 (-1.96)  (-1.74)  (-1.94)  (-1.83) 
CEO founder (0/1)  -0.32**  -0.26**  -0.27**  -0.30** 
 
 (-2.46)  (-2.22)  (-2.13)  (-2.34) 
CEO descendant (0/1)  -0.54***  -0.45***  -0.43***  -0.52*** 
 
 (-4.11)  (-3.64)  (-3.29)  (-3.98) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,585 2,585 2,585 2,585 2,502 2,502 2,576 2,576 
Adjusted R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.22 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






ROA adj. for 
init. book equity 
ROA adj. for 









Age<10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) -2.40  -0.95  -1.43  -2.32  
 
(-1.16)  (-0.66)  (-0.78)  (-1.26)  
CEO hire (0/1)  -3.12  -1.27  -1.71  -3.26 
 
 (-1.40)  (-0.80)  (-0.84)  (-1.61) 
CEO founder (0/1)  -2.47  -1.24  -1.95  -2.08 
 
 (-1.06)  (-0.76)  (-0.95)  (-1.01) 
CEO descendant (0/1)  14.52***  11.92***  13.29***  13.41*** 
 
 (3.39)  (3.61)  (3.37)  (3.39) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,348 2,348 2,348 2,348 2,224 2,224 2,324 2,324 
Adjusted R-squared 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.48 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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ROA adj. for 
init. book equity 
ROA adj. for 









Age≥10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) -0.48  -0.76  -0.12  -0.78  
 
(-0.43)  (-0.94)  (-0.12)  (-0.74)  
CEO hire (0/1)  -0.05  -0.37  0.34  -0.29 
 
 (-0.04)  (-0.40)  (0.31)  (-0.24) 
CEO founder (0/1)  -0.67  -1.06  -0.41  -1.01 
 
 (-0.54)  (-1.15)  (-0.35)  (-0.84) 
CEO descendant (0/1)  -1.33  -1.05  -0.67  -1.76 
 
 (-0.74)  (-0.80)  (-0.39)  (-1.02) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,590 2,590 2,589 2,589 2,505 2,505 2,581 2,581 
Adjusted R-squared 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.37 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel F: Table 24. Tobin’s Q in firm fixed effects regressions (specification based on Villalonga and Amit, 2006) 
Panel F.1 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 















Age<10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total family cash flow rights (%) -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
 
(-1.34)  (-1.32)  (-0.96)  (-1.29)  
Factor 1 (Extended family)  -0.02  -0.00  -0.01  -0.02 
 
 (-0.08)  (-0.02)  (-0.06)  (-0.10) 
Factor 2 (Founder)  -0.05  -0.06  -0.09  -0.05 
 
 (-0.36)  (-0.57)  (-0.72)  (-0.41) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control)  -0.16  -0.09  -0.17  -0.16 
 
 (-0.96)  (-0.78)  (-1.05)  (-0.98) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       Continued on next page 
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Observations 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,630 1,630 1,713 1,713 
Number of firms 260 260 260 260 259 259 256 256 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 
Panel F.2 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 















Age≥10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total family cash flow rights (%) -0.02***  -0.02**  -0.02***  -0.02***  
 
(-2.98)  (-2.53)  (-2.87)  (-2.94)  
Factor 1 (Extended family)  -0.07  -0.07  -0.06  -0.07 
 
 (-0.92)  (-0.96)  (-0.88)  (-0.95) 
Factor 2 (Founder)  -0.11  -0.11  -0.11  -0.11 
 
 (-1.08)  (-1.06)  (-1.03)  (-1.06) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control)  -0.02  -0.05  -0.02  -0.02 
 
 (-0.15)  (-0.38)  (-0.19)  (-0.17) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,644 1,644 1,678 1,678 
Number of firms 218 218 218 218 217 217 217 217 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.22 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.21 
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Age<10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total family cash flow rights (%) 0.18*  0.09  0.11  0.13  
 
(1.68)  (0.87)  (0.86)  (1.34)  
Factor 1 (Extended family)  0.23  -0.49  0.18  0.69 
 
 (0.11)  (-0.41)  (0.09)  (0.42) 
Factor 2 (Founder)  -1.52  -1.16  -0.86  -0.94 
 
 (-0.62)  (-0.67)  (-0.38)  (-0.50) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control)  1.92  -0.06  0.81  0.94 
 
 (0.70)  (-0.04)  (0.35)  (0.39) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,791 1,791 1,868 1,868 
Number of firms 271 271 271 271 271 271 269 269 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
























Age≥10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total family cash flow rights (%) 0.13*  0.05  0.13**  0.10  
 
(1.90)  (1.17)  (2.27)  (1.61)  
Factor 1 (Extended family)  0.76  0.17  0.62  0.62 
 
 (0.91)  (0.23)  (0.77)  (0.78) 
Factor 2 (Founder)  0.17  -0.36  0.19  -0.08 
 
 (0.20)  (-0.53)  (0.25)  (-0.10) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control)  0.05  0.00  0.08  0.04 
 
 (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.03) 
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Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,740 1,740 1,740 1,740 1,702 1,702 1,738 1,738 
Number of firms 221 221 221 221 220 220 221 221 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.15 
Panel H: Table 26. Impact of family exit on firm performance (specification following Pagano et al., 1998) 
Panel H.1 Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 






ROA adj. for 





Age<10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      0.06 -0.12 0.11 0.02 -2.04 0.59 -1.62 -0.13 
 
(0.33) (-0.73) (0.62) (0.13) (-0.55) (0.23) (-0.54) (-0.04) 
        0.29 -0.06 0.20 0.16 -3.06 2.24 -0.94 0.12 
 
(0.95) (-0.27) (0.71) (0.58) (-0.57) (0.65) (-0.19) (0.02) 
        0.60* 0.12 0.47 0.34 -11.71 -2.12 -0.79 -1.63 
 
(1.76) (0.42) (1.47) (1.13) (-1.53) (-0.46) (-0.14) (-0.30) 
        1.16** 0.52 1.18** 0.88** -17.75 -7.96 -10.47 -9.68 
 
(2.27) (1.20) (2.23) (2.02) (-1.60) (-1.24) (-1.16) (-1.15) 
       (n≥4) 0.06 -0.12 0.11 0.02 -2.04 0.59 -1.62 -0.13 
 
(0.33) (-0.73) (0.62) (0.13) (-0.55) (0.23) (-0.54) (-0.04) 
 
        
Observations 728 728 691 712 789 789 725 757 
Number of firms 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 
F-test: post-exit dummies 
are jointly zero 
0.19 0.40 0.23 0.30 0.22 0.03 0.35 0.55 
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Panel H.2 Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 






ROA adj. for 





Age≥10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      0.11 0.01 0.08 0.09 -0.61 0.37 -0.88 -0.80 
 
(0.56) (0.08) (0.41) (0.48) (-0.27) (0.18) (-0.39) (-0.36) 
       -0.19 -0.22 -0.17 -0.22 -2.11 -0.78 -3.46 -1.13 
 
(-0.94) (-1.12) (-0.83) (-1.06) (-0.82) (-0.37) (-1.19) (-0.45) 
       0.24 -0.00 0.05 0.03 -4.88 -1.00 -1.86 -1.15 
 
(0.78) (-0.02) (0.21) (0.13) (-1.09) (-0.44) (-0.66) (-0.44) 
       0.14 0.06 0.10 0.12 -2.86 -1.85 -3.68 -3.06 
 
(0.39) (0.17) (0.27) (0.33) (-0.86) (-0.70) (-1.06) (-0.92) 
       (n≥4) -0.23 -0.31 -0.24 -0.22 -3.34 -0.96 -4.55 -4.00 
 
(-0.73) (-0.98) (-0.75) (-0.71) (-0.84) (-0.28) (-1.07) (-1.01) 
 
        
Observations 728 728 680 724 785 782 716 779 
Number of firms 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 
F-test: post-exit dummies 
are jointly zero 
0.19 0.32 0.50 0.30 0.83 0.97 0.59 0.79 
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Panel I: Table 28. Combined wealth effect and family characteristics 
Panel I.1 (-1, +1) (-1, +1) (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-2, +2) (-2, +2) 
Age<10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
# Family executives and directors 2.20   1.57   
 
(0.65)   (0.48)   
# Family descendants  1.28   1.10  
 
 (0.96)   (0.85)  
Total family cash flow rights (%)   0.01   -0.02 
 
  (0.05)   (-0.14) 
Family excess voting rights (%)   -0.49   -0.42 
 
  (-1.18)   (-1.05) 
Young family firms (0/1)   -6.83   -5.03 
(age<9 years)   (-1.41)   (-1.07) 
CEO founder (0/1)   -4.53   -4.79 
 
  (-1.36)   (-1.47) 
CEO descendant (0/1)   4.95   5.14 
 
  (0.38)   (0.40) 
 
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 
Adjusted R-squared -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.08 0.09 0.11 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel I.2 (-1, +1) (-1, +1) (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-2, +2) (-2, +2) 
Age≥10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
# Family executives and directors -0.22   0.85   
 
(-0.12)   (0.41)   
# Family descendants  -0.19   0.55  
 
 (-0.13)   (0.33)  
Total family cash flow rights (%)   -0.08   -0.10 
 
  (-0.79)   (-0.87) 
Family excess voting rights (%)   0.04   -0.04 
 
  (0.22)   (-0.16) 
Young family firms (0/1)   -4.32   -2.89 
(age<9 years)   (-1.19)   (-0.66) 
CEO founder (0/1)   -7.45   -3.53 
 
  (-1.20)   (-0.47) 
CEO descendant (0/1) -0.22   0.85   
 
(-0.12)   (0.41)   
 
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54 
Adjusted R-squared -0.34 -0.34 -0.29 -0.34 -0.34 -0.41 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel J: Table 29. Combined wealth effect and factors for family characteristics 
Panel J.1 (-1, +1) (-2, +2) Panel J.2 (-1, +1) (-2, +2) 
Age<10 at the IPO (1) (2) Age≥10 at the IPO (1) (2) 



















Control variables Yes Yes Control variables Yes Yes 
Observations 66 66 Observations 54 54 
Adjusted R-squared -0.06 0.07 Adjusted R-squared -0.41 -0.44 
Year dummies Yes Yes Year dummies Yes Yes 
Panel K: Table 31. Family characteristics and investments: R&D component 
Panel K.1 R&D/(R&D+CAPEX)% Panel K.2 R&D/(R&D+CAPEX)% 
Age<10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) Age≥10 at the IPO (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family firm (0/1) -1.59    Family firm (0/1) -5.78*    
 
(-0.47)    
 
(-1.79)    
Total family cash flow rights (%)  -0.31***  -0.38*** Total family cash flow rights (%)  -0.17*  -0.19* 
 
 (-3.60)  (-3.96) 
 
 (-1.88)  (-1.89) 
Family excess voting rights (%)  -0.46*  -0.46 Family excess voting rights (%)  -0.21  -0.21 
 
 (-1.68)  (-1.63) 
 
 (-1.16)  (-1.16) 
Family CEO (0/1)  -1.49   Family CEO (0/1)  -5.72*   
 
 (-0.47)   
 
 (-1.84)   
Lone founder (0/1)   3.49  Lone founder (0/1)   -3.47  
 
  (0.98)  
 
  (-0.87)  
Multiple family members (0/1)   -8.99**  Multiple family members (0/1)   -7.91**  
 
  (-2.17)  
 
  (-2.20)  
CEO hire (0/1)    5.58 CEO hire (0/1)    2.22 
 
   (1.54) 
 
   (0.54) 
CEO founder (0/1)    2.08 CEO founder (0/1)    -4.11 
 
   (0.48) 
 
   (-0.97) 
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CEO descendant (0/1)    12.88 CEO descendant (0/1)    -5.72 
 
   (1.32) 
 
   (-1.03) 
 
    
 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,751 2,751 2,751 2,751 Observations 2,787 2,787 2,787 2,787 
Adjusted R-squared 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.56 Adjusted R-squared 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.47 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel L: Table 33. Family factors and investments: R&D component 
Panel L.1 R&D/(R&D+CAPEX)% Panel L.2 R&D/(R&D+CAPEX)% 
Age<10 at the IPO (1) (2) Age≥10 at the IPO (1) (2) 










Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) above 
median (0/1) 
-2.79  Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) above 
median (0/1) 
0.40  
(-0.97)  (0.14)  










Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) below 
median (0/1) 
 1.45 Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) below 
median (0/1) 
 -3.83 
 (0.50)  (-1.13) 










Control variables Yes Yes Control variables Yes Yes 
Observations 2,751 2,751 Observations 2,787 2,787 
Adjusted R-squared 0.55 0.55 Adjusted R-squared 0.46 0.46 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Ind. dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Year dummies Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Robust S.E. Yes Yes 
Table B-17. Replication of main results excluding certain industries 
This table presents the main results of Tables 8 (Panel A), 11 (Panel B), 17 (Panel C), 19 (Panel D), 20 (Panel E), 24 
(Panel F), 25 (Panel G), 26 (Panel H), 28 (Panel I), 29 (Panel J), 31 (Panel K), and 33 (Panel L) after excluding two 
industries.  The two industries are Chemicals (FF Industry Code=6), which has three firms but has no family exit, 
and Transportation (FF Industry Code=13), which has 10 firms but has no family maintaining control.  
Panel A: Table 8. Family control horizons: the impact of family factors 
 
Hazard Ratio: Cox proportional hazards estimation 
No Ind. 6 or 13 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.83**     
 
(-2.21)     
Factor 2 (Founder) 0.80***     
 
(-3.17)     
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) 1.11     
 
(1.46)     
# Nonfounder family executives  0.86    
 
 (-0.97)    
# Nonfounder family directors   0.78*   
 
  (-1.74)   
Nonfounder family members' cash flow rights (%)    0.98**  
 
   (-2.46)  
Family descendant (0/1)     0.73 
 
    (-1.19) 
Founder CEO (0/1)  0.73**    
 
 (-2.34)    
Founder Chair (0/1)   0.81   
 
  (-1.51)   
Founder's cash flow rights (%)    0.99*** 0.99*** 
 
   (-3.78) (-3.29) 
Family firm name (0/1)  0.98 1.00 1.10 0.97 
 
 (-0.07) (0.01) (0.40) (-0.12) 
Family ownership wedge  1.02** 1.02** 1.02** 1.03** 
 
 (2.25) (2.38) (2.13) (2.45) 
 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,514 3,514 3,514 3,514 3,514 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of subjects 481 481 481 481 481 
No. of events 256 256 256 256 256 







Table B-17 – Continued 
Panel B: Table 11. Family firm evolution outcomes in t+1: family exit and family firm failure 
Relative Risk Ratio from multinomial  logit regression, outcome: 1=family exit, 2=family firm failure 
No Ind. 6 or 13 (1) (2) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.66*** 0.88 
 
(-3.52) (-0.90) 
Factor 2 (Founder) 0.56*** 0.88 
 
(-7.26) (-1.05) 





Control variables Yes Yes 
Observations 3,520 3,520 
IPO cohort dummies Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.14 0.14 
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Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q with book 
equity>0 






No Ind. 6 or 13 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) 0.07  0.04  0.05  0.10  
 
(0.71)  (0.47)  (0.48)  (0.99)  
Total family cash flow rights (%)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
 (1.06)  (1.30)  (0.90)  (1.15) 
Family excess voting rights (0/1) -0.58***  -0.69***  -0.57***  -0.60***  
 
(-3.63)  (-5.29)  (-3.74)  (-3.78)  
Family excess voting rights (%)  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.01***  -0.02*** 
 
 (-2.88)  (-4.12)  (-2.89)  (-2.94) 
Family CEO (0/1) -0.12 -0.14 -0.04 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 -0.14 -0.15 
 
(-1.24) (-1.44) (-0.45) (-0.91) (-0.99) (-1.23) (-1.44) (-1.57) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,589 4,589 4,589 4,589 4,407 4,407 4,562 4,562 
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel D: Table 19. Tobin’s Q and family characteristics (specification following Anderson and Reeb, 2003) 
 
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 
Q with book 
equity>0 






No Ind. 6 or 13 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) -0.05  -0.03  -0.04  -0.04  
 
(-0.53)  (-0.34)  (-0.45)  (-0.39)  
CEO hire (0/1)  0.05  0.03  0.03  0.07 
 
 (0.47)  (0.30)  (0.31)  (0.66) 
CEO founder (0/1)  -0.10  -0.05  -0.08  -0.09 
 
 (-0.90)  (-0.52)  (-0.79)  (-0.85) 
CEO descendant (0/1)  -0.39***  -0.23**  -0.23**  -0.36*** 
 
 (-3.15)  (-2.25)  (-2.15)  (-3.05) 
 
      Continued on next page 
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Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,774 4,774 4,774 4,774 4,585 4,585 4,743 4,743 
Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.18 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






ROA adj. for 
init. book equity 
ROA adj. for 









No Ind. 6 or 13 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family firm (0/1) -0.78  -0.44  -0.25  -0.92  
 
(-0.70)  (-0.55)  (-0.25)  (-0.92)  
CEO hire (0/1)  -1.81  -0.84  -0.75  -1.98* 
 
 (-1.43)  (-0.90)  (-0.65)  (-1.70) 
CEO founder (0/1)  -0.33  -0.45  -0.24  -0.38 
 
 (-0.26)  (-0.49)  (-0.21)  (-0.33) 
CEO descendant (0/1)  2.64  2.03  2.62  2.09 
 
 (1.12)  (1.14)  (1.20)  (0.95) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,778 4,778 4,777 4,777 4,589 4,589 4,747 4,747 
Adjusted R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.47 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel F: Table 24. Tobin’s Q in firm fixed effects regressions (specification based on Villalonga and Amit, 2006) 
 Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for 
init. book 
equity 















No Ind. 6 or 13 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total family cash flow rights (%) -0.02***  -0.01**  -0.01***  -0.02***  
 
(-3.04)  (-2.49)  (-2.64)  (-3.00)  
      Continued on next page 
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Factor 1 (Extended family)  -0.14*  -0.11  -0.12  -0.14* 
 
 (-1.82)  (-1.56)  (-1.61)  (-1.86) 
Factor 2 (Founder)  -0.09  -0.08  -0.11  -0.09 
 
 (-1.03)  (-1.09)  (-1.33)  (-1.09) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control)  -0.08  -0.08  -0.09  -0.08 
 
 (-0.84)  (-1.01)  (-1.05)  (-0.86) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,284 3,284 3,284 3,284 3,164 3,164 3,269 3,269 
Number of firms 465 465 465 465 463 463 461 461 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.22 
























No Ind. 6 or 13 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total family cash flow rights (%) 0.24***  0.08  0.16**  0.18***  
 
(3.71)  (1.57)  (2.50)  (2.96)  
Factor 1 (Extended family)  0.68  -0.36  0.11  0.49 
 
 (0.68)  (-0.54)  (0.13)  (0.58) 
Factor 2 (Founder)  0.08  -0.49  0.27  0.12 
 
 (0.06)  (-0.52)  (0.22)  (0.12) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control)  0.20  -0.17  -0.04  -0.00 
 
 (0.12)  (-0.18)  (-0.03)  (-0.00) 
 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,383 3,383 3,484 3,484 
Number of firms 481 481 481 481 480 480 479 479 
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Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.20 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.18 
Panel H: Table 26. Impact of family exit on firm performance (specification following Pagano et al., 1998) 
 Tobin's Q 
Q adj. for init. 
book equity 






ROA adj. for 





No Ind. 6 or 13 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
      0.08 -0.06 0.09 0.05 -1.07 0.87 -0.92 -0.07 
 
(0.62) (-0.48) (0.71) (0.35) (-0.47) (0.51) (-0.46) (-0.03) 
        0.07 -0.14 0.01 -0.03 -2.26 1.28 -1.54 -0.16 
 
(0.34) (-0.91) (0.06) (-0.16) (-0.75) (0.63) (-0.55) (-0.06) 
        0.43* 0.06 0.28 0.20 -7.60* -0.66 -0.39 -0.86 
 
(1.85) (0.30) (1.41) (1.04) (-1.68) (-0.25) (-0.12) (-0.28) 
        0.64** 0.30 0.65** 0.48* -9.42* -4.08 -5.88 -5.55 
 
(2.07) (1.09) (2.06) (1.72) (-1.72) (-1.22) (-1.29) (-1.30) 
       (n≥4) 0.49* 0.18 0.45 0.35 -9.69* -3.61 -6.00 -5.32 
 
(1.67) (0.67) (1.56) (1.28) (-1.75) (-0.93) (-1.24) (-1.22) 
 
        
Observations 1,418 1,418 1,343 1,398 1,532 1,529 1,410 1,495 
Number of firms 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within R-squared 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 
F-test: post-exit dummies 
are jointly zero 
0.14 0.22 0.15 0.18 0.24 0.13 0.31 0.49 
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Panel I: Table 28. Combined wealth effect and family characteristics 
 (-1, +1) (-1, +1) (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-2, +2) (-2, +2) 
No Ind. 6 or 13 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
# Family executives and directors 0.54   1.33   
 
(0.48)   (1.12)   
# Family descendants  0.67   0.87  
 
 (0.86)   (1.07)  
Total family cash flow rights (%)   0.04   0.01 
 
  (0.69)   (0.20) 
Family excess voting rights (%)   -0.03   0.01 
 
  (-0.20)   (0.04) 
Young family firms (0/1)   0.36   1.03 
(age<9 years)   (0.12)   (0.33) 
CEO founder (0/1)   -2.52   -2.42 
 
  (-1.31)   (-1.20) 
CEO descendant (0/1)   -3.31   -2.73 
 
  (-0.82)   (-0.65) 
 
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.03 -0.00 0.10 0.10 0.06 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel J: Table 29. Combined wealth effect and factors for family characteristics 
 (-1, +1) (-2, +2) 
No Ind. 6 or 13 (1) (2) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) 0.35 0.65 
 
(0.34) (0.60) 
Factor 2 (Founder) 0.06 -0.32 
 
(0.06) (-0.32) 





Control variables Yes Yes 
Observations 116 116 
Adjusted R-squared -0.00 0.07 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Panel K: Table 31. Family characteristics and investments: R&D component 
 R&D/(R&D+CAPEX)% 
No Ind. 6 or 13 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family firm (0/1) -3.41    
 
(-1.42)    
Total family cash flow rights (%)  -0.28***  -0.31*** 
 
 (-4.09)  (-4.26) 
Family excess voting rights (%)  -0.31**  -0.32** 
 
 (-2.03)  (-2.07) 
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Family CEO (0/1)  -3.33   
 
 (-1.46)   
Lone founder (0/1)   0.91  
 
  (0.32)  
Multiple family members (0/1)   -8.34***  
 
  (-3.07)  
CEO hire (0/1)    5.10* 
 
   (1.85) 
CEO founder (0/1)    0.08 
 
   (0.03) 
CEO descendant (0/1)    -0.43 
 
   (-0.08) 
 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,358 5,358 5,358 5,358 
Adjusted R-squared 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.52 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel L: Table 33. Family factors and investments: R&D component 
 R&D/(R&D+CAPEX)% 
No Ind. 6 or 13 (1) (2) 
Factor 1 (Extended family) above median (0/1) -9.00***  
 
(-3.39)  
Factor 2 (Founder) above median (0/1) -3.27  
 
(-1.25)  
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) above median (0/1) -0.26  
 
(-0.12)  
Factor 1 (Extended family) below median (0/1)  8.11*** 
 
 (3.00) 
Factor 2 (Founder) below median (0/1)  1.84 
 
 (0.73) 
Factor 3 (Private benefits of control) below median (0/1)  -1.47 
 
 (-0.66) 
Factor 1, 2, or 3 below median (0/1) 2.16  
 
(0.95)  
Factor 1, 2, or 3 above median (0/1)  -7.77*** 
 
 (-3.13) 
   
Control variables Yes Yes 
Observations 5,358 5,358 
Adjusted R-squared 0.51 0.51 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Robust S.E. Yes Yes 
 
